Am I supposed to be able to see it from just this? Assuming it’s not the kind of thing that would hurt LW posters can you explain? Otherwise, pm it?
I think I know what wedrifid is getting at, but I don’t think Pascal’s Wager would do it. Pascal’s Wager argues that one should act as if one believes in God because the costs are low and the potential benefits (Heaven) are high.
But in order to get to the particular failure state at which I think wedrifid is hinting, you can’t just be betting on God—you have to be absolutely certain that Heaven exists and that its joys outweigh on every axis everything that Earth has to offer. Most people, no matter what they say, are not that certain, which is why we don’t routinely slaughter infants in order to ensure their blameless souls entry into Heaven. (Similar logic has been invoked to rationalize murders—such as innocent deaths at witch trials—but in these cases, as a justification pasted on after the fact rather than an honest motive towards murder.)
But in order to get to the particular failure state at which I think wedrifid is hinting, you can’t just be betting on God—you have to be absolutely certain that Heaven exists
No, absolute certainty is definitely not required. The cost is increased so a proportionate increase in probability*payoff is required. But this is still all dwarfed by the arbitrarily large payoffs inherent in religious questions. The whole point of ‘afterlife’ focussed doctrine is to encourage the flock to discount all ‘earthly’ matters as trivial compared to eternal questions.
Most people, no matter what they say, are not that certain, which is why we don’t routinely slaughter infants in order to ensure their blameless souls entry into Heaven.
No, that would not be a rational reason to refrain from the slaughter. The difference between 90% sure and absolutely certain isn’t really much of a big deal when you have the chance of flipping the sign bit of an arbitrarily large disulility payoff (Hell). A 0.05% hunch would be more than enough.
Rational agents that really have arbitrarily large utility payoffs floating around in their utility function will inevitably do things that look insane to us.
No, absolute certainty is definitely not required. The cost is increased so a proportionate increase in probability*payoff is required.
Right, but now you’ve left the standard formulation of Pascal’s Wager. The original Pascal’s Wager includes the stipulation that one loses nothing by behaving as if God were real. To get to a point where you’re willing to kill kids, obviously you have to go a lot further—you must be ready to incur substantial costs as a consequence of belief.
I think I know what wedrifid is getting at, but I don’t think Pascal’s Wager would do it. Pascal’s Wager argues that one should act as if one believes in God because the costs are low and the potential benefits (Heaven) are high.
But in order to get to the particular failure state at which I think wedrifid is hinting, you can’t just be betting on God—you have to be absolutely certain that Heaven exists and that its joys outweigh on every axis everything that Earth has to offer. Most people, no matter what they say, are not that certain, which is why we don’t routinely slaughter infants in order to ensure their blameless souls entry into Heaven. (Similar logic has been invoked to rationalize murders—such as innocent deaths at witch trials—but in these cases, as a justification pasted on after the fact rather than an honest motive towards murder.)
No, absolute certainty is definitely not required. The cost is increased so a proportionate increase in
probability*payoffis required. But this is still all dwarfed by the arbitrarily large payoffs inherent in religious questions. The whole point of ‘afterlife’ focussed doctrine is to encourage the flock to discount all ‘earthly’ matters as trivial compared to eternal questions.No, that would not be a rational reason to refrain from the slaughter. The difference between 90% sure and absolutely certain isn’t really much of a big deal when you have the chance of flipping the sign bit of an arbitrarily large disulility payoff (Hell). A 0.05% hunch would be more than enough.
Rational agents that really have arbitrarily large utility payoffs floating around in their utility function will inevitably do things that look insane to us.
Right, but now you’ve left the standard formulation of Pascal’s Wager. The original Pascal’s Wager includes the stipulation that one loses nothing by behaving as if God were real. To get to a point where you’re willing to kill kids, obviously you have to go a lot further—you must be ready to incur substantial costs as a consequence of belief.