The rationalist category can reasonably includes people who are not building unified probabilistic models, even if LW-style rationalists are Bayesians, because they apply similarly structured epistemological methods even if their specific methods are different.
I think this is the part of the post where orthonormal is explicitly drawing a boundary that isn’t yet consensus. (So, yes, there’s probably a disagreement here).
I think there is a meaningful category of “people who use similarly structured epistemological methods, without necessarily having a unified probability model.” There’s a separate, smaller category of “people doing the unified probabilistic model thing.”
One could argue that either of those makes sense to call a rationalist, but you at least need to reference those different categories sometimes.
Also:
I think this is the part of the post where orthonormal is explicitly drawing a boundary that isn’t yet consensus. (So, yes, there’s probably a disagreement here).
I think there is a meaningful category of “people who use similarly structured epistemological methods, without necessarily having a unified probability model.” There’s a separate, smaller category of “people doing the unified probabilistic model thing.”
One could argue that either of those makes sense to call a rationalist, but you at least need to reference those different categories sometimes.