To put the worthlessness of Somalia into perspective, here’s some numbers:
The GNP of Somalia is $2 billion.
This is almost assuredly due to the lack of a sound institutional structure which is needed for a market economy to develop. An invading country may be able to bring this structure to Somalia.
One thing Somalia has going for it: ports. An inland neighbor would love to have ports, I’m sure.
This is almost assuredly due to the lack of a sound institutional structure which is needed for a market economy to develop. An invading country may be able to bring this structure to Somalia.
It’s worth noting that before Ethiopia invaded with tacit US permission*, Somalia was being incrementally conquered and pieced back together by the Islamic Courts Union. The impression of them I got early on, before the US media began to consider them dangerous for being Islamic and fell in line behind the Ethiopian invasion, is that they did a pretty good job of governing—and certainly a better job than either the warlords or the government the Ethiopian installed.
This is almost assuredly due to the lack of a sound institutional structure which is needed for a market economy to develop. An invading country may be able to bring this structure to Somalia.
Said institutional structure would probably have to involve very few Somalis; broken governments and broken cultures tend to go hand in hand. The current attempt to introduce “rule of law” in Afghanistan is failing miserably in the face of widespread corruption. For example, local judges frequently rule in favor of whomever provides the largest bribe.
One would probably have to use Stalin-esque levels of oppression in order to successfully install such institutions in a lawless land. In the distant past, most rulers had no problems with ordering a few good massacres to keep the local population in line; it’s much harder to get away with that today, although the leadership of countries like Syria and Sudan don’t seem to be suffering very much.
One would probably have to use Stalin-esque levels of oppression in order to successfully install such institutions in a lawless land. In the distant past, most rulers had no problems with ordering a few good massacres to keep the local population in line; it’s much harder to get away with that today, although the leadership of countries like Syria and Sudan don’t seem to be suffering very much
If the invading country can somehow manage to stay out of the public eye, they could oppress as much as they want. However, this is probably more random than anything, though if the invaders are “communist liberators” it might help—though their economic policies probably wouldn’t be any good. All things considered, you’re right if the conversion is by force.
Ideally, the conversion wouldn’t be by force in the strong sense of the word—military police to come in and enforce some law and order, but otherwise live and let live. For this to work, the invaded country must not have any major cultural or ideological conflicts with their invaders, along with some other conditions that we don’t know about. These conditions probably aren’t in place for any given invader, but it remains a possibility.
Yes, the problem of developing good institutions is vexing. I doubt anyone knows much about how to do it.
Ports certainly are valuable. Ethiopia doesn’t want to depend on the Eritrean ports. But it’s a lot cheaper to pay taxes for Djibouti to maintain order in its port than for Ethiopia to create order in a Somali port. And to create order on the roads. Also, it’s probably expensive to cross the Ogaden plateau. Which brings us to the Somali rebellion in Ogaden, which would surely escalate if Ethiopia annexed Somalia. Maybe if Ogaden gained independence, it could annex Somalia.
But mainly, it’s Ethiopia’s failure to claim the ports that makes me doubt their worth. I dispute Eliezer’s claim that anyone would care. But some sense of propriety, perhaps Westphalian, prevents other countries from recognizing Somaliland.
This is almost assuredly due to the lack of a sound institutional structure which is needed for a market economy to develop. An invading country may be able to bring this structure to Somalia.
One thing Somalia has going for it: ports. An inland neighbor would love to have ports, I’m sure.
It’s worth noting that before Ethiopia invaded with tacit US permission*, Somalia was being incrementally conquered and pieced back together by the Islamic Courts Union. The impression of them I got early on, before the US media began to consider them dangerous for being Islamic and fell in line behind the Ethiopian invasion, is that they did a pretty good job of governing—and certainly a better job than either the warlords or the government the Ethiopian installed.
Arguably a major fuckup by both parties
Said institutional structure would probably have to involve very few Somalis; broken governments and broken cultures tend to go hand in hand. The current attempt to introduce “rule of law” in Afghanistan is failing miserably in the face of widespread corruption. For example, local judges frequently rule in favor of whomever provides the largest bribe.
One would probably have to use Stalin-esque levels of oppression in order to successfully install such institutions in a lawless land. In the distant past, most rulers had no problems with ordering a few good massacres to keep the local population in line; it’s much harder to get away with that today, although the leadership of countries like Syria and Sudan don’t seem to be suffering very much.
If the invading country can somehow manage to stay out of the public eye, they could oppress as much as they want. However, this is probably more random than anything, though if the invaders are “communist liberators” it might help—though their economic policies probably wouldn’t be any good. All things considered, you’re right if the conversion is by force.
Ideally, the conversion wouldn’t be by force in the strong sense of the word—military police to come in and enforce some law and order, but otherwise live and let live. For this to work, the invaded country must not have any major cultural or ideological conflicts with their invaders, along with some other conditions that we don’t know about. These conditions probably aren’t in place for any given invader, but it remains a possibility.
Yes, the problem of developing good institutions is vexing. I doubt anyone knows much about how to do it.
Ports certainly are valuable. Ethiopia doesn’t want to depend on the Eritrean ports. But it’s a lot cheaper to pay taxes for Djibouti to maintain order in its port than for Ethiopia to create order in a Somali port. And to create order on the roads. Also, it’s probably expensive to cross the Ogaden plateau. Which brings us to the Somali rebellion in Ogaden, which would surely escalate if Ethiopia annexed Somalia. Maybe if Ogaden gained independence, it could annex Somalia.
But mainly, it’s Ethiopia’s failure to claim the ports that makes me doubt their worth. I dispute Eliezer’s claim that anyone would care. But some sense of propriety, perhaps Westphalian, prevents other countries from recognizing Somaliland.