I like your interpretation of philosophy as it pertains to ethics, aesthetics, and perhaps metaphysics. Your Socrates example, and LW in general, privileges emotivist ethics, but this is an interesting point and not a drawback. Looking at ethics as a cognitive science is not necessarily a flawed approach, but it is important to consider the potential alternative models.
Philosophy has a branch called “philosophy of science” where your dissolution falls apart. Popperian falsifiability, Kuhnian paradigm shifts, and Bayesian reasoning all fall into this domain. There is a great compendium by Curd and Cover; I recommend searching the table of contents for essays also available online. Here, philosophers experiment with the precision of testable models rather than hypotheses.
Yes, I may have made an inferential leap here that was wrong or unnecessary. You and I agree very strongly on there being a distinction between Philosophy of Science and Experimental Philosophy. I wanted to draw a distinction between the kind of, “street philosophy” done by Socrates and the more rigorous, mathematical Philosophy of Science. “Experiment” may not have been the most appropriate verbiage.
I would be glad to reconsider my stance that this rationalist community privileges emotivist readings of ethics. I will begin looking into this. My reason for including this argument is the idea (from the article) that when philosophers ask questions about right and wrong or good and bad, they are really asking how people feel about these concepts.
street philosophy” done by Socrates and the more rigorous, mathematical Philosophy of Science.
PoSc done by analyticals is no more rigorous than other analytical philosophy, and PoSc done by continentals is no more rigorous that other continental.
Socrates and co were the analyticals of their day......let not the ungeometered enter the Academy.… with the role of the continentals being taken by the Sophists.
Well said again, and well-considered that ideas in minds can only move forwards through time (not a physical law). My initial reaction to this article was, “What about philosophy of science?” However, it seems my PoSc objections extend to other realms of philosophy as well. Thank you for leading me here.
Popperian falsifiability, Kuhnian paradigm shifts, and Bayesian reasoning all fall into this domain. There is a great compendium by Curd and Cover; I recommend searching the table of contents for essays also available online. Here, philosophers experiment with the precision of testable models rather than hypotheses.
Could you explain to me in what extend Popper provided a precise model that’s testable?
Popper (or Popperism) predicted that falsifiable models would yield more information than non-falsifiable ones.
I don’t think this is precisely testable, but it references precisely testable models. That is why I would categorize it as philosophy (of science), but not science.
I like your interpretation of philosophy as it pertains to ethics, aesthetics, and perhaps metaphysics. Your Socrates example, and LW in general, privileges emotivist ethics, but this is an interesting point and not a drawback. Looking at ethics as a cognitive science is not necessarily a flawed approach, but it is important to consider the potential alternative models.
Philosophy has a branch called “philosophy of science” where your dissolution falls apart. Popperian falsifiability, Kuhnian paradigm shifts, and Bayesian reasoning all fall into this domain. There is a great compendium by Curd and Cover; I recommend searching the table of contents for essays also available online. Here, philosophers experiment with the precision of testable models rather than hypotheses.
Nope.
You know Philosophy of Science is a different thing to Experimental Philosophy , right?
Yes, I may have made an inferential leap here that was wrong or unnecessary. You and I agree very strongly on there being a distinction between Philosophy of Science and Experimental Philosophy. I wanted to draw a distinction between the kind of, “street philosophy” done by Socrates and the more rigorous, mathematical Philosophy of Science. “Experiment” may not have been the most appropriate verbiage.
I would be glad to reconsider my stance that this rationalist community privileges emotivist readings of ethics. I will begin looking into this. My reason for including this argument is the idea (from the article) that when philosophers ask questions about right and wrong or good and bad, they are really asking how people feel about these concepts.
PoSc done by analyticals is no more rigorous than other analytical philosophy, and PoSc done by continentals is no more rigorous that other continental.
Socrates and co were the analyticals of their day......let not the ungeometered enter the Academy.… with the role of the continentals being taken by the Sophists.
Well said again, and well-considered that ideas in minds can only move forwards through time (not a physical law). My initial reaction to this article was, “What about philosophy of science?” However, it seems my PoSc objections extend to other realms of philosophy as well. Thank you for leading me here.
Could you explain to me in what extend Popper provided a precise model that’s testable?
Popper (or Popperism) predicted that falsifiable models would yield more information than non-falsifiable ones.
I don’t think this is precisely testable, but it references precisely testable models. That is why I would categorize it as philosophy (of science), but not science.