1) that facts about her utility functions aren’t naturalistic facts, as facts about her > cholesterol level or about neural activity in different parts of her cortex, are,
And they are likely to riposte that facts about her UF are naturalistic just because they
can be inferred from her behaviour. You seem to be in need of a narrow,
sipulative definition of naturalistic.
Some people might say, eg, that an evolved, living system’s goal is to survive. If this is your thought, my challenge would be to show me what basic physical facts entail that conclusion.
You introduced the word “basic” there. It might be the case that goals disappear on
a very fine-grained atomistic view of things (along with rules and structures and various other things). But that would mean that goals aren’t basic physical facts. Naturalism tends to be defined more epistemically than physicalism, so the inferrabilty of UFs (or goals or intentions) from coarse-grained physical behaviour
is a good basis for supposing them to be natural by that usage.
And they are likely to riposte that facts about her UF are naturalistic just because they can be inferred from her behaviour.
But this is false, surely. I take it that a fact about X’s UF might be some such as ‘X prefers apples to pears’. First, notice that X may also prefer his/her philosophy TA to his/her chemistry TA. X has different designs on the TA than on the apple. So, properly stated, preferences are orderings of desires, the objects of which are states of affairs rather than simple things (X desires that X eat an apple more than that X eat a pear). Second, to impute desires such as these requires also imputing beliefs (you observe the apple gathering behaviour -naturalistically unproblematic- but you also need to impute to X the belief that the things gathered are apples. X might be picking the apples thinking they are pears). There’s any number of ways to attribute beliefs and desires in a manner consistent with the behaviour. No collection of merely naturalistic facts will constrain these. There have been lots of theories advanced which try, but the concensus, I think, is that there is no easy naturalistic solution.
And they are likely to riposte that facts about her UF are naturalistic just because they can be inferred from her behaviour.
But this is false, surely. I take it that a fact about X’s UF might be some such as ‘X prefers apples to pears’. First, notice that X may also prefer his/her philosophy TA to his/her chemistry TA. X has different designs on the TA than on the apple. So, properly stated, preferences are orderings of desires, the objects of which are states of affairs rather than simple things (X desires that X eat an apple more than that X eat a pear). Second, to impute desires such as these requires also imputing beliefs (you observe the apple gathering behaviour -naturalistically unproblematic- but you also need to impute to X the belief that the things gathered are apples. X might be picking the apples thinking they are pears). There’s any number of ways to attribute beliefs and desires in a manner consistent with the behaviour. No collection of merely naturalistic facts will constrain these. There have been lots of theories advances which try, but the concensus, I think, is that there is no easy naturalistic solution.
And they are likely to riposte that facts about her UF are naturalistic just because they can be inferred from her behaviour.
But this is false, surely. I take it that a fact about X’s UF might be some such as ‘X prefers apples to pears’. First, notice that X may also prefer his/her philosophy TA to his/her chemistry TA. X has different designs on the TA than on the apple. So, properly stated, preferences are orderings of desires, the objects of which are states of affairs rather than simple things (X desires that X eat an apple more than that X eat a pear). Second, to impute desires such as these requires also imputing beliefs (you observe the apple gathering behaviour -naturalistically unproblematic- but you also need to impute to X the belief that the things gathered are apples. X might be picking the apples thinking they are pears). There’s any number of ways to attribute beliefs and desires in a manner consistent with the behaviour. No number of merely naturalistic facts will constrain these. There have been any number of theories advances which try, but the concensus, I think, is that all fail.
And they are likely to riposte that facts about her UF are naturalistic just because they can be inferred from her behaviour.
But this is false, surely. I take it that a fact about X’s UF might be some such as ‘X prefers apples to pears’ (is this what you have in mind?) First, notice that X may also prefer his/her philosophy TA to his/her EM Fields and Waves TA. X has different designs on the TA than on the apple. So, properly stated, preferences are orderings of desires, the objects of which are states of affairs rather than simple things (X desires that X eat an apple more than that X eat a pear). Second, to impute desires such as these requires also imputing beliefs (you observe the apple gathering behaviour -naturalistically unproblematic- but you also need to impute to X the belief that the things gathered are apples. X might be picking the apples thinking they are pears). There’s any number of ways to attribute beliefs and desires in a manner consistent with the behaviour. No number of merely naturalistic facts will constrain these. There have been lots of theories advanced which try, but the concensus, I think, is that there’s no easy naturalistic solution.
And they are likely to riposte that facts about her UF are naturalistic just because they can be inferred from her behaviour. You seem to be in need of a narrow, sipulative definition of naturalistic.
You introduced the word “basic” there. It might be the case that goals disappear on a very fine-grained atomistic view of things (along with rules and structures and various other things). But that would mean that goals aren’t basic physical facts. Naturalism tends to be defined more epistemically than physicalism, so the inferrabilty of UFs (or goals or intentions) from coarse-grained physical behaviour is a good basis for supposing them to be natural by that usage.
But this is false, surely. I take it that a fact about X’s UF might be some such as ‘X prefers apples to pears’. First, notice that X may also prefer his/her philosophy TA to his/her chemistry TA. X has different designs on the TA than on the apple. So, properly stated, preferences are orderings of desires, the objects of which are states of affairs rather than simple things (X desires that X eat an apple more than that X eat a pear). Second, to impute desires such as these requires also imputing beliefs (you observe the apple gathering behaviour -naturalistically unproblematic- but you also need to impute to X the belief that the things gathered are apples. X might be picking the apples thinking they are pears). There’s any number of ways to attribute beliefs and desires in a manner consistent with the behaviour. No collection of merely naturalistic facts will constrain these. There have been lots of theories advanced which try, but the concensus, I think, is that there is no easy naturalistic solution.
Oh, that’s the philosopher’s definition of naturalistic. OTOH, you could just adopt the scientists version and scan their brain.
Well, alright, please tell me: what is a Utility Function, that it can be inferred from a brain scan? How’s this supposed to work, in broad terms?
But this is false, surely. I take it that a fact about X’s UF might be some such as ‘X prefers apples to pears’. First, notice that X may also prefer his/her philosophy TA to his/her chemistry TA. X has different designs on the TA than on the apple. So, properly stated, preferences are orderings of desires, the objects of which are states of affairs rather than simple things (X desires that X eat an apple more than that X eat a pear). Second, to impute desires such as these requires also imputing beliefs (you observe the apple gathering behaviour -naturalistically unproblematic- but you also need to impute to X the belief that the things gathered are apples. X might be picking the apples thinking they are pears). There’s any number of ways to attribute beliefs and desires in a manner consistent with the behaviour. No collection of merely naturalistic facts will constrain these. There have been lots of theories advances which try, but the concensus, I think, is that there is no easy naturalistic solution.
But this is false, surely. I take it that a fact about X’s UF might be some such as ‘X prefers apples to pears’. First, notice that X may also prefer his/her philosophy TA to his/her chemistry TA. X has different designs on the TA than on the apple. So, properly stated, preferences are orderings of desires, the objects of which are states of affairs rather than simple things (X desires that X eat an apple more than that X eat a pear). Second, to impute desires such as these requires also imputing beliefs (you observe the apple gathering behaviour -naturalistically unproblematic- but you also need to impute to X the belief that the things gathered are apples. X might be picking the apples thinking they are pears). There’s any number of ways to attribute beliefs and desires in a manner consistent with the behaviour. No number of merely naturalistic facts will constrain these. There have been any number of theories advances which try, but the concensus, I think, is that all fail.
But this is false, surely. I take it that a fact about X’s UF might be some such as ‘X prefers apples to pears’ (is this what you have in mind?) First, notice that X may also prefer his/her philosophy TA to his/her EM Fields and Waves TA. X has different designs on the TA than on the apple. So, properly stated, preferences are orderings of desires, the objects of which are states of affairs rather than simple things (X desires that X eat an apple more than that X eat a pear). Second, to impute desires such as these requires also imputing beliefs (you observe the apple gathering behaviour -naturalistically unproblematic- but you also need to impute to X the belief that the things gathered are apples. X might be picking the apples thinking they are pears). There’s any number of ways to attribute beliefs and desires in a manner consistent with the behaviour. No number of merely naturalistic facts will constrain these. There have been lots of theories advanced which try, but the concensus, I think, is that there’s no easy naturalistic solution.