Yes, QM came about because of the recognition that classical physics is wrong. (I would take issue with some details of your one-sentence summary, but it doesn’t matter.) But then you leap from there to “the recognition that there is no material, mechanical explanation of all phenomena”, which is something entirely different.
Bell’s inequality and Aspect’s experiments demonstrating its violation don’t say that there is no material, mechanical explanation of all phenomena. They place limits on what sorts of material, mechanical explanation there might be.
I have no idea how you can (1) say that there is nothing wrong with Eliezer’s commitment to understanding minds in terms of brains, having (0) described his application here of that commitment as “someone unhesitatingly repeating a meme” and, unless I misunderstood your opening comment, characterized his position as that of an unconvinceable “true believer”.
Could you please explain either what grounds you have for thinking that Eliezer thinks that “science demands material, mechanical explanations” or else what grounds you have for thinking that QM shows this to be wrong? (I’m fairly sure that one of those is silly, but which one depends on what you mean by “material, mechanical explanations”.)
It seems to me that abandoning the search for material, mechanical explanations makes the problems you list less problematic only if what you actually do is to abandon the search for explanations. I’ve never seen the least hint of a non-material-mechanical explanation for any of them that actually explains anything.
Yes, QM came about because of the recognition that classical physics is wrong. (I would take issue with some details of your one-sentence summary, but it doesn’t matter.) But then you leap from there to “the recognition that there is no material, mechanical explanation of all phenomena”, which is something entirely different.
Bell’s inequality and Aspect’s experiments demonstrating its violation don’t say that there is no material, mechanical explanation of all phenomena. They place limits on what sorts of material, mechanical explanation there might be.
I have no idea how you can (1) say that there is nothing wrong with Eliezer’s commitment to understanding minds in terms of brains, having (0) described his application here of that commitment as “someone unhesitatingly repeating a meme” and, unless I misunderstood your opening comment, characterized his position as that of an unconvinceable “true believer”.
Could you please explain either what grounds you have for thinking that Eliezer thinks that “science demands material, mechanical explanations” or else what grounds you have for thinking that QM shows this to be wrong? (I’m fairly sure that one of those is silly, but which one depends on what you mean by “material, mechanical explanations”.)
It seems to me that abandoning the search for material, mechanical explanations makes the problems you list less problematic only if what you actually do is to abandon the search for explanations. I’ve never seen the least hint of a non-material-mechanical explanation for any of them that actually explains anything.