FWIW, while I am as certain as I can reasonably be that 2+2=4, This is not a foundational assumption. I wasn’t born knowing it. I arrived at it based on evidence acquired over time, and if I started encountering different evidence, I would eventually change my mind. See https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/6FmqiAgS8h4EJm86s/how-to-convince-me-that-2-2-3
Also, the reason that “Every assumption is incorrect unless there is evidence” isn’t “basic logic” is that “correct” and “incorrect” are not the right categories. Both a statement and its competing hypotheses are claims to which rational minds assign credences/probabilities that are neither zero nor one, for any finite level of evidence. A mind is built with assumptions that govern its operation, and some of those assumptions may be impossible for the mind itself to want to change or choose to change, but anything else that the mind is capable of representing and considering is fair game in the right environment.
This is a question that’s many reasoning steps into a discussion that’s well developed. Maxentropy priors, Solomonoff priors, uniform priors, there are good reasons to choose each depending on context, take your pick depending on the full set of hypotheses under consideration. Part of the answer is “There’s basically no such thing as no evidence if you have any reason to be considering a hypothesis at all.” Part is “It doesn’t matter that much as long as your choice isn’t actively perverse, because as long as you correctly update your priors over time, you’ll approach the correct probability eventually.”
I agree that you can refute Pascal’s Wager with anti-Pascal’s Wager. But if you evaluate all wagers and anti-wagers you are left with power seeking. It is always better to have more power. Don’t you agree?
No, I don’t, you aren’t, and I don’t, in that order.
If you agree that I can refute Pascal’s Wager then I don’t actually “face” it.
If I refute it, I’m not left with power seeking, I’m left with the same complete set of goals and options I had before we considered Pascal’s Wager. Those never went away.
And more power is better all else equal, but all else is not equal when I’m trading off effort and resources among plans and actions. So, it does not follow that seeking more power is always the best option.
FWIW, while I am as certain as I can reasonably be that 2+2=4, This is not a foundational assumption. I wasn’t born knowing it. I arrived at it based on evidence acquired over time, and if I started encountering different evidence, I would eventually change my mind. See https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/6FmqiAgS8h4EJm86s/how-to-convince-me-that-2-2-3
Also, the reason that “Every assumption is incorrect unless there is evidence” isn’t “basic logic” is that “correct” and “incorrect” are not the right categories. Both a statement and its competing hypotheses are claims to which rational minds assign credences/probabilities that are neither zero nor one, for any finite level of evidence. A mind is built with assumptions that govern its operation, and some of those assumptions may be impossible for the mind itself to want to change or choose to change, but anything else that the mind is capable of representing and considering is fair game in the right environment.
What is the probability if there is no evidence?
This is a question that’s many reasoning steps into a discussion that’s well developed. Maxentropy priors, Solomonoff priors, uniform priors, there are good reasons to choose each depending on context, take your pick depending on the full set of hypotheses under consideration. Part of the answer is “There’s basically no such thing as no evidence if you have any reason to be considering a hypothesis at all.” Part is “It doesn’t matter that much as long as your choice isn’t actively perverse, because as long as you correctly update your priors over time, you’ll approach the correct probability eventually.”
And here you face Pascal’s Wager.
I agree that you can refute Pascal’s Wager with anti-Pascal’s Wager. But if you evaluate all wagers and anti-wagers you are left with power seeking. It is always better to have more power. Don’t you agree?
No, I don’t, you aren’t, and I don’t, in that order.
If you agree that I can refute Pascal’s Wager then I don’t actually “face” it.
If I refute it, I’m not left with power seeking, I’m left with the same complete set of goals and options I had before we considered Pascal’s Wager. Those never went away.
And more power is better all else equal, but all else is not equal when I’m trading off effort and resources among plans and actions. So, it does not follow that seeking more power is always the best option.