That’s a weird definition of compulsion in this context. Others want to make choices. Sometimes those choices impact things you value. Sometime they doesn’t.
But preventing people from acting on choices seems like the common thread. Privileging whether things you value are effected seems relevant to whether the prevention is morally justified, but from point of view of preventing the implementation of another’s choice, the idea of compulsion seems identical.
In short, I assert the morally neutral description of an action ought not to vary based on moral judgment about the action.
That’s a weird definition of compulsion in this context. Others want to make choices. Sometimes those choices impact things you value. Sometime they doesn’t.
But preventing people from acting on choices seems like the common thread. Privileging whether things you value are effected seems relevant to whether the prevention is morally justified, but from point of view of preventing the implementation of another’s choice, the idea of compulsion seems identical.
In short, I assert the morally neutral description of an action ought not to vary based on moral judgment about the action.