even if you were risk-averse in lives saved, which I do not think you should be, you should give all your donation to the charity that most aids the global diversification program. Splitting your donations implies being risk-averse in what you personally achieve, which is perverse.
Being risk-averse with respect to wealth utility is reasonable, and is empirically verified to be the case with most people. Wealth utility is a special case of the more general concept of utility regarding outcomes. Risk-averseness is reasonable for wealth utility because the risk is personal. The risk that the donation with the highest expected saving of lives in fact saves fewer lives than another donation is not a personal risk. So, I agree that, assuming accurate information about the probabilities, you should donate to get the maximum expected bang for the buck.
you should give all your donation to the charity that most aids the global diversification program. Splitting your donations implies being risk-averse in what you personally achieve, which is perverse.
Well, you have to have a very bizarre utility function, for sure. ;)
even if you were risk-averse in lives saved, which I do not think you should be
I’m not sure about this point. I can imagine having a preference for saving at least X lives, versus an outcome with equal mean, but a more broadly distributed probability function.
I can imagine having a preference for saving at least X lives
I feel like you’ve got a point here but I’m not quite getting it. Our preferences are defined over outcomes, and I struggle to see how “saving X lives” can be seen as an outcome—I see outcomes more along the lines of “X number of people are born and then die at age 5, Y number of people are born and then die at age 70″. You can’t necessarily point to any individual and say whether or not they were “saved”.
I generally think of “the utility of saving 6 lives” as a shorthand for something like “the difference in utility between (X people die at age 5, Y people die at age 70) and (X-6 people die at age 5, Y+6 people die at age 70)”.
We’d have to use more precise language if that utility varies a lot for different choices of X and Y, of course.
even if you were risk-averse in lives saved, which I do not think you should be, you should give all your donation to the charity that most aids the global diversification program. Splitting your donations implies being risk-averse in what you personally achieve, which is perverse.
Being risk-averse with respect to wealth utility is reasonable, and is empirically verified to be the case with most people. Wealth utility is a special case of the more general concept of utility regarding outcomes. Risk-averseness is reasonable for wealth utility because the risk is personal. The risk that the donation with the highest expected saving of lives in fact saves fewer lives than another donation is not a personal risk. So, I agree that, assuming accurate information about the probabilities, you should donate to get the maximum expected bang for the buck.
Well, you have to have a very bizarre utility function, for sure. ;)
I’m not sure about this point. I can imagine having a preference for saving at least X lives, versus an outcome with equal mean, but a more broadly distributed probability function.
I feel like you’ve got a point here but I’m not quite getting it. Our preferences are defined over outcomes, and I struggle to see how “saving X lives” can be seen as an outcome—I see outcomes more along the lines of “X number of people are born and then die at age 5, Y number of people are born and then die at age 70″. You can’t necessarily point to any individual and say whether or not they were “saved”.
I generally think of “the utility of saving 6 lives” as a shorthand for something like “the difference in utility between (X people die at age 5, Y people die at age 70) and (X-6 people die at age 5, Y+6 people die at age 70)”.
We’d have to use more precise language if that utility varies a lot for different choices of X and Y, of course.