Sort-of agree. The Bayesian formulation of a similar strategy is: Don’t bother remembering an answer to a question when that answer is the same as what you would derive from the ignorance prior. i.e. discard evidence whose likelihood ratio is near 1. However, the prior isn’t always 50%.
Cool. I guess I never thought about what the distinction between active and passive disbelief would be for a Bayesian. It makes perfect sense now that I think about it… and it would have certainly made a whole bunch of discussions in my past a lot easier.
No, that makes sense to me. You have essentially no information about whether a statement is more likely to be true or false at that percentage range.
Sort-of agree. The Bayesian formulation of a similar strategy is: Don’t bother remembering an answer to a question when that answer is the same as what you would derive from the ignorance prior. i.e. discard evidence whose likelihood ratio is near 1. However, the prior isn’t always 50%.
Cool. I guess I never thought about what the distinction between active and passive disbelief would be for a Bayesian. It makes perfect sense now that I think about it… and it would have certainly made a whole bunch of discussions in my past a lot easier.
Pssh. Always learning something new, I guess.