g- quantum physics came about because of the recognition that classical physics is wrong. The problem that Max Planck solved by introducing the quantum was “How could any object in this universe exist without that object emitting so much energy that everything would be instantly vaporized?” Not a small problem.
The recognition that there is no material, mechanical explaination of all phenomena was important to the development of the new science and the new scientific view of the universe. The revolution was completed (in terms of the experimental evidence) with the Aspect experiments and Bell’s theorem. The revolution in terms of cached thought is continuing.
There is nothing wrong with Eliezer’s commitment, a commitment I respect.
The idea that science demands material, mechanical explainations is the cached thought that I was pointing out as not true. I believe that would be a valid example of what the post is about.
Specific difficulties in neuroscience and philosophy include:
The one mentioned by Eliezer in his post, the binding problem( there is no place in your brain where what you experience comes together the way you experience it), the self (there is no “I” in the brain), the experience of conscious will as being causully efficacious, the observed instances of fully functional human beings who have little or no brain, memory (no memory banks in the brain)...
g- quantum physics came about because of the recognition that classical physics is wrong. The problem that Max Planck solved by introducing the quantum was “How could any object in this universe exist without that object emitting so much energy that everything would be instantly vaporized?” Not a small problem. The recognition that there is no material, mechanical explaination of all phenomena was important to the development of the new science and the new scientific view of the universe. The revolution was completed (in terms of the experimental evidence) with the Aspect experiments and Bell’s theorem. The revolution in terms of cached thought is continuing. There is nothing wrong with Eliezer’s commitment, a commitment I respect. The idea that science demands material, mechanical explainations is the cached thought that I was pointing out as not true. I believe that would be a valid example of what the post is about. Specific difficulties in neuroscience and philosophy include: The one mentioned by Eliezer in his post, the binding problem( there is no place in your brain where what you experience comes together the way you experience it), the self (there is no “I” in the brain), the experience of conscious will as being causully efficacious, the observed instances of fully functional human beings who have little or no brain, memory (no memory banks in the brain)...