(1) Any discussion of what art is. (2) Any discussion of whether or not the universe is real. (3) Any conversation about whether machines can truly be intelligent.
I agree that the answers to these questions depend on definitions, but then, so does the answer to the question, “how long is this stick ?”. Depending on your definition, the answer may be “this many meters long”, “depends on which reference frame you’re using”, “the concept of a fixed length makes no sense at this scale and temperature”, or “it’s not a stick, it’s a cube”. That doesn’t mean that the question is inherently confused, only that you and your interlocutor have a communication problem.
That said, I believe that questions (1) and (3) are, in fact, questions about humans. They can be rephrased as “what causes humans to interpret an object or a performance as art”, and “what kind of things do humans consider to be intelligent”. The answers to these questions would be complex, involving multi-modal distributions with fuzzy boundaries, etc., but that still does not necessarily imply that the questions are confused.
Which is not to say that confused questions don’t exist, or that modern philosophical academia isn’t riddled with them; all I’m saying is that your examples are not convincing.
I agree that the answers to these questions depend on definitions
I think he meant that those questions depend ONLY on definitions.
As in, there’s a lot of interesting real world knowledge that goes in getting a submarine to propel itself, but that now we know that, have, people asking “can a submarine swim” is only interesting in deciding “should the English word ‘swim’ apply to the motion of a submarine, which is somewhat like the motion of swimming, but not entirely”. That example sounds stupid, but people waste a lot of time on the similar case of “think” instead of “swim”.
“What causes humans to interpret an object or a performance as art” and “What is art?” may be seen as two entirely different questions to certain philosophers. I’m skeptical that people who frequent this site would make such a distinction, but we aren’t talking about LWers here.
People whoe frequent this site already do make parallel distinctions about more LW-friendly topics. For instance, the point of the Art of Rationality is that there is a right way to do thinking and persuading, which is not to say that Reason “just is” whatever happens to persuade or convince people, since people can be persuaded by bad arguments. If that can be made to work, then “it’s hanging in a gallery, but it isn’t art” can be made to work.
ETA:
That said, I believe that questions (1) and (3) are, in fact, questions about humans.
Rationality is about humans, in a sense, too. The moral is that being “about humans” doens’t imply that the
search for norms or real meanings, or genuine/pseudo distinctions is fruitless.
Agreed, but my point was that questions about humans are questions about the Universe (since humans are part of it), and therefore they can be answerable and meaningful. Thus, you could indeed come up with an answer that sounds something like, “it’s hanging in a gallery, but our model predicts that it’s only 12.5% art”.
But I agree with BerryPick6 when he says that not all philosophers make that distinction.
I agree that the answers to these questions depend on definitions, but then, so does the answer to the question, “how long is this stick ?”
There’s a key distinction that I feel you may be glossing over here. In the case of the stick question, there is an extremely high probability that you and the person you’re talking to, though you may not be using exactly the same definitions, are using definitions that are closely enough entangled with observable features of the world be broadly isomorphic.
In other words, there is a good chance that, without either of you adjusting your definitions, you and the neurotypical human you’re talking to are likely to be able to come up with some answer that both of you will find satisfying, and will allow you to meaningfully predict future experiences.
With the three examples I raised, this isn’t the case. There are a host of different definitions, which are not closely entangled with simple, observable features of the world. As such, even if you and the person you’re talking to have similar life experiences, there is no guarantee that you will come to the same conclusions, because your definitions are likely to be personal, and the outcome of the question depends heavily upon those definitions.
Furthermore, in the three cases I mentioned, unlike the stick, if you hold a given position, it’s not at all clear what evidence could persuade you to change your mind, for many possible (and common!) positions. This is a telltale sign of a confused question.
There are a host of different definitions, which are not closely entangled with simple, observable features of the world.
I believe that at least two of those definitions could be something like, “what kinds of humans would consider this art ?”, or “will machines ever pass the Turing test”. These questions are about human actions which express human thoughts, and are indeed observable features of the world. I do agree that there are many other, more personal definitions that are of little use.
Your examples include:
(1) Any discussion of what art is.
(2) Any discussion of whether or not the universe is real.
(3) Any conversation about whether machines can truly be intelligent.
I agree that the answers to these questions depend on definitions, but then, so does the answer to the question, “how long is this stick ?”. Depending on your definition, the answer may be “this many meters long”, “depends on which reference frame you’re using”, “the concept of a fixed length makes no sense at this scale and temperature”, or “it’s not a stick, it’s a cube”. That doesn’t mean that the question is inherently confused, only that you and your interlocutor have a communication problem.
That said, I believe that questions (1) and (3) are, in fact, questions about humans. They can be rephrased as “what causes humans to interpret an object or a performance as art”, and “what kind of things do humans consider to be intelligent”. The answers to these questions would be complex, involving multi-modal distributions with fuzzy boundaries, etc., but that still does not necessarily imply that the questions are confused.
Which is not to say that confused questions don’t exist, or that modern philosophical academia isn’t riddled with them; all I’m saying is that your examples are not convincing.
I think he meant that those questions depend ONLY on definitions.
As in, there’s a lot of interesting real world knowledge that goes in getting a submarine to propel itself, but that now we know that, have, people asking “can a submarine swim” is only interesting in deciding “should the English word ‘swim’ apply to the motion of a submarine, which is somewhat like the motion of swimming, but not entirely”. That example sounds stupid, but people waste a lot of time on the similar case of “think” instead of “swim”.
Ok, that’s a good point; inserting the word “only” in there does make a huge difference.
I also agree with BerryPick6 on this sub-thread.
“What causes humans to interpret an object or a performance as art” and “What is art?” may be seen as two entirely different questions to certain philosophers. I’m skeptical that people who frequent this site would make such a distinction, but we aren’t talking about LWers here.
People whoe frequent this site already do make parallel distinctions about more LW-friendly topics. For instance, the point of the Art of Rationality is that there is a right way to do thinking and persuading, which is not to say that Reason “just is” whatever happens to persuade or convince people, since people can be persuaded by bad arguments. If that can be made to work, then “it’s hanging in a gallery, but it isn’t art” can be made to work.
ETA:
Rationality is about humans, in a sense, too. The moral is that being “about humans” doens’t imply that the search for norms or real meanings, or genuine/pseudo distinctions is fruitless.
Agreed, but my point was that questions about humans are questions about the Universe (since humans are part of it), and therefore they can be answerable and meaningful. Thus, you could indeed come up with an answer that sounds something like, “it’s hanging in a gallery, but our model predicts that it’s only 12.5% art”.
But I agree with BerryPick6 when he says that not all philosophers make that distinction.
There’s a key distinction that I feel you may be glossing over here. In the case of the stick question, there is an extremely high probability that you and the person you’re talking to, though you may not be using exactly the same definitions, are using definitions that are closely enough entangled with observable features of the world be broadly isomorphic.
In other words, there is a good chance that, without either of you adjusting your definitions, you and the neurotypical human you’re talking to are likely to be able to come up with some answer that both of you will find satisfying, and will allow you to meaningfully predict future experiences.
With the three examples I raised, this isn’t the case. There are a host of different definitions, which are not closely entangled with simple, observable features of the world. As such, even if you and the person you’re talking to have similar life experiences, there is no guarantee that you will come to the same conclusions, because your definitions are likely to be personal, and the outcome of the question depends heavily upon those definitions.
Furthermore, in the three cases I mentioned, unlike the stick, if you hold a given position, it’s not at all clear what evidence could persuade you to change your mind, for many possible (and common!) positions. This is a telltale sign of a confused question.
I believe that at least two of those definitions could be something like, “what kinds of humans would consider this art ?”, or “will machines ever pass the Turing test”. These questions are about human actions which express human thoughts, and are indeed observable features of the world. I do agree that there are many other, more personal definitions that are of little use.