I propose a following form of reductionism, which I call positivism:
For a theory to count as knowledge, it has to fit into the body of knowledge, there have to be links that can be mathematically traced to the “core theories”. The total, firm knowledge postulates a possible reality. There is no claim that the possible reality is real (therefore anti-realism). But for it to count as knowledge it has to be metaphysically possible, there could be reality exactly as described. Where we are not led to believe that a part of our experience or experiments or a theory has to be part of “reality exactly as described by the integrated theory including core theories”, that part of our knowledge hasn’t been reduced yet.
I propose a following form of reductionism, which I call positivism:
For a theory to count as knowledge, it has to fit into the body of knowledge, there have to be links that can be mathematically traced to the “core theories”. The total, firm knowledge postulates a possible reality. There is no claim that the possible reality is real (therefore anti-realism). But for it to count as knowledge it has to be metaphysically possible, there could be reality exactly as described. Where we are not led to believe that a part of our experience or experiments or a theory has to be part of “reality exactly as described by the integrated theory including core theories”, that part of our knowledge hasn’t been reduced yet.