I changed my mind since then. So I would make different decisions now… more in line with what others here have been proposing.
I would try to optimize for all projected future clones. But in a scenario where I know some clones are going to die no matter what they do (your previous question), I would partially discount the experiences such clones have before they die and try to optimize more for the experiences of the survivor. That’s just my personal preference: the lifelong memory of the survivor matters more than the precise terminal existence of the killed clone.
Regarding your new questions about anticipation, under the new theory that has no concept of personal continuity, there doesn’t seem to be such a thing as personal survival where duplication&termination are involved.
Sounds consistent. Forgive me if I probe a bit further: I’m not trying to be rude, I’m interested in the boundaries of your theory.
In an unconsciousness—clone—destroy original brain—wake scenario, do you anticipate surviving ?
In an unconsciousness—clone twice—destroy original brain—wake scenario, do you identify with / anticipate being zero, one or two of the clones ?
I changed my mind since then. So I would make different decisions now… more in line with what others here have been proposing.
I would try to optimize for all projected future clones. But in a scenario where I know some clones are going to die no matter what they do (your previous question), I would partially discount the experiences such clones have before they die and try to optimize more for the experiences of the survivor. That’s just my personal preference: the lifelong memory of the survivor matters more than the precise terminal existence of the killed clone.
Regarding your new questions about anticipation, under the new theory that has no concept of personal continuity, there doesn’t seem to be such a thing as personal survival where duplication&termination are involved.