So ten seconds isn’t enough time to create a significant difference between the RobinZs, in your opinion. What if Omega told you that in the ten seconds following duplication, you, the original RZ, would have an original thought that would not occur to the other RZs (perhaps as a result of different environments)? Would that change your mind? What if Omega qualified it as a significant thought, one that could change the course of your life—maybe the seed of a new scientific theory, or an idea for a novel that would have won you a Pulitzer, had original RZ continued to exist?
I think the problem with this scenario is that saying “ten seconds” isn’t meaningfully different from saying “1 Planck time”, which becomes obvious when you turn down the offer that involves ten hours or years. Our answers are tied to our biological perception of time—if an hour felt like a second, we’d agree to the ten hour option. I don’t think they’re based on any rational observation of what actually happens in those ten seconds. A powerful AI would not agree to Omega’s offer—how many CPU cycles can you pack into ten seconds?
I don’t quite understand the idea that someone who accepted the original offer (timespan = 10 seconds) would turn down the offer for any greater timespan. Surely more lifespan for the original (or for any one copy) is a good thing? If you favor creation of clones at cost of your life, why wouldn’t you favor creation of clones at no immediate cost at all?
I like your point. I think I would accept such an offer with a greater time span, if N was > 1, if I knew how long I had and if I could be with my copies.
The psychological stress of anticipating dying wouldn’t be worth it to me for just N=1
Not knowing when that one would die (only that he would) would be too psychologically stressful to be worth it.
The one of me with an expiration date would live his remaining time differently than those who kept going. The ones of me who kept going would do things to honor him and fulfill his needs. The doomed one would expect them to do this.
For longer expiration dates, we collectively would need greater compensation (more copies) to make it worth it.
...no, I don’t think so. It would change what the original RobinZ would do, but not a lot else.
So ten seconds isn’t enough time to create a significant difference between the RobinZs, in your opinion. What if Omega told you that in the ten seconds following duplication, you, the original RZ, would have an original thought that would not occur to the other RZs (perhaps as a result of different environments)? Would that change your mind? What if Omega qualified it as a significant thought, one that could change the course of your life—maybe the seed of a new scientific theory, or an idea for a novel that would have won you a Pulitzer, had original RZ continued to exist?
I think the problem with this scenario is that saying “ten seconds” isn’t meaningfully different from saying “1 Planck time”, which becomes obvious when you turn down the offer that involves ten hours or years. Our answers are tied to our biological perception of time—if an hour felt like a second, we’d agree to the ten hour option. I don’t think they’re based on any rational observation of what actually happens in those ten seconds. A powerful AI would not agree to Omega’s offer—how many CPU cycles can you pack into ten seconds?
I don’t quite understand the idea that someone who accepted the original offer (timespan = 10 seconds) would turn down the offer for any greater timespan. Surely more lifespan for the original (or for any one copy) is a good thing? If you favor creation of clones at cost of your life, why wouldn’t you favor creation of clones at no immediate cost at all?
I like your point. I think I would accept such an offer with a greater time span, if N was > 1, if I knew how long I had and if I could be with my copies.
The psychological stress of anticipating dying wouldn’t be worth it to me for just N=1
Not knowing when that one would die (only that he would) would be too psychologically stressful to be worth it.
The one of me with an expiration date would live his remaining time differently than those who kept going. The ones of me who kept going would do things to honor him and fulfill his needs. The doomed one would expect them to do this.
For longer expiration dates, we collectively would need greater compensation (more copies) to make it worth it.
For short time spans (1 second), I would accept N=1 for teleportation.
I don’t know if I’ll claim that.