I see no reason that the reducibility of something would deny it’s potential status as something to be valued. I could value whirlpools without denying that they’re made of water, or (for an example closer to reality) literature without denying that it’s made up of words which are made up of letters.
Agreed. But if you read DanielLC’s argument he seem to think that that the reducibility of for example personal identity makes it unimportant in terms of value since it can be reduced to “mind frames” over time. Basically I wonder if his understanding of qualia (if that even such a thing really exists) would be totally wrong or could be reduced, would he then claim that mind frames are morally unimportant because the can be reduced to something ells or that the concept is misleading.
I see no reason that the reducibility of something would deny it’s potential status as something to be valued. I could value whirlpools without denying that they’re made of water, or (for an example closer to reality) literature without denying that it’s made up of words which are made up of letters.
Sorry for taking such a long time to answer.
Agreed. But if you read DanielLC’s argument he seem to think that that the reducibility of for example personal identity makes it unimportant in terms of value since it can be reduced to “mind frames” over time. Basically I wonder if his understanding of qualia (if that even such a thing really exists) would be totally wrong or could be reduced, would he then claim that mind frames are morally unimportant because the can be reduced to something ells or that the concept is misleading.