It is perhaps worth noting that the word “status” often gets used on LW to describe position in a social structure, with the understanding that individuals with higher status get various benefits (not always obvious ones), and that a lot of human behavior is designed to obtain/challenge/protect status even if the individual performing the behavior doesn’t consciously have that goal. I suspect that talking about the blue weasels as a high-status subgroup would not raise any eyebrows here, and would imply all the patterns you discuss here, even if talking about the “privilege” possessed by blue weasels raised hackles.
Somewhat to my amusement, I’ve gotten chastised for talking about status this way in communities of social activists, who “explained” to me that I was actually talking about privilege, and referring to it as status trivialized it.
Somewhat to my amusement, I’ve gotten chastised for talking about status this way in communities of social activists, who “explained” to me that I was actually talking about privilege, and referring to it as status trivialized it.
That’s an interesting complaint. It suggests that we might understand and talk about social organization in ways that’re denotationally familiar to these communities of social activists, whoever they are, but that certain connotations are customary in that space that aren’t customary here.
As others have noted I don’t think status is all that good a term for what’s going on in the weasel example, but insofar as our understanding of status does overlap with the activist scene’s understanding of privilege, I think this is a good argument for preferring our own framing. At least unless and until we can decide that we actually want those connotations.
I suspect that talking about the blue weasels as a high-status subgroup would not raise any eyebrows here,
I might object since this is an abuse of the concept of status. Status is about how a person is thought of by other people. It is not about who happens to benefit from an established Schelling point, especially if the group benefiting had nothing to do with establishing it.
Status is about how a person is thought of by other people.
I’m assuming it’s acceptable to treat weasels as “people” in this example. Can you clarify how, on your account, the way red weasels in this example are thought of by other weasels differs (or doesn’t differ) from the way blue weasels are thought of?
Can you clarify how, on your account, the way red weasels in this example are thought of by other weasels differs (or doesn’t differ) from the way blue weasels are thought of?
I don’t know, i.e., it’s not at all clear from the example, and that’s my point. Analyzing the example in terms of status doesn’t work.
It seems clear to me, for example, that red weasels are thought of in the example as possessing an abnormal temperature sense, and blue weasels are thought of as possessing a normal temperature sense. Would you disagree with this?
It seems clear to me, for example, that red weasels are thought of in the example as possessing an abnormal temperature sense, and blue weasels are thought of as possessing a normal temperature sense. Would you disagree with this?
Well fubarobfusco stipulated they are and it’s his hypothetical situation. Aside from that, I’m not sure what you’re asking.
As I mentioned here, I’d analyze the weasel example in terms of Schelling points. As fubarobfusco referred to the weasels using standard room temperature and citing Wikipedia, I assume the weasels chose their Schelling point based on human norms, most likely they’ve adopted any human norms wholesale in an attempt to emulate the successful human civilization. I realize I’ve just massively expended fubarobfusco’s hypothetical, but that’s the thing about Schelling points, they can make irrelevant aspects of the scenario relevant.
Well fubarobfusco stipulated they are and it’s his hypothetical situation. Aside from that, I’m not sure what you’re asking.
Yes, I agree that in fubarobfusco’s presentation of his hypothetical situation, the red red weasels are thought of in the example as possessing an abnormal temperature sense, and blue weasels are thought of as possessing a normal temperature sense. Which is why fubarobfusco’s presentation of his hypothetical situation seems to me to clearly provide enough information to determine at least some ways in which red weasels are thought of by other weasels differently from the way blue weasels are thought of. Which is why I was puzzled when you claimed fubarobfusco’s presentation didn’t provide enough information to determine that.
Hope that clarifies what I was asking. No further answer is required, though; I think I’ve gotten enough of a response.
WRT Schelling points, if properly understanding your analysis depends on reading Strategy of Conflict, I’ll defer further discussion until I’ve done so. Thanks for the pointer.
As fubarobfusco referred to the weasels using standard room temperature and citing Wikipedia, I assume the weasels chose their Schelling point based on human norms, most likely they’ve adopted any human norms wholesale in an attempt to emulate the successful human civilization.
I assumed the hypothetical took place in a world only populated by weasels, where Wikipedia was written by weasels, and the room temperature article ultimately reflected the historical thermostat setting standard set by blue weasels.
“Privilege” has two disadvantages vis-à-vis “status”, though. First, it suggests a binary distinction—privilege or no privilege -, as opposed to degrees of status. Second, status can be acquired, while the way I hear “privilege” used seems to exclude that.
Folks who use “privilege” as part of their usual vocabulary often note that people can have (and lack) different sorts of privilege, actually — for instance, racial, religious, or heterosexual privilege — that these are not projected onto a single dimension.
Yes, the usual term for this is “intersectionality,” but I have yet to see a good theory of how intersectionality actually works, that does not consist mainly of just repeating the word (as a teacher’s password).
Status does seem like a superior conceptual tool, for the reasons Creutzer cited. (It helps explain why, say, football players may have obvious ‘privilege’ only in certain situations and with certain people, and may actually be underprivileged in other situations.)
The only thing it is lacking is a widespread understanding & terminology to reflect the fact that people (especially high-status people) are often oblivious to status differentials & treat them as basic features of the universe.
The only thing it is lacking is a widespread understanding & terminology to reflect the fact that people (especially high-status people) are often oblivious to status differentials & treat them as basic features of the universe.
I’m not sure about that, in my experience it’s low status people who are more likely to treat status differentials as basic features of the universe. High status people seem to be more aware of status, as indicated by how much effort they put into fighting for it (mostly against other high status people).
Not sure. That may start to tie into Moldbug’s Cathedral a bit?
Alternatively, you may be ignoring the full scale. I’d say that the people most likely to ignore status or just consider it basic are those who are secure in their own status.
I didn’t say low status people ignore status, rather they tend to treat it as basic features of the universe, specifically I was referring to existentialism in this sense.
Yes, the usual term for this is “intersectionality,” but I have yet to see a good theory of how intersectionality actually works, that does not consist mainly of just repeating the word (as a teacher’s password).
As far I can tell, intersectionality is just the observation that if A is worse than Ā and E is worse than Ē, then AE is usually worse than ĀE and AĒ. Which of course isn’t always the case.
EDIT: IOW, intersectionality is the idea that this remotely makes sense.
Thinking about it I think the biggest problem with “intersectionality” and the concept of “privilege” in general is that it groups together many differences that actually have very little else in common and encourages people to apply ideas appropriate to one of these categories to others where they are frequently wildly inappropriate. To take three examples from the chart that are in some sense maximally different consider race, religion, and disability.
Race is an innate property that controversially correlates with certain abilities and behaviors. Disability is an innate property (or practical purposes at least) that perfectly and inherently correlates with ability. One way to see the difference between the two is to notice that a procedure that makes a blind person sighted is an unalloyed good that would more-or-less completely solve the problem, whereas a procedure that turns a black person’s skin white doesn’t solve any of the relevant problems.
Religion is a choice (subject to the person’s tradition). While there are in fact to reasons to avoid discriminating by religion except when its directly relevant they are somewhat different from the reasons for the other traits.
Religion is a choice (subject to the person’s tradition).
For some value of “choice” and “subject”, it is… OTOH, I think (though I’m extrapolating like hell, so I’m not very confident) that many fewer people convert to a different religion than dye their hair (at least among females), and still saying “hair colour is a choice (subject to the person’s genome)” would sound kind-of weird to me.
I frequently hear “privilege” used in ways that allow for it to be acquired or lost, and I frequently hear it used in ways that allow for different groups to have more or less privilege relative to one another (that is, degrees of privilege). But I’m willing to believe that other linguistic communities exist that behave as you describe.
Remember, just because people are using a term incorrectly does not mean that the term does not represent something empirically useful. In this case, the nuance between “Status” and “Privilege” is that “Privilege” is a special kind of status; it is status acquired based on group identity. There’s an entire branch of study called “Intersectionality” that touches precisely on the ideas that ‘privilege’ exists in degrees, can be gained and lost, and is often situational. Even there, though, there’s a lot of BS and politicking.
But remember that that doesn’t invalidate the usefulness of the concept, any more than “just-so stories” and BS justifications invalidate evolutionary psychology as a discipline. Intersectionality is clearly a fruitful area for cultural research that is in desperate need of a rationalist approach.
Intersectionality does need better rationalism. I’d add that some intersectioanlity has the drawback of fighting a War On Keeping Your Identity Small, and in many cases, when activist groups dedicated to a single purpose absorb the idea of intersectionality, they rapidly assimilate into the the greater Social Justice Bloc, with all the positives and all the negatives that entails. Furthermore, intersectionality sometimes appears to stand against utilitarian strict optimization.
Yes, one thing that bothers me about social justice folks is that they sometimes sound very essentialist (“they assume a homeless white man is more privileged than Oprah Winfrey”, as I’ve seen someone put it).
They do have their explanation there. The essentialim I have noticed usually comes from radical feminism (which is often taken to mean ‘extremist feminism’ but while nearly all radical feminists are extremist, the term when used by radical feminists actually refers to a specific and rather essentialist + one sided view of gender relations).
They have a tendancy to conceptualize patriarchy as a diffuse property of society that colors everything that even slightly involves gender, and tend to be unwilling to slice it up into its component parts. They also tend to ignore how immense the possible gender-relations-space is outside patriarchy/!patriarchy.
The thing I find most frustrating is how learning about intersectionality leads to groups being assimilated by the Equality Borg. It’s almost like an infohazard for progressives.
In this case, the nuance between “Status” and “Privilege” is that “Privilege” is a special kind of status; it is status acquired based on group identity.
I would like to point out that you’ve just swapped the definition of “privilege” from the one fubarobfusco gave to the one I mentioned in this comment.
It is perhaps worth noting that the word “status” often gets used on LW to describe position in a social structure, with the understanding that individuals with higher status get various benefits (not always obvious ones), and that a lot of human behavior is designed to obtain/challenge/protect status even if the individual performing the behavior doesn’t consciously have that goal. I suspect that talking about the blue weasels as a high-status subgroup would not raise any eyebrows here, and would imply all the patterns you discuss here, even if talking about the “privilege” possessed by blue weasels raised hackles.
Somewhat to my amusement, I’ve gotten chastised for talking about status this way in communities of social activists, who “explained” to me that I was actually talking about privilege, and referring to it as status trivialized it.
When in Rome, I endorse speaking Italian.
That’s an interesting complaint. It suggests that we might understand and talk about social organization in ways that’re denotationally familiar to these communities of social activists, whoever they are, but that certain connotations are customary in that space that aren’t customary here.
As others have noted I don’t think status is all that good a term for what’s going on in the weasel example, but insofar as our understanding of status does overlap with the activist scene’s understanding of privilege, I think this is a good argument for preferring our own framing. At least unless and until we can decide that we actually want those connotations.
I might object since this is an abuse of the concept of status. Status is about how a person is thought of by other people. It is not about who happens to benefit from an established Schelling point, especially if the group benefiting had nothing to do with establishing it.
I’m assuming it’s acceptable to treat weasels as “people” in this example. Can you clarify how, on your account, the way red weasels in this example are thought of by other weasels differs (or doesn’t differ) from the way blue weasels are thought of?
I don’t know, i.e., it’s not at all clear from the example, and that’s my point. Analyzing the example in terms of status doesn’t work.
OK; thanks for the clarification.
It seems clear to me, for example, that red weasels are thought of in the example as possessing an abnormal temperature sense, and blue weasels are thought of as possessing a normal temperature sense. Would you disagree with this?
Well fubarobfusco stipulated they are and it’s his hypothetical situation. Aside from that, I’m not sure what you’re asking.
As I mentioned here, I’d analyze the weasel example in terms of Schelling points. As fubarobfusco referred to the weasels using standard room temperature and citing Wikipedia, I assume the weasels chose their Schelling point based on human norms, most likely they’ve adopted any human norms wholesale in an attempt to emulate the successful human civilization. I realize I’ve just massively expended fubarobfusco’s hypothetical, but that’s the thing about Schelling points, they can make irrelevant aspects of the scenario relevant.
Yes, I agree that in fubarobfusco’s presentation of his hypothetical situation, the red red weasels are thought of in the example as possessing an abnormal temperature sense, and blue weasels are thought of as possessing a normal temperature sense. Which is why fubarobfusco’s presentation of his hypothetical situation seems to me to clearly provide enough information to determine at least some ways in which red weasels are thought of by other weasels differently from the way blue weasels are thought of. Which is why I was puzzled when you claimed fubarobfusco’s presentation didn’t provide enough information to determine that.
Hope that clarifies what I was asking. No further answer is required, though; I think I’ve gotten enough of a response.
WRT Schelling points, if properly understanding your analysis depends on reading Strategy of Conflict, I’ll defer further discussion until I’ve done so. Thanks for the pointer.
I assumed the hypothetical took place in a world only populated by weasels, where Wikipedia was written by weasels, and the room temperature article ultimately reflected the historical thermostat setting standard set by blue weasels.
“Privilege” has two disadvantages vis-à-vis “status”, though. First, it suggests a binary distinction—privilege or no privilege -, as opposed to degrees of status. Second, status can be acquired, while the way I hear “privilege” used seems to exclude that.
Folks who use “privilege” as part of their usual vocabulary often note that people can have (and lack) different sorts of privilege, actually — for instance, racial, religious, or heterosexual privilege — that these are not projected onto a single dimension.
Yes, the usual term for this is “intersectionality,” but I have yet to see a good theory of how intersectionality actually works, that does not consist mainly of just repeating the word (as a teacher’s password).
Status does seem like a superior conceptual tool, for the reasons Creutzer cited. (It helps explain why, say, football players may have obvious ‘privilege’ only in certain situations and with certain people, and may actually be underprivileged in other situations.)
The only thing it is lacking is a widespread understanding & terminology to reflect the fact that people (especially high-status people) are often oblivious to status differentials & treat them as basic features of the universe.
I’m not sure about that, in my experience it’s low status people who are more likely to treat status differentials as basic features of the universe. High status people seem to be more aware of status, as indicated by how much effort they put into fighting for it (mostly against other high status people).
Not sure. That may start to tie into Moldbug’s Cathedral a bit?
Alternatively, you may be ignoring the full scale. I’d say that the people most likely to ignore status or just consider it basic are those who are secure in their own status.
I didn’t say low status people ignore status, rather they tend to treat it as basic features of the universe, specifically I was referring to existentialism in this sense.
As far I can tell, intersectionality is just the observation that if A is worse than Ā and E is worse than Ē, then AE is usually worse than ĀE and AĒ. Which of course isn’t always the case.
EDIT: IOW, intersectionality is the idea that this remotely makes sense.
Thinking about it I think the biggest problem with “intersectionality” and the concept of “privilege” in general is that it groups together many differences that actually have very little else in common and encourages people to apply ideas appropriate to one of these categories to others where they are frequently wildly inappropriate. To take three examples from the chart that are in some sense maximally different consider race, religion, and disability.
Race is an innate property that controversially correlates with certain abilities and behaviors. Disability is an innate property (or practical purposes at least) that perfectly and inherently correlates with ability. One way to see the difference between the two is to notice that a procedure that makes a blind person sighted is an unalloyed good that would more-or-less completely solve the problem, whereas a procedure that turns a black person’s skin white doesn’t solve any of the relevant problems.
Religion is a choice (subject to the person’s tradition). While there are in fact to reasons to avoid discriminating by religion except when its directly relevant they are somewhat different from the reasons for the other traits.
I agree with almost everything, but:
For some value of “choice” and “subject”, it is… OTOH, I think (though I’m extrapolating like hell, so I’m not very confident) that many fewer people convert to a different religion than dye their hair (at least among females), and still saying “hair colour is a choice (subject to the person’s genome)” would sound kind-of weird to me.
I frequently hear “privilege” used in ways that allow for it to be acquired or lost, and I frequently hear it used in ways that allow for different groups to have more or less privilege relative to one another (that is, degrees of privilege). But I’m willing to believe that other linguistic communities exist that behave as you describe.
Remember, just because people are using a term incorrectly does not mean that the term does not represent something empirically useful. In this case, the nuance between “Status” and “Privilege” is that “Privilege” is a special kind of status; it is status acquired based on group identity. There’s an entire branch of study called “Intersectionality” that touches precisely on the ideas that ‘privilege’ exists in degrees, can be gained and lost, and is often situational. Even there, though, there’s a lot of BS and politicking.
But remember that that doesn’t invalidate the usefulness of the concept, any more than “just-so stories” and BS justifications invalidate evolutionary psychology as a discipline. Intersectionality is clearly a fruitful area for cultural research that is in desperate need of a rationalist approach.
Mostly agreed.
Intersectionality does need better rationalism. I’d add that some intersectioanlity has the drawback of fighting a War On Keeping Your Identity Small, and in many cases, when activist groups dedicated to a single purpose absorb the idea of intersectionality, they rapidly assimilate into the the greater Social Justice Bloc, with all the positives and all the negatives that entails. Furthermore, intersectionality sometimes appears to stand against utilitarian strict optimization.
Yes, one thing that bothers me about social justice folks is that they sometimes sound very essentialist (“they assume a homeless white man is more privileged than Oprah Winfrey”, as I’ve seen someone put it).
They do have their explanation there. The essentialim I have noticed usually comes from radical feminism (which is often taken to mean ‘extremist feminism’ but while nearly all radical feminists are extremist, the term when used by radical feminists actually refers to a specific and rather essentialist + one sided view of gender relations).
They have a tendancy to conceptualize patriarchy as a diffuse property of society that colors everything that even slightly involves gender, and tend to be unwilling to slice it up into its component parts. They also tend to ignore how immense the possible gender-relations-space is outside patriarchy/!patriarchy.
The thing I find most frustrating is how learning about intersectionality leads to groups being assimilated by the Equality Borg. It’s almost like an infohazard for progressives.
I would like to point out that you’ve just swapped the definition of “privilege” from the one fubarobfusco gave to the one I mentioned in this comment.
Yup, agreed with all of this. (Not sure if you thought otherwise.)