It’s about continuity and quantitative commensurability of preferences. Aggregating lots of small events is not quite the same balancing method as multiplying a large event by a tiny probability, and I think some people did bite the second bullet but not the first (?!) - but it’s the same basic concept of continuity and quantitative commensurability that lets you compare utility intervals on a common scale and “shut up and multiply”.
The commonality between aggregation and probability for multiplying that is occurring in this case is reasonable, but that lies on the same level as the argument that Psy-Kosh makes in adorable maybes.
The point of this post is that his argument doesn’t just give you continuity. There is some missing step.
Elsewhere in these comments I’m claiming what is missing is actually an additional premise.
Your link deals neither with equality of preferences or with probability. Could you please explain its relevance?
Also, why does this example imply that continuity is generally valid?
It’s about continuity and quantitative commensurability of preferences. Aggregating lots of small events is not quite the same balancing method as multiplying a large event by a tiny probability, and I think some people did bite the second bullet but not the first (?!) - but it’s the same basic concept of continuity and quantitative commensurability that lets you compare utility intervals on a common scale and “shut up and multiply”.
The commonality between aggregation and probability for multiplying that is occurring in this case is reasonable, but that lies on the same level as the argument that Psy-Kosh makes in adorable maybes.
The point of this post is that his argument doesn’t just give you continuity. There is some missing step.
Elsewhere in these comments I’m claiming what is missing is actually an additional premise.