Whose idea of reductionism are you criticising? I think your post could get more useful by being more clear about the idea you want to challenge.
Hmm.
I think this is closest I get to having a “Definiton 3.4.1” in my post
...the other reductionism I mentioned, the ‘big thing = small thing + small thing’ one...
Essentially, the claim is that to accurately explain reality, non-reductionist explanations aren’t always wrong.
The confusion, however, that I realized elsewhere in the thread, is that I conflate ‘historical explanation’ with ‘predictive explanation’. Good predictive explanation will almost always be reductionist, because, as it says on the tin, big are made of smaller things. Good historical explanations, though, will be contra-reductionist, they’ll explain phenomena in terms of its relation to the environment. Consider evolution; the genes seem to be explained non-reductionistically because their presence or absence is determined by it effect on the environment i.e. whether its fit, so the explanation for how it got there necessarily includes complex things because they cause it.
I also get the feeling that use bailey in a context where motte would be the right word.
Right you are. Pretty embarrassing, really.
I’ve edited the OP with this in mind, but it somewhat pointless as the thesis is no longer supported IMO.
Apart from that I don’t know what you mean with theory in “Reductionism is a philosophy, not a theory.” As a result on using a bunch of terms where I don’t know exactly what you mean it’s hard to follow your argument.
Artifact of confusion; if contra-reductionism is a valid platform for explanation, then the value of reductionism isn’t constative—that is, it isn’t about whether it’s true or false, but something at the meta-level, rather than the object level. The antecedent is no longer believed, so now I do not believe the consequent.
The conceit I had by calling it a philosophy, or more accurately, a perspective, is essentially that you have a dataset, then you can apply a ‘reductionist’ filter on it to get reductionist explanations and a ‘contra-reductionist’ filter to get contra explanations. This was a confusion; and only seemed reasonable because I I was treating the two type of explanation—historical and predictive—as somehow equivalent, which I now know to be mistaken.
P.S, I’ve added most of this comment to the OP so future readers know my revised opinion on the accuracy of this post. If you object to this tell me.
...the other reductionism I mentioned, the ‘big thing = small thing + small thing’ one...
There the open question of what + means.
I’ve added most of this comment to the OP so future readers know my revised opinion on the accuracy of this post.
To me your post didn’t feel inaccurate but confused. A mix of saying trival things and throwing around terms where I don’t know exactly what you mean and I’m not sure whether you have thought about what you mean exactly either.
Good predictive explanation will almost always be reductionist, because, as it says on the tin, big are made of smaller things.
Cognitive psychologists generally make better predicitons about human behavior than neuroscientists. Here it seems to me like you think about philosophy as distinct from empirical reality. I get the impression that you try to understand reductionism without seeing how it’s actually applied and not applied in reality.
You can also make great predicions on believes that the function of the heart is pumping blood even if there are no “function-atoms” around.
Cognitive psychologists generally make better predicitons about human behavior than neuroscientists.
I grant you that; my assertion was one of type, not of degree. A predictive explanation will generally (yes, I am retracting my ‘almost always’ quantifier) be reductionist, but this a very different statement than the most reductionist explanation will be the best.
Here it seems to me like you think about philosophy as distinct from empirical reality.
Less ‘distinct’ and more ‘abstracted’. The put it as pithy (and oversimplified) as possible, empiricism is about what is (probably) true, philosophy is about about what is (probably) necessarily true.
I could be more precise and accurate about my own thoughts here, but philosophy is one of those terms where if you ask ten different people you’ll get twelve different answers. The relation between philosophy and empirical reality depends on what ‘philosophy’ is.
To me your post didn’t feel inaccurate but confused.
I think confusion is inaccuracy at the meta level.
And besides that, I actually felt when writing that post that I was repeating ‘I was confused’ to the point of parody. Illusion of transparency, I suppose.
A mix of saying trival things and throwing around terms where I don’t know exactly what you mean
I’m for being ambiguous, but you’ll have be more precise about what I’m being ambiguous about. I can’t be clear about my terminology without knowing where I’m being unclear.
I’m not sure whether you have thought about what you mean exactly either.
I don’t think it’s worth debating what I meant when I don’t mean it anymore.
You can also make great predicions on believes that the function of the heart is pumping blood even if there are no “function-atoms” around.
It’s not clear what you’re saying here. If you’re talking about why the heart pumps blood instead of doing something else, that requires a historical explanation, a ‘why is it like this instead of like that’ and presumes the heart was optimized for something, and would have been optimized for something else if something had willed it.
If this is what you’re saying then yeah, the explanation will not be reductionist.
If you’re saying you can predict the broad strokes of what the heart will do without reducing all the way to the level of ‘function atoms’ then I completely agree. The space of explanations of reality at the level of atoms is large enough that even if most of them don’t even vaguely resemble reality there still isn’t enough motivation or information to exhaust the search space. Incomplete reductions are fine until there’s motivations for deeper explanations.
If you weren’t saying either of these things, then I’ve misunderstood you.
Hmm.
I think this is closest I get to having a “Definiton 3.4.1” in my post
Essentially, the claim is that to accurately explain reality, non-reductionist explanations aren’t always wrong.
The confusion, however, that I realized elsewhere in the thread, is that I conflate ‘historical explanation’ with ‘predictive explanation’. Good predictive explanation will almost always be reductionist, because, as it says on the tin, big are made of smaller things. Good historical explanations, though, will be contra-reductionist, they’ll explain phenomena in terms of its relation to the environment. Consider evolution; the genes seem to be explained non-reductionistically because their presence or absence is determined by it effect on the environment i.e. whether its fit, so the explanation for how it got there necessarily includes complex things because they cause it.
Right you are. Pretty embarrassing, really.
I’ve edited the OP with this in mind, but it somewhat pointless as the thesis is no longer supported IMO.
Artifact of confusion; if contra-reductionism is a valid platform for explanation, then the value of reductionism isn’t constative—that is, it isn’t about whether it’s true or false, but something at the meta-level, rather than the object level. The antecedent is no longer believed, so now I do not believe the consequent.
The conceit I had by calling it a philosophy, or more accurately, a perspective, is essentially that you have a dataset, then you can apply a ‘reductionist’ filter on it to get reductionist explanations and a ‘contra-reductionist’ filter to get contra explanations. This was a confusion; and only seemed reasonable because I I was treating the two type of explanation—historical and predictive—as somehow equivalent, which I now know to be mistaken.
P.S, I’ve added most of this comment to the OP so future readers know my revised opinion on the accuracy of this post. If you object to this tell me.
There the open question of what
+means.To me your post didn’t feel inaccurate but confused. A mix of saying trival things and throwing around terms where I don’t know exactly what you mean and I’m not sure whether you have thought about what you mean exactly either.
Cognitive psychologists generally make better predicitons about human behavior than neuroscientists. Here it seems to me like you think about philosophy as distinct from empirical reality. I get the impression that you try to understand reductionism without seeing how it’s actually applied and not applied in reality.
You can also make great predicions on believes that the function of the heart is pumping blood even if there are no “function-atoms” around.
I grant you that; my assertion was one of type, not of degree. A predictive explanation will generally (yes, I am retracting my ‘almost always’ quantifier) be reductionist, but this a very different statement than the most reductionist explanation will be the best.
Less ‘distinct’ and more ‘abstracted’. The put it as pithy (and oversimplified) as possible, empiricism is about what is (probably) true, philosophy is about about what is (probably) necessarily true.
I could be more precise and accurate about my own thoughts here, but philosophy is one of those terms where if you ask ten different people you’ll get twelve different answers. The relation between philosophy and empirical reality depends on what ‘philosophy’ is.
I think confusion is inaccuracy at the meta level.
And besides that, I actually felt when writing that post that I was repeating ‘I was confused’ to the point of parody. Illusion of transparency, I suppose.
I’m for being ambiguous, but you’ll have be more precise about what I’m being ambiguous about. I can’t be clear about my terminology without knowing where I’m being unclear.
I don’t think it’s worth debating what I meant when I don’t mean it anymore.
It’s not clear what you’re saying here. If you’re talking about why the heart pumps blood instead of doing something else, that requires a historical explanation, a ‘why is it like this instead of like that’ and presumes the heart was optimized for something, and would have been optimized for something else if something had willed it.
If this is what you’re saying then yeah, the explanation will not be reductionist.
If you’re saying you can predict the broad strokes of what the heart will do without reducing all the way to the level of ‘function atoms’ then I completely agree. The space of explanations of reality at the level of atoms is large enough that even if most of them don’t even vaguely resemble reality there still isn’t enough motivation or information to exhaust the search space. Incomplete reductions are fine until there’s motivations for deeper explanations.
If you weren’t saying either of these things, then I’ve misunderstood you.