xxd

• xxdDec 21, 2011, 6:04 PM

  0 points

  in reply to: TheOtherDave’s comment on: Wel­come to Less Wrong!

  I think we’re on the same page from a logical perspective.

  My guess is the perspective taken is that of physical science vs compsci.

  My guess is a compsci perspective would tend to view the two individuals as being two instances of the class of individual X. The two class instances are logically equivalent exception for position.

  The physical science perspective is that there are two bunches of matter near each other with the only thing differing being the position. Basically the same scenario as two electrons with the same spin state, momentum, energy etc but different positions. There’s no way to distinguish the two of them from physical properties but there are two of them not one.

  Regardless, if you believe they are the same person then you go first through the teleportation device… ;->

• xxdDec 21, 2011, 5:18 AM

  1 point

  in reply to: APMason’s comment on: Wel­come to Less Wrong!

  It matters to you if you’re the original and then you are killed.

  You are right that they are both an instance of person X but my argument is that this is not the equivalent to them being the same person in fact or even in law (whatever that means).

  Also when/​if this comes about I bet the law will side with me and define them as two different people in the eyes of the law. (And I’m not using this to fallaciously argue from authority, just pointing out I strongly believe I am correct—though willing to concede if there is ultimately some logical way to prove they are the same person.)

  The reason is obvious. If they are the same person and one of them kills someone are both of them guilty? If one fathers a child, is the child the offspring of both of them?

  Because of this I cannot agree beyond saying that the two different people are copies of person x. Even you are prepared to concede that they are different people to each other after the mental states begin to diverge so I can’t close the logical gap why you say they are the same person and not copies of the same person one being the original. You come partway to saying they are different people. Why not come all the way?

• xxdDec 21, 2011, 3:57 AM

  1 point

  in reply to: TheOtherDave’s comment on: Wel­come to Less Wrong!

  I understand completely your logic but I do not buy it because I do not agree that at the instant of the copying you have one person at two locations. They are two different people. One being the original and the other being an exact copy.

• xxdDec 21, 2011, 3:55 AM

  1 point

  in reply to: APMason’s comment on: Wel­come to Less Wrong!

  K here’s where we disagree:

  Original Copy A and new Copy B are indeed instances of person X but it’s not a class with two instances as in CompSci 101. The class is Original A and it’s B that is the instance. They are different people.

  In order to make them the same person you’d need to do something like this: Put some kind of high bandwidth wifi in their heads which synchronize memories. Then they’d be part of the same hybrid entity. But at no point are they the same person.

• xxdDec 21, 2011, 3:39 AM

  0 points

  in reply to: xxd’s comment on: Wel­come to Less Wrong!

  Come on. Don’t vote me down without responding.

• xxdDec 21, 2011, 3:34 AM

  0 points

  in reply to: Nornagest’s comment on: Wel­come to Less Wrong!

  Here’s why I conclude a risk exists: http://​​lesswrong.com/​​lw/​​b9/​​welcome_to_less_wrong/​​5huo?context=1#5huo

• xxdDec 21, 2011, 3:33 AM

  0 points

  in reply to: TheOtherDave’s comment on: Wel­come to Less Wrong!

  this follows: http://​​lesswrong.com/​​lw/​​b9/​​welcome_to_less_wrong/​​5huo?context=1#5huo

• xxdDec 21, 2011, 3:28 AM

  2 points

  in reply to: Bugmaster’s comment on: Wel­come to Less Wrong!

  I’m talking exactly about a process that is so flawless you can’t tell the difference. Where my concern comes from is that if you don’t destroy the original you now have two copies. One is the original (although you can’t tell the difference between the copy and the original) and the other is the copy.

  Now where I’m uncomfortable is this: If we then kill the original by letting Freddie Krueger or Jason do his evil thing then though the copy is still alive AND is/​was indistinguishable from the original then the alternative hypothesis which I oppose states that the original is still alive and yet I can see the dead body there.

  Simply speeding the process up perhaps by vaporizing the original doesn’t make the outcome any different, the original is still dead.

  It gets murkier if the original is destructively scanned and then rebuilt from the same atoms but I’d still be reluctant to do this myself.

  That said, I’d be willing to become a hybrid organism slowly by replacing parts of me and although it wouldn’t be the original me at the end of the total replacement process it would still be the hybrid “me”.

  Interesting position on the killing of the NPCs and in terms of usefulness that’s why it doesn’t matter to me if a being is sentient or not in order to meet my definition of AI.

  What links here?

  • xxd's comment on Wel­come to Less Wrong! by MBlume (Dec 21, 2011, 3:33 AM; 0 points)
  • xxd's comment on Wel­come to Less Wrong! by MBlume (Dec 21, 2011, 3:34 AM; 0 points)

• xxdDec 21, 2011, 3:19 AM

  1 point

  in reply to: Nornagest’s comment on: Wel­come to Less Wrong!

  Risk avoidance. I’m uncomfortable with taking the position that creating a second copy and destroying the original is the original simply because if it isn’t then the original is now dead.

• xxdDec 21, 2011, 3:08 AM

  −2 points

  in reply to: TheOtherDave’s comment on: Wel­come to Less Wrong!

  Here’s one: Let’s say that the world is a simulation AND that strongly godlike AI is possible. To all intents and purposes, even though the bible in the simulation is provably inconsistent, the existence of a being indistinguishable from the God in such a bible would not be ruled out because though the inhabitants of the world are constrained by the rules of physics in their own state machines or objects or whatever, the universe containing the simulation is subject to it’s own set of physics and logic and therefore may vary even inside the simulation but not be detectable to you or I.

• xxdDec 21, 2011, 2:59 AM

  1 point

  in reply to: TheOtherDave’s comment on: Wel­come to Less Wrong!

  “(shrug) After the process you describe, there exist two people in identical bodies with identical memories. What conceivable difference does it make which of those people we label “me”? What conceivable difference does it make whether we label both of those people “me”″

  Because we already have a legal precedent. Twins. Though their memories are very limited they are legally different people. My position is rightly so.

• xxdDec 21, 2011, 2:57 AM

  3 points

  in reply to: TheOtherDave’s comment on: Wel­come to Less Wrong!

  Ha Ha. You’re right. Thanks for reflecting that back to me.

  Yes if you break apart my argument I’m saying exactly that though I hadn’t broken it down to that extent before.

  The last part I disagree with which is that I assume that I’m always better at detecting people than the AI is. Clearly I’m not but in my own personal case I don’t trust it if it disagrees with me because of simple risk management. If it’s wrong and it kills me then resurrects a copy then I have experienced total loss. If it’s right then I’m still alive.

  But I don’t know the answer. And thus I would have to say that it would be necessary to only allow scenario #1 if I were designing the AI because though I could be wrong I’d prefer not to take the risk of personal destruction.

  That said if someone chose to destructively scan themselves to upload that would be their personal choice.

• xxdDec 21, 2011, 2:51 AM

  0 points

  in reply to: Bugmaster’s comment on: Wel­come to Less Wrong!

  You’re right. It is impossible to determine that the current copy is the original or not.

  “Disturbing how?” Yes I would dismiss the person as being a fruitbar of course. But if the technology existed to destructively scan an individual and copy them into a simulation or even reconstitute them from different atoms after being destructively scanned I’d be really uncomfortable with it. I personally would strenously object to ever teleporting myself or copying myself by this method into a simulation.

  “edges away slowly” lol. Not any more evil than I believe it was Phil who explicitly stated he would kill others who would seek to prevent the building of an AI based on his utility function. I would fight to prevent the construction of an AI based on anything but the average utility function of humanity even if it excluded my own maximized utility function because I’m honest enough to say that maximizing my own personal utility function is not in the best interests of humanity. Even then I believe that producing an AI whose utility function is maximizing the best interests of humanity is incredibly difficult and thus have concluded that created an AI whose definition is just NOT(Unfriendly) and attempting to trade with it is probably far easier. Though I have not read Eliezer’s CEV paper so I require further input.

  “difficult to force them to do my bidding”.

  I don’t know if you enjoy video games or not. Right now there’s a 1st person shooter called Modern Warfare 3. It’s pretty damn realistic though the non-player-characters [NPCs] - which you shoot and kill—are automatons and we know for sure that they’re automatons. Now fast forward 20 years and we have NPCs which are so realistic that to all intents and purposes they pass the turing test. Is killing these NPCs in Modern Warfare 25 murder?

• xxdDec 21, 2011, 2:35 AM

  0 points

  in reply to: APMason’s comment on: Wel­come to Less Wrong!

  That’s a point of philosophical disagreement between us. Here’s why:

  Take an individual.

  Then take a cell from that individual. Grow it in a nutrient bath. Force it to divide. Rinse, wash, repeat.

  You create a clone of that person.

  Now is that clone the same as the original? No it is not. It is a copy. Or in a natural version of this, a twin.

  Now let’s say technology exists to transfer memories and mind states.

  After you create the clone-that-is-not-you you then put your memories into it.

  If we keep the original alive the clone is still not you. How does killing the original QUICKLY make the clone you?

• xxdDec 21, 2011, 2:25 AM

  0 points

  in reply to: APMason’s comment on: Wel­come to Less Wrong!

  OK give me time to digest the jargon.

• xxdDec 21, 2011, 2:22 AM

  0 points

  in reply to: APMason’s comment on: Wel­come to Less Wrong!

  But is it destroying people if the simulations are the same as the original?

• xxdDec 21, 2011, 2:20 AM

  0 points

  in reply to: TimS’s comment on: Wel­come to Less Wrong!

  Isn’t doing anything for us…

• xxdDec 21, 2011, 2:18 AM

  0 points

  in reply to: Bugmaster’s comment on: Wel­come to Less Wrong!

  Really good discussion.

  Would I believe? I think the answer would depend on whether I could find the original or not. I would, however, find it disturbing to be told that the copy was a copy.

  And yes, if the beings are fully sentient then yes I agree it’s ethically questionable. But since we cannot tell then it comes down to the conscience of the individual so I guess I’m evil then.

• xxdDec 21, 2011, 2:15 AM

  0 points

  in reply to: APMason’s comment on: Wel­come to Less Wrong!

  Agreed. It’s the only way we have of verifying that it’s a duck.

  But is the destructively scanned duck the original duck even though it appears to be the same to all intents and purposes even though you can see the mulch that used to be the body of the original lying there beside the new copy?

• xxdDec 21, 2011, 2:12 AM

  0 points

  in reply to: Oligopsony’s comment on: Wel­come to Less Wrong!

  While I don’t doubt that many people would be OK with this I wouldn’t because of the lack of certainty and provability.

  My difficulty with this concept goes further. Since it’s not verifiable that the copy is you even though it seems to present the same outputs to any verifiable test then what is to prevent an AI getting round the restriction on not destroying humanity?

  “Oh but the copies running in a simulation are the same thing as the originals really”, protests the AI after all the humans have been destructively scanned and copied into a simulation...