Well, if you reason that way, you will end up two-boxing. And, of course, Omega will know that you will end up two-boxing. Therefore, he will put nothing in Box B. If, on the other hand, you had chosen to one-box instead, Omega would have known that, too. And he would have put $1000000 in Box B. If you say, “Oh, the contents of the boxes are already fixed, so I’m gonna two-box!”, there is not going to be anything in Box B. It doesn’t matter what reasoning you use to justify two-boxing, or how elaborate your argument is; if you end up two-boxing, you are going to get $1000 with probability (Omega’s-predictive-power)%. Sure, you can say, “The boxes are already filled,” but guess what? If you do that, you’re not going to get any money. (Well, I mean, you’ll get $1000, but you could have gotten $1000000.) Remember, the goal of a rationalist is to win. If you want to win, you will one-box. Period.
You chose to two-box in this hypothetical Newcomb’s Problem when you said earlier in this thread that you would two-box. Fortunately, since this is a hypothetical, you don’t actually gain or lose any utility from answering as you did, but had this been a real-life Newcomb-like situation, you would have. If (I’m actually tempted to say “when”, but that discussion can be held another time) you ever encounter a real-life Newcomb-like situation, I strongly recommend you one-box (or whatever the equivalent of one-boxing is in that situation).
I don’t believe real-life Newcomb situations exist or will exist in my future.
I also think that the local usage of “Newcomb-like” is misleading in that it is used to refer to situations which don’t have much to do with the classic Newcomb’s Problem.
I strongly recommend you one-box
You recommendation was considered and rejected :-)
I don’t believe real-life Newcomb situations exist or will exist in my future.
It is my understanding that Newcomb-like situations arise whenever you deal with agents who possess predictive capabilities greater than chance. It appears, however, that you do not agree with this statement. If it’s not too inconvenient, could you explain why?
Well, if you reason that way, you will end up two-boxing. And, of course, Omega will know that you will end up two-boxing. Therefore, he will put nothing in Box B. If, on the other hand, you had chosen to one-box instead, Omega would have known that, too. And he would have put $1000000 in Box B. If you say, “Oh, the contents of the boxes are already fixed, so I’m gonna two-box!”, there is not going to be anything in Box B. It doesn’t matter what reasoning you use to justify two-boxing, or how elaborate your argument is; if you end up two-boxing, you are going to get $1000 with probability (Omega’s-predictive-power)%. Sure, you can say, “The boxes are already filled,” but guess what? If you do that, you’re not going to get any money. (Well, I mean, you’ll get $1000, but you could have gotten $1000000.) Remember, the goal of a rationalist is to win. If you want to win, you will one-box. Period.
Notice the tense you are using: “had chosen”. When did that choice happen? (for a standard participant)
You chose to two-box in this hypothetical Newcomb’s Problem when you said earlier in this thread that you would two-box. Fortunately, since this is a hypothetical, you don’t actually gain or lose any utility from answering as you did, but had this been a real-life Newcomb-like situation, you would have. If (I’m actually tempted to say “when”, but that discussion can be held another time) you ever encounter a real-life Newcomb-like situation, I strongly recommend you one-box (or whatever the equivalent of one-boxing is in that situation).
I don’t believe real-life Newcomb situations exist or will exist in my future.
I also think that the local usage of “Newcomb-like” is misleading in that it is used to refer to situations which don’t have much to do with the classic Newcomb’s Problem.
You recommendation was considered and rejected :-)
It is my understanding that Newcomb-like situations arise whenever you deal with agents who possess predictive capabilities greater than chance. It appears, however, that you do not agree with this statement. If it’s not too inconvenient, could you explain why?
Can you define what is a “Newcomb-like” situation and how can I distinguish such from a non-Newcomb-like one?