Being obedient is not always the same as acting in the interests of the company.
If you are a corrupt cop at the head of a police department, you want people lower down on the chain also be corrupt. You want to be able to buy their allegiance by providing the right incentives.
A boss who wants to hit his short term metrics wants directs who also care about the short term metrics that the boss can control and not directs who optimize for long term success of the company.
More to this: you want underlings who are obedient to you personally (since you’re their boss), not rigidly obedient. You might want your underlings’ underlings to be rigidly obedient, so that you can better control (and be informed of) things a few layers down, and structural features may favor one of the other of these incentives.
Being obedient is not always the same as acting in the interests of the company.
If you are a corrupt cop at the head of a police department, you want people lower down on the chain also be corrupt. You want to be able to buy their allegiance by providing the right incentives.
A boss who wants to hit his short term metrics wants directs who also care about the short term metrics that the boss can control and not directs who optimize for long term success of the company.
More to this: you want underlings who are obedient to you personally (since you’re their boss), not rigidly obedient. You might want your underlings’ underlings to be rigidly obedient, so that you can better control (and be informed of) things a few layers down, and structural features may favor one of the other of these incentives.