Thanks for this answer. Describing how prediction error minimization theory applies to self-esteem in such a clear way helped me understand both that theory as well as self-esteem more clearly.
I’m confused by the “way to fix self-esteem” you describe. I do not understand how “esteem generation” might reduce “esteem error prediction”. What would be a concrete example for such a process? I haven’t done any research on that topic though, except reading maybe 2 or 3 articles on LW, so I might well be missing some crucial parts of how the theory works. Can you recommend any ressources which might serve as a good starting point?
Maybe it will help if I make the model more formal, since there are multiple variables and it can be a little hard to see what’s going on if you don’t already have the intuitions to track them from normal words.
Let m be a measure of self esteem as a result of seeing some evidence e about the world (an observation). The prediction error is the extent to which E:E→M (the expectation relation that goes from evidence to a measure of self esteem) diverges from A:E→M (the relation that calculates the actual update in measure of self esteem). So prediction error looks like when E(e)=m≠A(e), and the larger the difference between E(e) and A(e) the larger the error.
A self-esteem set point, s∈M, is a measure of self esteem you are targeting such that if A(e)≠s then you want (set an expectation that E(e′)=s for some as yet unobserved evidence e′) to increase or lower your observed self-esteem A(e) such that it matches s.
Warning: This is an off-the-cuff model of the theory I just made up right now, so it’s probably non-standard and I’d have to think/read about the formalism more to fully endorse it (it’s also a little slopping in a couple places because I’m out of practice). I mean to use it only as a pedagogical tool here.
When I suggest we can fix self-esteem, I mean we can work to adjust A(e) and E(e) so that they better match, and work to alter A such that the actual esteem you observe yourself to have also matches the set point s. What that looks like in the case of wanting more esteem than you currently have and repeatedly expecting to have more esteem than you observe yourself having (the case where E(e)<A(e)) and it being true that A(e)<s. The fix in this case is to take actions that cause E(e) to rise to match A(e) and take actions that cause A(e) to rise to match s, and even better if this can be done in concert by making A conditional on |E(e)−A(e)| such that A(e) increases as A(e)−E(e) decreases towards 0.
Oh, to your other question, I have no special resources to recommend. I mostly arrived at a version of this theory on my own, then found out about Friston and perceptual control theory and was like “ah, great, someone already worked this out, one less thing for me to worry about!”.
In my recent post on value drift I had a paragraph with a bunch of links, though I think they are the things you may have already seen. For completeness and in case you missed any of the ones I liked, here it is copied into this comment:
If we tear away the idea that we might possess values, we are left with the act of valuing, and to value something is ultimately to judge it or assess its worth. While I can’t hope to fit all my philosophy into this paragraph, I consider valuing, judging, or assessing to be one of the fundamental operations of “conscious” things, it being the key input that powers the feedback loops that differentiate the “living” from the “dead”. For historical reasons we might call this feeling or sensation, and if you like control theory “sensing” seems appropriate since in a control system it is the sensor that determines and sends the signal to the controller after it senses the system. Promisingmoderntheories suggest control theory is useful for modeling the human mind as a hierarchy of control systems that minimize prediction error while also maintaining homeostasis, and this matches with one of the most detailed and longest used theories of human psychology, so I feel justified in saying that the key, primitive action happening when we value something is that we sense or judge it to be good, neutral, or bad (or, if you prefer, more, same, or less).
Thanks for this answer. Describing how prediction error minimization theory applies to self-esteem in such a clear way helped me understand both that theory as well as self-esteem more clearly.
I’m confused by the “way to fix self-esteem” you describe. I do not understand how “esteem generation” might reduce “esteem error prediction”. What would be a concrete example for such a process? I haven’t done any research on that topic though, except reading maybe 2 or 3 articles on LW, so I might well be missing some crucial parts of how the theory works. Can you recommend any ressources which might serve as a good starting point?
Maybe it will help if I make the model more formal, since there are multiple variables and it can be a little hard to see what’s going on if you don’t already have the intuitions to track them from normal words.
Let m be a measure of self esteem as a result of seeing some evidence e about the world (an observation). The prediction error is the extent to which E:E→M (the expectation relation that goes from evidence to a measure of self esteem) diverges from A:E→M (the relation that calculates the actual update in measure of self esteem). So prediction error looks like when E(e)=m≠A(e), and the larger the difference between E(e) and A(e) the larger the error.
A self-esteem set point, s∈M, is a measure of self esteem you are targeting such that if A(e)≠s then you want (set an expectation that E(e′)=s for some as yet unobserved evidence e′) to increase or lower your observed self-esteem A(e) such that it matches s.
Warning: This is an off-the-cuff model of the theory I just made up right now, so it’s probably non-standard and I’d have to think/read about the formalism more to fully endorse it (it’s also a little slopping in a couple places because I’m out of practice). I mean to use it only as a pedagogical tool here.
When I suggest we can fix self-esteem, I mean we can work to adjust A(e) and E(e) so that they better match, and work to alter A such that the actual esteem you observe yourself to have also matches the set point s. What that looks like in the case of wanting more esteem than you currently have and repeatedly expecting to have more esteem than you observe yourself having (the case where E(e)<A(e)) and it being true that A(e)<s. The fix in this case is to take actions that cause E(e) to rise to match A(e) and take actions that cause A(e) to rise to match s, and even better if this can be done in concert by making A conditional on |E(e)−A(e)| such that A(e) increases as A(e)−E(e) decreases towards 0.
Oh, to your other question, I have no special resources to recommend. I mostly arrived at a version of this theory on my own, then found out about Friston and perceptual control theory and was like “ah, great, someone already worked this out, one less thing for me to worry about!”.
In my recent post on value drift I had a paragraph with a bunch of links, though I think they are the things you may have already seen. For completeness and in case you missed any of the ones I liked, here it is copied into this comment: