Substance dualists generally insist upon the “stillbirth” or p-zombie possibilities
You don’t have to be a substance dualist to believe a sim could be a zombie: there’s an argument based on physicalism.
Computation isn’t causation. Computation is essentially a lossy, high level description of the physical behaviour. It’s possible for qualia to depend on some aspects of the physics that isn’t captured the computational description …which means that out of two systems running the same algorithm on different hardware,one could have qualia , but the other not. The other is a kind of zombie, but not a p-zombie because of the physical difference. Moreover, it’s possible,given physicalism , for qualia to depend on the real physics ,not on comoutattii a at that level of granularity.
You don’t have to be a substance dualist to believe a sim could be a zombie: there’s an argument based on physicalism.
Computation isn’t causation. Computation is essentially a lossy, high level description of the physical behaviour. It’s possible for qualia to depend on some aspects of the physics that isn’t captured the computational description …which means that out of two systems running the same algorithm on different hardware,one could have qualia , but the other not. The other is a kind of zombie, but not a p-zombie because of the physical difference. Moreover, it’s possible,given physicalism , for qualia to depend on the real physics ,not on comoutattii a at that level of granularity.