The unemployment rate doesn’t accurately represent this. I’d say labor force participation rate in males is a more accurate reflection of the underlying issue.
Male labor force participation rate in the US has declined from 87.5% to 70% from 1950 to present, per federal reserve bank of St. Louis. I’ve sent them a query to get their exclusionary criteria for the base male labor force pool.
Me, I’m with Wiener. His worries were ahead of his time, as people in the 50s and 60s expected household robots around the corner. People underestimated how hard general purpose AI would be. But between computing power, sensors, and improved algorithms, we’re starting to turn the corner. No mechanical Minnie the Maid yet, but automowers, roombas, automatic fruit pickers are economically viable for some, and will only get more and more so as time goes on.
I’m disappointed in EY’s economic analysis, as it ignores all the frictional costs in hiring. Yes, if you ignore such things, by relative advantage arguments everyone who wants a job has one. Since that is observably not the world we live in, those costs are clearly relevant to the analysis. Also, the wage under that perfectly efficient system may be a penny an hour.
Not everyone will be economically viable under all conditions. Horses used to be economically viable as productive members of the work force, or productive tools, if you prefer. Now they’re mainly economically viable as pets or dinner. Most people don’t want either occupation.
The unemployment rate doesn’t accurately represent this. I’d say labor force participation rate in males is a more accurate reflection of the underlying issue.
Why?
Male labor force participation rate in the US has declined from 87.5% to 70% from 1950 to present, per federal reserve bank of St. Louis. I’ve sent them a query to get their exclusionary criteria for the base male labor force pool.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics gives a figure of 71% for males over the age of 16 in 2010. There are many confounding factors here:
We’re still recovering from a recession — the rate was ~73% before the recession.
Since 1950 high school completion has increased from ~ 55% to 80% and college completion has increased from ~ 5% to ~ 25% so there are more students nowadays.
Since 1950, life expectancy for men has increased from 66 to 76, and labor force participation rate of 65-75 year olds is unrepresentatively small, at about 30%.
I’m disappointed in EY’s economic analysis, as it ignores all the frictional costs in hiring. Yes, if you ignore such things, by relative advantage arguments everyone who wants a job has one. Since that is observably not the world we live in, those costs are clearly relevant to the analysis. Also, the wage under that perfectly efficient system may be a penny an hour.
Automation could reduce the cost of hiring.
I don’t see why one would expect the frictional cost of hiring to push against hiring human workers at equilibrium.
Workers wouldn’t be willing to work for 1 cent an hour, so the wage under a perfectly efficient system would have to be higher than 1 cent an hour.
There could be a Malthusian type scenario where everyone is working really hard just to have a life barely worth living. But this is separate from the unemployment issue.
Take Uber, Sidecar, and Lyft as examples. I can’t find any data, but anecdotally these services appear to reduce the cost, and increase the wages, for patrons and drivers respectively by between 20 and 50%, with increased convenience for both. You know it’s working when entrenched, competing sectors of the industry are protesting and lobbying.
Eliezer’s suggestion about forgotten industries (maids and butlers) seems much more on point if automatic markets can remove hiring friction. Ride sharing has a rapidly-converging rating system that, with high-success, pairs drivers and riders, a paradigm that seems like it could succeed elsewhere with (if slow) changes in legality and public perception. Twenty years ago it would have nothing but incredible to not hold in your hand items costing a month’s wage before buying them and waiting two days for them to appear on your doorstep. If there’s a coming analogous revolution for the workforce, it could be even shorter, which puts it far out of reach of major AGI advances.
Twenty years ago it would have nothing but incredible to not hold in your hand items costing a month’s wage before buying them and waiting two days for them to appear on your doorstep.
This first catalogue was a single sheet of paper with a price list, 8 by 12 inches, showing the merchandise for sale and ordering instructions. Montgomery Ward identified a market of merchant-wary farmers in the Midwest. Within two decades, his single-page list of products grew into a 540-page illustrated book selling over 20,000 items. From about 1921 to 1931, Ward sold prefabricated kit houses, called Wardway Homes, by mail order.[4]
Unless of course you were putting your emphasis on 2-day mailing. I suspect Ward couldn’t sell you a new house and deliver it in 2 days.
The unemployment rate doesn’t accurately represent this. I’d say labor force participation rate in males is a more accurate reflection of the underlying issue.
Male labor force participation rate in the US has declined from 87.5% to 70% from 1950 to present, per federal reserve bank of St. Louis. I’ve sent them a query to get their exclusionary criteria for the base male labor force pool.
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/LNS11300001
Me, I’m with Wiener. His worries were ahead of his time, as people in the 50s and 60s expected household robots around the corner. People underestimated how hard general purpose AI would be. But between computing power, sensors, and improved algorithms, we’re starting to turn the corner. No mechanical Minnie the Maid yet, but automowers, roombas, automatic fruit pickers are economically viable for some, and will only get more and more so as time goes on.
I’m disappointed in EY’s economic analysis, as it ignores all the frictional costs in hiring. Yes, if you ignore such things, by relative advantage arguments everyone who wants a job has one. Since that is observably not the world we live in, those costs are clearly relevant to the analysis. Also, the wage under that perfectly efficient system may be a penny an hour.
Not everyone will be economically viable under all conditions. Horses used to be economically viable as productive members of the work force, or productive tools, if you prefer. Now they’re mainly economically viable as pets or dinner. Most people don’t want either occupation.
Why?
The Bureau of Labor Statistics gives a figure of 71% for males over the age of 16 in 2010. There are many confounding factors here:
We’re still recovering from a recession — the rate was ~73% before the recession.
Since 1950 high school completion has increased from ~ 55% to 80% and college completion has increased from ~ 5% to ~ 25% so there are more students nowadays.
Since 1950, female participation labor force participation rate has increased by ~ 25 absolute percentage points, lessening the need for the male head of household to work.
Since 1950, life expectancy for men has increased from 66 to 76, and labor force participation rate of 65-75 year olds is unrepresentatively small, at about 30%.
Automation could reduce the cost of hiring.
I don’t see why one would expect the frictional cost of hiring to push against hiring human workers at equilibrium.
Workers wouldn’t be willing to work for 1 cent an hour, so the wage under a perfectly efficient system would have to be higher than 1 cent an hour.
There could be a Malthusian type scenario where everyone is working really hard just to have a life barely worth living. But this is separate from the unemployment issue.
Take Uber, Sidecar, and Lyft as examples. I can’t find any data, but anecdotally these services appear to reduce the cost, and increase the wages, for patrons and drivers respectively by between 20 and 50%, with increased convenience for both. You know it’s working when entrenched, competing sectors of the industry are protesting and lobbying.
Eliezer’s suggestion about forgotten industries (maids and butlers) seems much more on point if automatic markets can remove hiring friction. Ride sharing has a rapidly-converging rating system that, with high-success, pairs drivers and riders, a paradigm that seems like it could succeed elsewhere with (if slow) changes in legality and public perception. Twenty years ago it would have nothing but incredible to not hold in your hand items costing a month’s wage before buying them and waiting two days for them to appear on your doorstep. If there’s a coming analogous revolution for the workforce, it could be even shorter, which puts it far out of reach of major AGI advances.
Er… mail-order is old. Very old. Like, ordinary farmers in the Midwest would easily send off to Montgomery Ward orders for hugely expensive things like farming equipment. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mail_order#Ward:_mail_order_pioneer :
Unless of course you were putting your emphasis on 2-day mailing. I suspect Ward couldn’t sell you a new house and deliver it in 2 days.