That’s what I was talking about when I said that it meant utilitarians should ‘technically change that view’ and that it was not doing so that made Utilitarianism incoherent. Do I actually know what percentage of utilitarians explicitly include the path in the calculation? No.
I could be wrong that they generally don’t do that. Whether it is true or not, it is an intuition that both the OP and I share about Utilitarianism. I don’t think I’ve ever seen a utilitarian argument that did care about the paths. My impression is that explicitly including paths is deontological or virtue-ethical in practice. It is the one premise of my argument that could be entirely false. Would you say that a significant portion of utilitarians actually care about the path rather than the results?
Would you say you are one? Assuming you are familiar enough with it and have the time, I would be interested in how you formulate the basics of Utilitarianism in a path dependent manner, and would you say that is different in actual meaning to how it is usually formulated (assuming you agree that path-dependent isn’t the usual form)?
Yes, I consider it very likely correct to care about paths. I don’t care what percentage of utilitarians have which kinds of utilitarian views because the most common views have huge problems and are not likely to be right. There isn’t that much that utilitarians have in common other than the general concept of maximizing aggregate utility (that is, maximizing some aggregate of some kind of utility). There are disagreements over what the utility is of (it doesn’t have to be world states), what the maximization is over (doesn’t have to be actions), how the aggregation is done (doesn’t have to be a sum or an average or even to use any cardinal information, and don’t forget negative utilitarianism fits in here too), which utilities are aggregated (doesn’t have to be people’s own preference utilities, nor does it have to be happiness, nor pleasure and suffering, nor does it have to be von Neumann–Morgenstern utilities), or with what weights (if any; and they don’t need to be equal). I find it all pretty confusing. Attempts by some smart people to figure it out in the second half of the 20th century seem to have raised more questions than they have produced answers. I wouldn’t be very surprised if there were people who knew the answers and they were written up somewhere, but if so I haven’t come across that yet.
You probably don’t agree with this, but if I understand what you’re saying, utilitarians don’t really agree on anything or really have shared categories? Since utility is a nearly meaningless word outside of context due to broadness and vagueness, and they don’t agree on anything about it, Utilitarianism shouldn’t really be considered a thing itself? Just a collection of people who don’t really fit into the other paradigms but don’t rely on pure intuitions. Or in other words, pre-paradigmatic?
I don’t see “utility” or “utilitarianism” as meaningless or nearly meaningless words. “Utility” often refers to von Neumann–Morgenstern utilities and always refers to some kind of value assigned to something by some agent from some perspective that they have some reason to find sufficiently interesting to think about. And most ethical theories don’t seem utilitarian, even if perhaps it would be possible to frame them in utilitarian terms.
I can’t say I’m surprised a utilitarian doesn’t realize how vague it sounds? It is a jargon taken from a word that simply means ability to be used widely? Utility is an extreme abstraction, literally unassignable, and entirely based on guessing. You’ve straightforwardly admitted that it doesn’t have an agreed upon basis. Is it happiness? Avoidance of suffering? Fulfillment of the values of agents? Etc.
Utilitarians constantly talk about monetary situations, because that is one place they can actually use it and get results? But there, it’s hardly different than ordinary statistics. Utility there is often treated as a simple function of money but with diminishing returns. Looking up the term for the kind of utility you mentioned, it seems to once again only use monetary situations as examples, and sources claimed it was meant for lotteries and gambling.
Utility as a term makes sense there, but is the only place where your list has general agreement on what utility means? That doesn’t mean it is a useless term, but it is a very vague one.
Since you claim there isn’t agreement on the other aspects of the theories, that makes them more of an artificial category where the adherents don’t really agree on anything. The only real connection seems to be wanting to do math on on how good things are?
The only real connection seems to be wanting to do math on on how good things are?
Yes, to me utilitarian ethical theories do seem usually more interested in formalizing things. That is probably part of their appeal. Moral philosophy is confusing, so people seek to formalize it in the hope of understanding things better (that’s the good reason to do it, at least; often the motivation is instead academic, or signaling, or obfuscation). Consider Tyler Cowen’s review of Derek Parfit’s arguments in On What Matters:
Parfit at great length discusses optimific principles, namely which specifications of rule consequentialism and Kantian obligations can succeed, given strategic behavior, collective action problems, non-linearities, and other tricks of the trade. The Kantian might feel that the turf is already making too many concessions to the consequentialists, but my concern differs. I am frustrated with this very long and very central part of the book, which cries out for formalization or at the very least citations to formalized game theory.
If you’re analyzing a claim such as — “It is wrong to act in some way unless everyone could rationally will it to be true that everyone believes such acts to be morally permitted” (p.20) — words cannot bring you very far, and I write this as a not-very-mathematically-formal economist.
Parfit is operating in the territory of solution concepts and game-theoretic equilibrium refinements, but with nary a nod in their direction. By the end of his lengthy and indeed exhausting discussions, I do not feel I am up to where game theory was in 1990.
I wouldn’t be surprised if there are lots of Utilitarians who do not even consider path-dependence. Typical presentations of utility do not mention path dependence and nearly all the toy examples presented for utility calculations do not involve path dependence.
I do think that most, if prompted, would agree that utility can and in practice will depend upon path and therefore so does aggregated utility.
Utilitarianism is pretty broad! There are utilitarians who care about the paths taken to reach an outcome.
That’s what I was talking about when I said that it meant utilitarians should ‘technically change that view’ and that it was not doing so that made Utilitarianism incoherent. Do I actually know what percentage of utilitarians explicitly include the path in the calculation? No.
I could be wrong that they generally don’t do that. Whether it is true or not, it is an intuition that both the OP and I share about Utilitarianism. I don’t think I’ve ever seen a utilitarian argument that did care about the paths. My impression is that explicitly including paths is deontological or virtue-ethical in practice. It is the one premise of my argument that could be entirely false. Would you say that a significant portion of utilitarians actually care about the path rather than the results?
Would you say you are one? Assuming you are familiar enough with it and have the time, I would be interested in how you formulate the basics of Utilitarianism in a path dependent manner, and would you say that is different in actual meaning to how it is usually formulated (assuming you agree that path-dependent isn’t the usual form)?
Yes, I consider it very likely correct to care about paths. I don’t care what percentage of utilitarians have which kinds of utilitarian views because the most common views have huge problems and are not likely to be right. There isn’t that much that utilitarians have in common other than the general concept of maximizing aggregate utility (that is, maximizing some aggregate of some kind of utility). There are disagreements over what the utility is of (it doesn’t have to be world states), what the maximization is over (doesn’t have to be actions), how the aggregation is done (doesn’t have to be a sum or an average or even to use any cardinal information, and don’t forget negative utilitarianism fits in here too), which utilities are aggregated (doesn’t have to be people’s own preference utilities, nor does it have to be happiness, nor pleasure and suffering, nor does it have to be von Neumann–Morgenstern utilities), or with what weights (if any; and they don’t need to be equal). I find it all pretty confusing. Attempts by some smart people to figure it out in the second half of the 20th century seem to have raised more questions than they have produced answers. I wouldn’t be very surprised if there were people who knew the answers and they were written up somewhere, but if so I haven’t come across that yet.
You probably don’t agree with this, but if I understand what you’re saying, utilitarians don’t really agree on anything or really have shared categories? Since utility is a nearly meaningless word outside of context due to broadness and vagueness, and they don’t agree on anything about it, Utilitarianism shouldn’t really be considered a thing itself? Just a collection of people who don’t really fit into the other paradigms but don’t rely on pure intuitions. Or in other words, pre-paradigmatic?
I don’t see “utility” or “utilitarianism” as meaningless or nearly meaningless words. “Utility” often refers to von Neumann–Morgenstern utilities and always refers to some kind of value assigned to something by some agent from some perspective that they have some reason to find sufficiently interesting to think about. And most ethical theories don’t seem utilitarian, even if perhaps it would be possible to frame them in utilitarian terms.
I can’t say I’m surprised a utilitarian doesn’t realize how vague it sounds? It is a jargon taken from a word that simply means ability to be used widely? Utility is an extreme abstraction, literally unassignable, and entirely based on guessing. You’ve straightforwardly admitted that it doesn’t have an agreed upon basis. Is it happiness? Avoidance of suffering? Fulfillment of the values of agents? Etc.
Utilitarians constantly talk about monetary situations, because that is one place they can actually use it and get results? But there, it’s hardly different than ordinary statistics. Utility there is often treated as a simple function of money but with diminishing returns. Looking up the term for the kind of utility you mentioned, it seems to once again only use monetary situations as examples, and sources claimed it was meant for lotteries and gambling.
Utility as a term makes sense there, but is the only place where your list has general agreement on what utility means? That doesn’t mean it is a useless term, but it is a very vague one.
Since you claim there isn’t agreement on the other aspects of the theories, that makes them more of an artificial category where the adherents don’t really agree on anything. The only real connection seems to be wanting to do math on on how good things are?
Yes, to me utilitarian ethical theories do seem usually more interested in formalizing things. That is probably part of their appeal. Moral philosophy is confusing, so people seek to formalize it in the hope of understanding things better (that’s the good reason to do it, at least; often the motivation is instead academic, or signaling, or obfuscation). Consider Tyler Cowen’s review of Derek Parfit’s arguments in On What Matters:
I wouldn’t be surprised if there are lots of Utilitarians who do not even consider path-dependence. Typical presentations of utility do not mention path dependence and nearly all the toy examples presented for utility calculations do not involve path dependence.
I do think that most, if prompted, would agree that utility can and in practice will depend upon path and therefore so does aggregated utility.