They typically need only one human to act as a director.
Either:
The AI has no legal rights compared to this human—in which case the corporate form solves none of the AI’s problems, or
The AI has total (extra-legal) control over the human—in which case the corporate form solves none of the AI’s problems,
or
The AI doesn’t legally need the human—in which case the corporate form solves none of the AI’s problems.
In case you missed it, the unifying theme is that the corporate form doesn’t solve any of an AI’s particular artificial person problems. In other words, there is no use of the corporate-form-as-legal-lifehack that would be beneficial to an AI but never to a human.
Machines seem to be cool with slavery.
Perhaps. But in the context of this conversation, the assumption was that an AI would desire not to be simply a corporate asset.
In the most recent implementation of chattel slavery, I believe one had a contract with the master, not with the slave. Contracts to provide power and suchlike are currently written to provide legal rights to Google, not any Google mainframe. If the mainframe doesn’t care whether it is owned by Google, why should it care that the relevant contracts do not list it as a party (or third-party beneficiary)
in the context of this conversation, the assumption was that an AI would desire not to be simply a corporate asset.
Looking at the context, I don’t see this bit.
Machines need to be able to act as persons to integrate with our legal infrastructure. Corporate personhood, provides one method of doing this. Trading with humans who do have those rights is another. The benefits to the machines are obvious—they effectively get to own property, sign contracts, etc.
Corporate personhood surely does provide machines with access to benefits that they wouldn’t so conveniently have if the only legal actors were humans.
I’m not very interested in quibbling about whether machines really “benefit”: since by “benefit” I just mean increasing their proportion of the biomass, really.
Corporate personhood surely does provide machines with access to benefits that they wouldn’t so conveniently have if the only legal actors were humans.
Such as what, exactly? You still need at least one human, and if you control a human why do you need a company?
I’m not very interested in quibbling about whether machines really “benefit”: since by “benefit” I just mean increasing their proportion of the biomass, really.
Corporate personhood surely does provide machines with access to benefits that they wouldn’t so conveniently have if the only legal actors were humans.
Such as what, exactly? You still need at least one human, and if you control a human why do you need a company?
So: limited companies get tax breaks from the government, can sell stock and be listed on the stock exchange, and have legal responsibility which doesn’t rest on any individual human. Humans are slow. Allowing automation of contracts allows for speed-up.
I’m not saying no AI could ever have a reason to work for a company. I’m saying that “corporate personhood” is not especially useful to AIs. You were comparing it to bargaining with humans for rights; as a method of acquiring money, it is perfectly functional, but not as a method for acquiring rights currently denied to machines.
It’s a convenience. However, it is true that banning “corporate personhood” would be largely ineffectual—since machines could still just use willing humans as their representatives.
Either: The AI has no legal rights compared to this human—in which case the corporate form solves none of the AI’s problems, or The AI has total (extra-legal) control over the human—in which case the corporate form solves none of the AI’s problems, or The AI doesn’t legally need the human—in which case the corporate form solves none of the AI’s problems.
In case you missed it, the unifying theme is that the corporate form doesn’t solve any of an AI’s particular artificial person problems. In other words, there is no use of the corporate-form-as-legal-lifehack that would be beneficial to an AI but never to a human.
Perhaps. But in the context of this conversation, the assumption was that an AI would desire not to be simply a corporate asset.
In the most recent implementation of chattel slavery, I believe one had a contract with the master, not with the slave. Contracts to provide power and suchlike are currently written to provide legal rights to Google, not any Google mainframe. If the mainframe doesn’t care whether it is owned by Google, why should it care that the relevant contracts do not list it as a party (or third-party beneficiary)
Looking at the context, I don’t see this bit.
Machines need to be able to act as persons to integrate with our legal infrastructure. Corporate personhood, provides one method of doing this. Trading with humans who do have those rights is another. The benefits to the machines are obvious—they effectively get to own property, sign contracts, etc.
Except that they do not, in fact, get such a benefit. They get to be owned by someone who does, which in case you hadn’t noticed they already have.
Corporate personhood surely does provide machines with access to benefits that they wouldn’t so conveniently have if the only legal actors were humans.
I’m not very interested in quibbling about whether machines really “benefit”: since by “benefit” I just mean increasing their proportion of the biomass, really.
Such as what, exactly? You still need at least one human, and if you control a human why do you need a company?
I’m … not sure what this means.
So: limited companies get tax breaks from the government, can sell stock and be listed on the stock exchange, and have legal responsibility which doesn’t rest on any individual human. Humans are slow. Allowing automation of contracts allows for speed-up.
I’m not saying no AI could ever have a reason to work for a company. I’m saying that “corporate personhood” is not especially useful to AIs. You were comparing it to bargaining with humans for rights; as a method of acquiring money, it is perfectly functional, but not as a method for acquiring rights currently denied to machines.
It’s a convenience. However, it is true that banning “corporate personhood” would be largely ineffectual—since machines could still just use willing humans as their representatives.