Except when the evil guys take over, Then you are in trouble if you oppose them.
Which is why the effective scope of morality is limited by concentrated power, as I said.
That doesn’t affect my point. If there are actual or conceptual circumstances where instrumental good diverges from moral good, the two cannot be equated.
I did not equate moral good with instrumental good in the first place.
Why would it be wrong if they do?
I didn’t say it would be wrong. I was talking about making predictions. The usefulness of morality in helping you to predict outcomes is limited by concentrated power.
You theory of morality seems to be in need of another theory of morality to justify it.
On the contrary, my theory of morality is confirmed by the evidence. You yourself supplied some of the evidence. You pointed out that a concentration of power creates an exception to the prediction that someone who guns down random people will be neutralized. But this exception fits with my theory of morality, since my theory of morality is that it is the spontaneous self-regulation of humanity. Concentrated power interferes with self-regulation.
I did not equate moral good with instrumental good in the first place.
...but you also say...
The usefulness of morality in helping you to predict outcomes
..which seems to imply that you are still thinking of morality as something that has
to pay its way instrumentally, by making useful predictions.
On the contrary, my theory of morality is confirmed by the evidence[..]But this exception fits with my theory of morality, since my theory of morality is that it is the spontaneous self-regulation of humanity. Concentrated power interferes with self-regulation.
It’s a conceptual truth that power interferes with spontaneous self-regulation: but that isn’t the point. The point is not that you have a theory that makes predictions, but
whether it is a theory of morality.
It is dubious to say of any society that the way it is organised is ipso facto moral. You have forestalled the relativistic problem by saying that socieites must self organise for equality and justice, not any old way, which
takes it as read that equality and justice are Good Things. But an ethical theory
must explain why they are good, not rest on them as a given.
..which seems to imply that you are still thinking of morality as something that has to pay its way instrumentally, by making useful predictions.
“Has to”? I don’t remember saying “has to”. I remember saying “does”, or words to that effect. I was disputing the following claim:
The difference is, believing “The world is round” affects whether I win or not, whereas believing “I’m morally in the wrong” does not.
This is factually false, considered as a claim about the real world.
It is dubious to say of any society that the way it is organised is ipso facto moral. You have forestalled the relativistic problem by saying that socieites must self organise for equality and justice, not any old way, which takes it as read that equality and justice are Good Things. But an ethical theory must explain why they are good, not rest on them as a given.
I am presenting the hypothesis that, under certain constraints, there is no way for humanity to organize itself but morally or close to morally and that it does organize itself morally or close to morally. The most important constraint is that the organization is spontaneous, that is to say, that it does not rely on a central power forcing everyone to follow the same rules invented by that same central power. Another constraint is absence of war, though I think this constraint is already implicit in the idea of “spontaneous order” that I am making use of, since war destroys order and prevents order.
Because humans organize themselves morally, it is possible to make predictions. However, because of the “no central power” constraint, the scope of those predictions is limited to areas outside the control of the central power.
Fortunately for those of us who seek to make predictions on the basis of morality, and also fortunately for people in general, even though the planet is covered with centralized states, much of life still remains largely outside of their control.
I am presenting the hypothesis that, under certain constraints, there is no way for humanity to organize itself but morally or close to morally and that it does organize itself morally or close to morally.
is that a stipulative definition(“morality” =def “spontaneous organisation”) or
is there some independent standard of morality on which it based?
The most important constraint is that the organization is spontaneous, that is to say, that it does not rely on a central power forcing everyone to follow the same rules invented by that same central power.
What about non-centralised power? What if one fairly large group—the gentry, men, citizens, some racial group, have power over another in a decentralised way?
And what counts as a society? Can an Athenian slave-owner state that all citizens in their society are equal, and, as for slaves, they are not members of their society.
ETA:
Actually, it’s worse than that. Not only are there examples of non-centralised power,there are cases where centralised power is on the side of angels
and spontaneous self-organisation on the the other side; for instance
the Civil Rights struggle, where the federal government backed equality,
and the opposition was from the grassroots.
ETA: Actually, it’s worse than that. Not only are there examples of non-centralised power,there are cases where centralised power is on the side of angels and spontaneous self-organisation on the the other side; for instance the Civil Rights struggle, where the federal government backed equality, and the opposition was from the grassroots.
The Civil Rights struggle was national government versus state government, not government versus people. The Jim Crow laws were laws created by state legislatures, not spontaneous laws created by the people.
There is, by the way, such a thing as spontaneous law created by the people even under the state. The book Order Without Law is about this. The “order” it refers to is the spontaneous law—that is, the spontaneous self-government of the people acting privately, without help from the state. This spontaneous self-government ignores and in some cases contradicts the state’s official, legislated law.
Jim Crow was an example of official state law, and not an example of spontaneous order.
The Civil Rights struggle was national government versus state government, not government versus people. The Jim Crow laws were laws created by state legislatures, not spontaneous laws created by the people.
Plenty of things that happened weren’t sanctioned by state legislatures, such as discrimination by private lawyers, hassling of voters during registration drives,
and the assassination of MLK
There is, by the way, such a thing as spontaneous law created by the people even under the state.
But law isn’t morality. There is such a thing as a laws that apply only to certain
people, and which support privilege and the status quo rather than equality and
justice.
Plenty of things that happened weren’t sanctioned by state legislatures, such as discrimination by private lawyers, hassling of voters during registration drives, and the assassination of MLK
Legislation distorts society and the distortion ripples outward. As for the assassination, that was a single act. Order is a statistical regularity.
But law isn’t morality.
I didn’t say it was. I pointed out an example of spontaneous order. It is my thesis that spontaneous order tends to be moral. Much order is spontaneous, so much order is moral, so you can make predictions on the basis of what is moral. That should not be confused with a claim that all order is morality, that all law is morality, which is the claim that you are disputing and a claim I did not make.
From it’s primordial state of equality...? I can see how a society that starts equal might self organise to stay that way. But I don’t think they start equal that often.
Which is why the effective scope of morality is limited by concentrated power, as I said.
I did not equate moral good with instrumental good in the first place.
I didn’t say it would be wrong. I was talking about making predictions. The usefulness of morality in helping you to predict outcomes is limited by concentrated power.
On the contrary, my theory of morality is confirmed by the evidence. You yourself supplied some of the evidence. You pointed out that a concentration of power creates an exception to the prediction that someone who guns down random people will be neutralized. But this exception fits with my theory of morality, since my theory of morality is that it is the spontaneous self-regulation of humanity. Concentrated power interferes with self-regulation.
You say:
...but you also say...
..which seems to imply that you are still thinking of morality as something that has to pay its way instrumentally, by making useful predictions.
It’s a conceptual truth that power interferes with spontaneous self-regulation: but that isn’t the point. The point is not that you have a theory that makes predictions, but whether it is a theory of morality.
It is dubious to say of any society that the way it is organised is ipso facto moral. You have forestalled the relativistic problem by saying that socieites must self organise for equality and justice, not any old way, which takes it as read that equality and justice are Good Things. But an ethical theory must explain why they are good, not rest on them as a given.
“Has to”? I don’t remember saying “has to”. I remember saying “does”, or words to that effect. I was disputing the following claim:
This is factually false, considered as a claim about the real world.
I am presenting the hypothesis that, under certain constraints, there is no way for humanity to organize itself but morally or close to morally and that it does organize itself morally or close to morally. The most important constraint is that the organization is spontaneous, that is to say, that it does not rely on a central power forcing everyone to follow the same rules invented by that same central power. Another constraint is absence of war, though I think this constraint is already implicit in the idea of “spontaneous order” that I am making use of, since war destroys order and prevents order.
Because humans organize themselves morally, it is possible to make predictions. However, because of the “no central power” constraint, the scope of those predictions is limited to areas outside the control of the central power.
Fortunately for those of us who seek to make predictions on the basis of morality, and also fortunately for people in general, even though the planet is covered with centralized states, much of life still remains largely outside of their control.
is that a stipulative definition(“morality” =def “spontaneous organisation”) or is there some independent standard of morality on which it based?
What about non-centralised power? What if one fairly large group—the gentry, men, citizens, some racial group, have power over another in a decentralised way?
And what counts as a society? Can an Athenian slave-owner state that all citizens in their society are equal, and, as for slaves, they are not members of their society.
ETA: Actually, it’s worse than that. Not only are there examples of non-centralised power,there are cases where centralised power is on the side of angels and spontaneous self-organisation on the the other side; for instance the Civil Rights struggle, where the federal government backed equality, and the opposition was from the grassroots.
The Civil Rights struggle was national government versus state government, not government versus people. The Jim Crow laws were laws created by state legislatures, not spontaneous laws created by the people.
There is, by the way, such a thing as spontaneous law created by the people even under the state. The book Order Without Law is about this. The “order” it refers to is the spontaneous law—that is, the spontaneous self-government of the people acting privately, without help from the state. This spontaneous self-government ignores and in some cases contradicts the state’s official, legislated law.
Jim Crow was an example of official state law, and not an example of spontaneous order.
Plenty of things that happened weren’t sanctioned by state legislatures, such as discrimination by private lawyers, hassling of voters during registration drives, and the assassination of MLK
But law isn’t morality. There is such a thing as a laws that apply only to certain people, and which support privilege and the status quo rather than equality and justice.
Legislation distorts society and the distortion ripples outward. As for the assassination, that was a single act. Order is a statistical regularity.
I didn’t say it was. I pointed out an example of spontaneous order. It is my thesis that spontaneous order tends to be moral. Much order is spontaneous, so much order is moral, so you can make predictions on the basis of what is moral. That should not be confused with a claim that all order is morality, that all law is morality, which is the claim that you are disputing and a claim I did not make.
From it’s primordial state of equality...? I can see how a society that starts equal might self organise to stay that way. But I don’t think they start equal that often.