In the example he does start with a word, namely ‘art’, then uses our intuition to get a set of examples. This is more-or-less how conceptual analysis works.
I disagree. Suppose after proposing a definition of art based to the listed examples, someone produced another example that clearly satisfied our intuitions of what constituted art but didn’t satisfy the definitions. Would Eliezer:
a) say “sorry despite our intuitions that example isn’t art by definition”, or
b) conclude that the example was art and there was a problem with the definition?
He’s not trying to define art in accord with on our collective intuitions, he’s trying to find the simplest boundary around a list of examples based on an individual’s intuitions.
I would argue that the list of examples in the article is abbreviated for simplicity. If there is no single clear simple boundary between the two sets, one can always ask for more examples. But one asks an individual and not all of humanity.
He’s not trying to define art in accord with on our collective intuitions, he’s trying to find the simplest boundary around a list of examples based on an individual’s intuitions.
I would argue he’s trying to find the simplest coherent extrapolation of our intuitions.
Why do we even care about what specifically Eliezer Yudkowsky was trying to do in that post? Isn’t “is it more helpful to try to find the simplest boundary around a list or the simplest coherent explanation of intuitions?” a much better question?
Focus on what matters, work on actually solving problems instead of trying to just win arguments.
The answer to your question is “it depends on the situation”. There are some situations in which are intuitions contain some useful, hidden information which we can extract with this method. There are some situation in which our intuitions differ and it makes sense to consider a bunch of separate lists.
But, regardless, it is simply the case that when Eliezer says
“Perhaps you come to me with a long list of the things that you call “art” and “not art”″
and
“It feels intuitive to me to draw this boundary, but I don’t know why—can you find me an intension that matches this extension? Can you give me a simple description of this boundary?”
he is not talking about “our intuitions”, but a single list provided by a single person.
(It is also the case that I would rather talk about that than whatever useless thing I would instead be doing with my time.)
In the example he does start with a word, namely ‘art’, then uses our intuition to get a set of examples. This is more-or-less how conceptual analysis works.
But he’s not analyzing “art”, he’s analyzing the set of examples, and that is all the difference.
I disagree. Suppose after proposing a definition of art based to the listed examples, someone produced another example that clearly satisfied our intuitions of what constituted art but didn’t satisfy the definitions. Would Eliezer:
a) say “sorry despite our intuitions that example isn’t art by definition”, or
b) conclude that the example was art and there was a problem with the definition?
I’m guessing (b).
He’s not trying to define art in accord with on our collective intuitions, he’s trying to find the simplest boundary around a list of examples based on an individual’s intuitions.
I would argue that the list of examples in the article is abbreviated for simplicity. If there is no single clear simple boundary between the two sets, one can always ask for more examples. But one asks an individual and not all of humanity.
I would argue he’s trying to find the simplest coherent extrapolation of our intuitions.
Why do we even care about what specifically Eliezer Yudkowsky was trying to do in that post? Isn’t “is it more helpful to try to find the simplest boundary around a list or the simplest coherent explanation of intuitions?” a much better question?
Focus on what matters, work on actually solving problems instead of trying to just win arguments.
The answer to your question is “it depends on the situation”. There are some situations in which are intuitions contain some useful, hidden information which we can extract with this method. There are some situation in which our intuitions differ and it makes sense to consider a bunch of separate lists.
But, regardless, it is simply the case that when Eliezer says
“Perhaps you come to me with a long list of the things that you call “art” and “not art”″
and
“It feels intuitive to me to draw this boundary, but I don’t know why—can you find me an intension that matches this extension? Can you give me a simple description of this boundary?”
he is not talking about “our intuitions”, but a single list provided by a single person.
(It is also the case that I would rather talk about that than whatever useless thing I would instead be doing with my time.)