..and its not too iimportant what the community is crystallized around? Believing in things you can’t justify or explain is something that an atheist community can safely borrow from religion?
and its not too iimportant what the community is crystallized around?
Of course it’s important. What gives you another impression?
Believing in things you can’t justify or explain is something that an atheist community can safely borrow from religion?
It’s not clear to me where you’re getting this. To be clear, I think that the LW perspective has different definitions of “believe,” “justify,” and “explain” from traditional philosophy, but I don’t think that it gets its versions from religion. I also think that atheism is a consequence of LW’s epistemology, not a foundation of it. (As a side note, the parts of religion that don’t collapse when brought into a robust epistemology are solid enough to build on, and there’s little to be gained by turning your nose up at their source.)
In this particular conversation, the religion analogy is used primarily in a social and historical sense. People believe things; people communicate and coordinate on beliefs. How has that communication and coordination happened in the past, and what can we learn from that?
We can learn that “all for the cause, whatever it is” is a failure of rationality.
To be clear, I think that the LW perspective has different definitions of “believe,” “justify,” and “explain” from traditional philosophy,
I think the LW perspective has the same definitions...but possibly different theories from the various theories of traditional philosophy. (It also looks like LW has a different definition if “definition”, which really confuses things)
the parts of religion that don’t collapse when brought into a robust epistemology
Religious epistemology—dogmatism+vagueness—is just the problem
We can learn that “all for the cause, whatever it is” is a failure of rationality.
Entirely agreed.
Religious epistemology—dogmatism+vagueness—is just the problem
I don’t see the dogmatism you’re noticing—yes, Eliezer has strong opinions on issues I don’t think he should have strong opinions on, but those strong opinions are only weakly transmitted to others and you’ll find robust disagreement. Similarly, the vagueness I’ve noticed tends to be necessary vagueness, in the sense of “X is an open problem, but here’s my best guess at how X will be solved. You’ll notice that it’s fuzzy here, there, and there, which is why I think the problem is still open.”
So what actually is the LessWrongian theory of ethics?
In order to answer this question, I’m switching to the anthropology of moral belief and practice (as lukeprog puts it here).
I don’t think there’s a single agreed-upon theory. The OP is part of lukeprog’s sequence where he put forward a theory of meta-ethics he calls pluralistic moral reductionism, which he says here is not even an empathetic theory of meta-ethics, let alone applied ethics. Eliezer’s sequence on meta-ethics suffers from the flaw that it’s written ‘in character,’ and was not well-received. If you look at survey results, you see that the broadest statements we can make are things like “overall people here lean towards consequentialism.”
I doubt you’ll find anyone here seriously saying that we’ve found a definitive theory of metaethics. That is our eventual goal, yes, but right now, there are at best several competing theories. No absolutely correct theory has even been proposed, much less endorsed by the majority of LW. So the answer to your question (“Why do people believe it?”) is, as far as I can tell, “They don’t.” My question, however, is why you think this is something really bad, as opposed to something just slightly bad.
..and its not too iimportant what the community is crystallized around? Believing in things you can’t justify or explain is something that an atheist community can safely borrow from religion?
Of course it’s important. What gives you another impression?
It’s not clear to me where you’re getting this. To be clear, I think that the LW perspective has different definitions of “believe,” “justify,” and “explain” from traditional philosophy, but I don’t think that it gets its versions from religion. I also think that atheism is a consequence of LW’s epistemology, not a foundation of it. (As a side note, the parts of religion that don’t collapse when brought into a robust epistemology are solid enough to build on, and there’s little to be gained by turning your nose up at their source.)
In this particular conversation, the religion analogy is used primarily in a social and historical sense. People believe things; people communicate and coordinate on beliefs. How has that communication and coordination happened in the past, and what can we learn from that?
We can learn that “all for the cause, whatever it is” is a failure of rationality.
I think the LW perspective has the same definitions...but possibly different theories from the various theories of traditional philosophy. (It also looks like LW has a different definition if “definition”, which really confuses things)
Religious epistemology—dogmatism+vagueness—is just the problem
Entirely agreed.
I don’t see the dogmatism you’re noticing—yes, Eliezer has strong opinions on issues I don’t think he should have strong opinions on, but those strong opinions are only weakly transmitted to others and you’ll find robust disagreement. Similarly, the vagueness I’ve noticed tends to be necessary vagueness, in the sense of “X is an open problem, but here’s my best guess at how X will be solved. You’ll notice that it’s fuzzy here, there, and there, which is why I think the problem is still open.”
So what actually is the LessWrongian theory of ethics?
And, assuming you don’t know....why are there people who believe it, for some value of believe?
In order to answer this question, I’m switching to the anthropology of moral belief and practice (as lukeprog puts it here).
I don’t think there’s a single agreed-upon theory. The OP is part of lukeprog’s sequence where he put forward a theory of meta-ethics he calls pluralistic moral reductionism, which he says here is not even an empathetic theory of meta-ethics, let alone applied ethics. Eliezer’s sequence on meta-ethics suffers from the flaw that it’s written ‘in character,’ and was not well-received. If you look at survey results, you see that the broadest statements we can make are things like “overall people here lean towards consequentialism.”
Ok. You can’t summarize it unambiguously either. So why do people believe it?
From Vaniver’s comment:
What “it” are you speaking of?
The lesswrongian theory of ethics, If you don’t believe there is such a singular entity, you couldn’t say so...I’m hardly going to disagree.
I doubt you’ll find anyone here seriously saying that we’ve found a definitive theory of metaethics. That is our eventual goal, yes, but right now, there are at best several competing theories. No absolutely correct theory has even been proposed, much less endorsed by the majority of LW. So the answer to your question (“Why do people believe it?”) is, as far as I can tell, “They don’t.” My question, however, is why you think this is something really bad, as opposed to something just slightly bad.
If you look upthread, youll see that what I think is really bad is advising people not to study mainstream philosophy.
I also think it bad to call philosophy diseased for not being able to solve problems you can’t solve either.
And it might be an idea to add a warning to the metaethics sequences: “Before reading these million words, please note that they don’t go anywhere”.