But you do because fields are just an after-the-fact construction to make understanding reality more manageable. There’s just one reality (for a phenomenologically useful sense of “reality” as the thing which you experience), fields just pick a part of it to focus on, and as such there is much overlap between how we know things in fields.
I disagree thoroughly with that paragraph.
Science is not about “understanding reality”. Or at least, not the “reality” as “the thing which you experience”. The impact of science in “the thing which we experience” can only be seen through pragmatism. Quantum physics is good not because it gives to some of us a more manageable understanding of reality, but because it gives to all of us tools relying on quantum effects. If we talk about science as “understanding reality”, then it’s not “the thing which we experience”. And in that case, science understands many different, sometimes independent realities.
“as such there is much overlap between how we know things in fields”. There are only small overlaps between NLP, linguistics and cognitive psychology, all three studying natural languages. There are strong differences between logic from a philosophical point of view, logic from a mathematical foundations point of view and logic from a CS point of view., all three studying logic. A science is defined by its object and by its method.
To be concrete about it, there are many fields we consider part of science and they all use the shared epistemological methods of science to explore particular topics.
Well, if you put all the methods used in different sciences in the common sets of “shared epistemological methods of science”, then I have to tautologically agree. But as well as concrete differences (a chemical experimental protocol is very different from a physical one), there are abstract differences (controlled experiments, natural experiments, historical inquiry, formal proof, naked human reasoning). So I don’t understand your point.
We don’t reinvent science for physics, biology, etc. each time because each field is really just choosing to focus on a particular part of the questions science is designed to answer.
Well, if a field is solely an “after-the-fact construction”, there is no intention or design in fields. Putting that aside, my explanation to the fact that we don’t reinvent science every time is more down-to-earth : tragedy of the commons and chronology. Focusing on epistemology is hard and time consuming, and doesn’t benefit individuals, but everyone at the same time. Except in particular instances (foundational crisis), researchers won’t take the burden on themselves. Also, epistemology advances came after these fields were set.
I think there’s also a deeper confusion here where you seem to be thinking as if ontology comes first. That is, you are taking a transcendental stance.
I take ontology and epistemology as separate. A science is defined by its object (ontos), and by its method (epistemy). Given I can make both arguments for different sciences (where their ontos come before their epistemy, and where their epistemy come before their ontos), I see them as separate.
When you say “that is ontology comes first but we have to experience it so there’s no way for us to know that where epistemology isn’t prior”, you beg the question : you assume there is no higher order ontological knowledge, but that there is higher order epistemological knowledge (without which we couldn’t have relevant experiments). And I can derive epistemological knowledge from observation and ontological knowledge as much as I can derive ontological knowledge from experiments and epistemological knowledge.
I take ontology and epistemology as separate. A science is defined by its object (ontos), and by its method (epistemy). Given I can make both arguments for different sciences (where their ontos come before their epistemy, and where their epistemy come before their ontos), I see them as separate.
Great! My misunderstanding.
When you say “that is ontology comes first but we have to experience it so there’s no way for us to know that where epistemology isn’t prior”, you beg the question : you assume there is no higher order ontological knowledge, but that there is higher order epistemological knowledge (without which we couldn’t have relevant experiments). And I can derive epistemological knowledge from observation and ontological knowledge as much as I can derive ontological knowledge from experiments and epistemological knowledge.
I suppose I do insofar as the very act of experiencing experience is experience and thus by at all noticing your experience you know a way of knowing. And although you may infer things about epistemology from ontology, you cannot derive them because ontology must be constructed from knowledge gained through experience (at least if we demand a phenomenological account of knowledge), and thus all ontology is tainted by the epistemological methods of experience used to gain such knowledge.
I suppose I do insofar as the very act of experiencing experience is experience and thus by at all noticing your experience you know a way of knowing. And although you may infer things about epistemology from ontology, you cannot derive them because ontology must be constructed from knowledge gained through experience (at least if we demand a phenomenological account of knowledge), and thus all ontology is tainted by the epistemological methods of experience used to gain such knowledge.
Naive observation precedes any epistemic method to gain knowledge. However, let’s say we consider naive observation and innate reasoning as being part of a proto-epistemy. Then we have to acknowledge too that we have a fair-share of embedded ontological knowledge that we don’t gain through experience, but that we have when we are born. (Time, space, multiplicity, weight, etc.).
This is paramount, as without that, we would actually be trapped in infinite regress.
I disagree thoroughly with that paragraph.
Science is not about “understanding reality”. Or at least, not the “reality” as “the thing which you experience”. The impact of science in “the thing which we experience” can only be seen through pragmatism. Quantum physics is good not because it gives to some of us a more manageable understanding of reality, but because it gives to all of us tools relying on quantum effects.
If we talk about science as “understanding reality”, then it’s not “the thing which we experience”. And in that case, science understands many different, sometimes independent realities.
“as such there is much overlap between how we know things in fields”. There are only small overlaps between NLP, linguistics and cognitive psychology, all three studying natural languages. There are strong differences between logic from a philosophical point of view, logic from a mathematical foundations point of view and logic from a CS point of view., all three studying logic. A science is defined by its object and by its method.
Well, if you put all the methods used in different sciences in the common sets of “shared epistemological methods of science”, then I have to tautologically agree. But as well as concrete differences (a chemical experimental protocol is very different from a physical one), there are abstract differences (controlled experiments, natural experiments, historical inquiry, formal proof, naked human reasoning). So I don’t understand your point.
Well, if a field is solely an “after-the-fact construction”, there is no intention or design in fields.
Putting that aside, my explanation to the fact that we don’t reinvent science every time is more down-to-earth : tragedy of the commons and chronology. Focusing on epistemology is hard and time consuming, and doesn’t benefit individuals, but everyone at the same time. Except in particular instances (foundational crisis), researchers won’t take the burden on themselves. Also, epistemology advances came after these fields were set.
I take ontology and epistemology as separate. A science is defined by its object (ontos), and by its method (epistemy). Given I can make both arguments for different sciences (where their ontos come before their epistemy, and where their epistemy come before their ontos), I see them as separate.
When you say “that is ontology comes first but we have to experience it so there’s no way for us to know that where epistemology isn’t prior”, you beg the question : you assume there is no higher order ontological knowledge, but that there is higher order epistemological knowledge (without which we couldn’t have relevant experiments). And I can derive epistemological knowledge from observation and ontological knowledge as much as I can derive ontological knowledge from experiments and epistemological knowledge.
Great! My misunderstanding.
I suppose I do insofar as the very act of experiencing experience is experience and thus by at all noticing your experience you know a way of knowing. And although you may infer things about epistemology from ontology, you cannot derive them because ontology must be constructed from knowledge gained through experience (at least if we demand a phenomenological account of knowledge), and thus all ontology is tainted by the epistemological methods of experience used to gain such knowledge.
Naive observation precedes any epistemic method to gain knowledge. However, let’s say we consider naive observation and innate reasoning as being part of a proto-epistemy. Then we have to acknowledge too that we have a fair-share of embedded ontological knowledge that we don’t gain through experience, but that we have when we are born. (Time, space, multiplicity, weight, etc.).
This is paramount, as without that, we would actually be trapped in infinite regress.