I know that post and don’t think it invalidates my point. Its main point is that for a proposition to be meaningful it is not necessary that it can be verified directly, but it is often sufficient if the proposition is part of a logically coherent theory that is tested as a whole. This is not in conflict with the demand on difference in anticipated experiences from different beliefs: the hypothesis that a cheesecake materialised in the centre of the Sun may not be falsified by direct observation, but still is incompatible with the picture of the world dictated by perfectly testable and verified physical theories.
As a side note, the linked post has been criticised as strawmanning logical positivism.
I know that post and don’t think it invalidates my point. Its main point is that for a proposition to be meaningful it is not necessary that it can be verified directly, but it is often sufficient if the proposition is part of a logically coherent theory that is tested as a whole.
So what testable logically coherent theory is your main point a part of?
Do you want to read about the testable consequences of the belief that beliefs should have testable consequences, or was your question only rhetorical?
Do you want to read about the testable consequences of the belief that beliefs should have testable consequences, or was your question only rhetorical?
One testable consequence of the belief that beliefs should have testable consequences (let’s call it T) is that people who believe T will have higher percentage of true beliefs than people who don’t. Although this is not much a consequence of T as a more precise reformulation thereof.
Well, yes. That was basically pragmatist’s answer to my question which I have accepted.
It is a little bit disturbing since I am forced to give metaphysics more credit that I used to. The possible way out is to limit the testability criterion only to direct logical consequences of beliefs so that it doesn’t apply to “psychological” consequences of form “believing X increases likelihood of believing Y (even if there is no logical connection between X and Y)”. This might be a good idea but I am not sure where precisely to draw the line between direct and psychological consequences of beliefs.
To have an objective criterion for evaluating ideas in case my intuition is ifluenced by bias. To find out what exactly makes most metaphysics appear unsatisfactory and empty to me. Why are people concerned with formalising epistemology, after all?
By the way, you don’t need to link to the Sequences articles for me, I have read them all.
If I aim to apply the criterion “a theory is worthy only if it has direct logical testable consequences”, I better know what do I mean by “direct consequence”.
Not really.
I know that post and don’t think it invalidates my point. Its main point is that for a proposition to be meaningful it is not necessary that it can be verified directly, but it is often sufficient if the proposition is part of a logically coherent theory that is tested as a whole. This is not in conflict with the demand on difference in anticipated experiences from different beliefs: the hypothesis that a cheesecake materialised in the centre of the Sun may not be falsified by direct observation, but still is incompatible with the picture of the world dictated by perfectly testable and verified physical theories.
As a side note, the linked post has been criticised as strawmanning logical positivism.
So what testable logically coherent theory is your main point a part of?
Do you want to read about the testable consequences of the belief that beliefs should have testable consequences, or was your question only rhetorical?
I’d actually find that fascinating :)
Are they similar to this?
One testable consequence of the belief that beliefs should have testable consequences (let’s call it T) is that people who believe T will have higher percentage of true beliefs than people who don’t. Although this is not much a consequence of T as a more precise reformulation thereof.
You do realize you can apply that procedure to give any metaphysical belief testable consequences, including the one you were asking about here.
Well, yes. That was basically pragmatist’s answer to my question which I have accepted.
It is a little bit disturbing since I am forced to give metaphysics more credit that I used to. The possible way out is to limit the testability criterion only to direct logical consequences of beliefs so that it doesn’t apply to “psychological” consequences of form “believing X increases likelihood of believing Y (even if there is no logical connection between X and Y)”. This might be a good idea but I am not sure where precisely to draw the line between direct and psychological consequences of beliefs.
Why do you care?
To have an objective criterion for evaluating ideas in case my intuition is ifluenced by bias. To find out what exactly makes most metaphysics appear unsatisfactory and empty to me. Why are people concerned with formalising epistemology, after all?
By the way, you don’t need to link to the Sequences articles for me, I have read them all.
What do any of those have to do with where you “draw the line between direct and psychological consequences of beliefs”?
If I aim to apply the criterion “a theory is worthy only if it has direct logical testable consequences”, I better know what do I mean by “direct consequence”.