(3) If it were the case that (not-P), S would not believe that P
(4) If it were the case that P, S would believe that P
I’m genuinely surprised. Condition 4 seems blatantly unnecessary and I had thought analytic philosophers (and Nozick in particular) more competent than that. Am I missing something?
Your hunch is right. Starting on page 179 of Nozick’s Philosophical explanations, he address counterexamples like the one that Will Sawin proposed. In response, he gives a modified version of his criteria. As near as I can tell, my first counterexample still breaks it, though.
I’m genuinely surprised. Condition 4 seems blatantly unnecessary and I had thought analytic philosophers (and Nozick in particular) more competent than that. Am I missing something?
Your hunch is right. Starting on page 179 of Nozick’s Philosophical explanations, he address counterexamples like the one that Will Sawin proposed. In response, he gives a modified version of his criteria. As near as I can tell, my first counterexample still breaks it, though.