The ‘you’ I used referred only to the pre-duplication person, who is making the choice, and who is singular.
The view you describe is the view I described in the last paragraph of my previous comment (the one you replied to). I understand and agree that you decide things for all identical copies of you who may appear in the next second—because they’re identical, they preserve your decisions. But you can only anticipate experiencing some one thing, not a plurality.
If someone creates a clone (or several) of me, I may not even know about it; and I do not expect to experience anything differently due to the existence of that clone.
If someone destroys my body, I presume I’ll stop experiencing, although I have no idea what that would be like.
By inference, if someone creates a precise clone of me elsewhere and destroys my body at the same moment, I won’t suddenly start experiencing the clone’s life. I.e., I don’t expect to suddenly experience a complete shift in location. Rather, I would experience the same thing (or lack of it) that I would experience if someone killed me without creating a clone.
Yes, this begs the question of why I experience continuity in this body, since physics has no concept of a continuous body. And why do I experience continuity across sleep and unconsciousness? I don’t have an answer, but neither do the alternative you’re proposing. The only real answer I’ve seen is the timeless hypothesis: that at each moment I have a separate moment-experience, which happens to include memories of previous experiences, but they are not necessarily true—they are just the way my brain makes sense of the universe, and it highlights or even invents continuity. But this is too much like the Boltzmann’s Brain conjecture—consistent and with explanatory power, but unsatisfying.
“You” sure seemed like it referred to only one of the postduplication individuals here:
In the second option, you are not affected in any way.
(This when one of me seems to be quite seriously affected, in that you plan to torture and kill that one.)
And here:
You won’t privilege what youactually experience.
(This when I do privilege what I actually experience, and simply think of “I” in these futures as a plural.)
you don’t know in advance which of ten thousand copies you’ll be
(But I’ll be all of them! It’s not as though 9,999 of these people are p-zombies or strangers or even just brand-new genetically identical twins! They’re my futures!)
The ‘you’ I used referred only to the pre-duplication person, who is making the choice, and who is singular.
The view you describe is the view I described in the last paragraph of my previous comment (the one you replied to). I understand and agree that you decide things for all identical copies of you who may appear in the next second—because they’re identical, they preserve your decisions. But you can only anticipate experiencing some one thing, not a plurality.
If someone creates a clone (or several) of me, I may not even know about it; and I do not expect to experience anything differently due to the existence of that clone.
If someone destroys my body, I presume I’ll stop experiencing, although I have no idea what that would be like.
By inference, if someone creates a precise clone of me elsewhere and destroys my body at the same moment, I won’t suddenly start experiencing the clone’s life. I.e., I don’t expect to suddenly experience a complete shift in location. Rather, I would experience the same thing (or lack of it) that I would experience if someone killed me without creating a clone.
Yes, this begs the question of why I experience continuity in this body, since physics has no concept of a continuous body. And why do I experience continuity across sleep and unconsciousness? I don’t have an answer, but neither do the alternative you’re proposing. The only real answer I’ve seen is the timeless hypothesis: that at each moment I have a separate moment-experience, which happens to include memories of previous experiences, but they are not necessarily true—they are just the way my brain makes sense of the universe, and it highlights or even invents continuity. But this is too much like the Boltzmann’s Brain conjecture—consistent and with explanatory power, but unsatisfying.
“You” sure seemed like it referred to only one of the postduplication individuals here:
(This when one of me seems to be quite seriously affected, in that you plan to torture and kill that one.)
And here:
(This when I do privilege what I actually experience, and simply think of “I” in these futures as a plural.)
(But I’ll be all of them! It’s not as though 9,999 of these people are p-zombies or strangers or even just brand-new genetically identical twins! They’re my futures!)