I hazily recall that in the introduction to Benjamin Grahams “Intelligent Investor, “Buffett credits his former mentor with educating a group of stellar-performing security analysts and investors, among whom he counts himself.
Buffett has advised to read Graham, Fisher (Phil), and take it from there, so to speak. Easier said than done. Graham and Dodd’s 1934 classic, “Security Analysis,” for example, is comprised of 726 pages including its index. There is nothing seductively narrative, personal or hyperbolic about the book’s content. Rather, it states plainly that the function of security analysis is can be placed under the headings: descriptive, selective, and critical. Anyone who was serious about learning Buffett’s techniques, it seems obvious, should at least peruse books authored by his mentor while trying to internalize some of their lessons. Failure to do so constitutes a curious and telling omission.
Much of the run of management books fall into the groove of presenting engaging narratives based on ex post facto selection of protagonists. Buffett undoubtedly understands that while success is not random, it is fleeting. That understanding may be what motivates the perpetual search for talent.
Two other books of general interest on this topic include “The Halo Effect” by Phil Rosenzweig (on the specific delusions propagated in much excellence literature); and “Winning the Loser’s Game” by Charles Ellis (on the long-term futility of chasing outsize investment returns through a strategy based on active trading). Yes, it is possible to win by not losing when you are playing a loser’s game. But apparently for many, it’s simply easier to buy excellence porn and indulge in wishful thinking.
I hazily recall that in the introduction to Benjamin Grahams “Intelligent Investor, “Buffett credits his former mentor with educating a group of stellar-performing security analysts and investors, among whom he counts himself.
Buffett has advised to read Graham, Fisher (Phil), and take it from there, so to speak. Easier said than done. Graham and Dodd’s 1934 classic, “Security Analysis,” for example, is comprised of 726 pages including its index. There is nothing seductively narrative, personal or hyperbolic about the book’s content. Rather, it states plainly that the function of security analysis is can be placed under the headings: descriptive, selective, and critical. Anyone who was serious about learning Buffett’s techniques, it seems obvious, should at least peruse books authored by his mentor while trying to internalize some of their lessons. Failure to do so constitutes a curious and telling omission.
Much of the run of management books fall into the groove of presenting engaging narratives based on ex post facto selection of protagonists. Buffett undoubtedly understands that while success is not random, it is fleeting. That understanding may be what motivates the perpetual search for talent.
Two other books of general interest on this topic include “The Halo Effect” by Phil Rosenzweig (on the specific delusions propagated in much excellence literature); and “Winning the Loser’s Game” by Charles Ellis (on the long-term futility of chasing outsize investment returns through a strategy based on active trading). Yes, it is possible to win by not losing when you are playing a loser’s game. But apparently for many, it’s simply easier to buy excellence porn and indulge in wishful thinking.