A standard example for the threats and promises section is the police and rule of law, who in large part work by threatening violence/imprisonment. However, the ratio of times we choose not to break the law, to times we do and the threat comes through, is massive, and I imagine it looks incredibly cost-effective from the standpoint of government.
Those were also really interesting conclusions regarding MAD, that I’d want to help my opponent build tech that could do a second-strike, and also that the incentive would be to stockpile nukes. The position of America and Russia atm is no longer obviously bad to me (as opposed to a position where they each reduce to like 10-50 nukes), and might even just be pretty optimal.
Anyhow, I really appreciate people reading valuable books and writing up their new insights in a clear and concise manner, and these were all very interesting, so I’ve curated this post.
A standard example for the threats and promises section is the police and rule of law, who in large part work by threatening violence/imprisonment. However, the ratio of times we choose not to break the law, to times we do and the threat comes through, is massive, and I imagine it looks incredibly cost-effective from the standpoint of government.
Those were also really interesting conclusions regarding MAD, that I’d want to help my opponent build tech that could do a second-strike, and also that the incentive would be to stockpile nukes. The position of America and Russia atm is no longer obviously bad to me (as opposed to a position where they each reduce to like 10-50 nukes), and might even just be pretty optimal.
Anyhow, I really appreciate people reading valuable books and writing up their new insights in a clear and concise manner, and these were all very interesting, so I’ve curated this post.
Nitpick: I think you have this reversed. The ratio is actually large, right?
Thou art correct, and I’ve edited my comment accordingly.