I don’t think I know of anyone who believes that everything is explicable in terms of causally things that have mass and exist as solid, liquid or gas, still less that everything must be. And I can’t imagine how anything in Eliezer’s original post suggests that he’s insisting on any such limitation.
Neither can I see how this has anything to do with QM (except, I guess, that some versions of QM give us a universe with randomness in it as well as determinism), or with Feynman’s comment about machinery. (The fundamental laws known at any time are by definition laws that no one has found any machinery behind. This was just as true of Newton’s laws in 1700 as of QM in 2000.)
I don’t think I know of anyone who believes that everything is explicable in terms of causally things that have mass and exist as solid, liquid or gas, still less that everything must be. And I can’t imagine how anything in Eliezer’s original post suggests that he’s insisting on any such limitation.
Neither can I see how this has anything to do with QM (except, I guess, that some versions of QM give us a universe with randomness in it as well as determinism), or with Feynman’s comment about machinery. (The fundamental laws known at any time are by definition laws that no one has found any machinery behind. This was just as true of Newton’s laws in 1700 as of QM in 2000.)