For the first issue, I agree that “Carefully Bootstrapped Alignment” is organizationally hard, but I don’t think improving the organizational culture is an effective solution. It is too slow and humans often make mistakes. I think technical solutions are needed. For example, let an AI be responsible for safety assessment. When a researcher submits a job to the AI training cluster, this AI assesses the safety of the job. If this job may produce a dangerous AI, the job will be rejected. In addition, external supervision is also needed. For example, the government could stipulate that before an AI organization releases a new model, it needs to be evaluated by a third-party safety organization, and all organizations with computing resources exceeding a certain threshold need be supervised. There is more discussion on this in the section Restricting AI Development.
For the second issue, you mentioned free variables. I think this is a key point. In the case where we are not fully confident in the safety of AI, we should reduce free variables as much as possible. This is why I proposed a series of AI Controllability Rules. The priority of these rules is higher than the goals. AI should be trained to achieve the goals under the premise of complying with the rules. In addition, I think we should not place all our hopes on alignment. We should have more measures to deal with the situation where AI alignment fails, such as AI Monitoring and Decentralizing AI Power.
Weibing Wang
1. I think it is “Decentralizing AI Power”. So far, most descriptions of the extreme risks of AI assume the existence of an all-powerful superintelligence. However, I believe this can be avoided. That is, we can create a large number of AI instances with independent decision-making and different specialties. Through their collaboration, they can also complete the complex tasks that a single superintelligence can accomplish. They will supervise each other to ensure that no AI will violate the rules. This is very much like human society: The power of a single individual is very weak, but through division of labor and collaboration, humans have created an unprecedentedly powerful civilization.
2. I am not sure that an international governance system will definitely succeed in AI safety. This requires extremely arduous efforts. First, all countries need to reach a consensus on AI risks, but this has not happened yet. So I think risk evaluation is a very important task. If it can be proven that the risks of AI in the future are very high, for example, higher than that of nuclear weapons, then countries may cooperate, just as they have cooperated in controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the past. Second, even if countries are willing to cooperate, they will also face great challenges. Restricting the development of AI is much more difficult than restricting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. I discussed some restriction methods in Section 14.3, but I am also not sure whether these methods can be effectively implemented.
The core idea about alignment is described here: https://wwbmmm.github.io/asi-safety-solution/en/main.html#aligning-ai-systems
If you only focus on alignment, you can only read Sections 6.1-6.3, and the length of this part will not be too long.
Thank you for your comment! I think your concern is right. Many safety measures may slow down the development of AI’s capabilities. Developers who ignore safety may develop more powerful AI more quickly. I think this is a governance issue. I have discussed some solutions in Sections 13.2 and 16. If you are interested, you can take a look.
Thank you for your comment! I think my solution is applicable to arbitrary intelligent AI for the following reasons:
1. During the development stage, AI will align with the developers’ goals. If the developers are benevolent, they will specify a goal that is beneficial to humans. Since the developers’ goals have a higher priority than the users’ goals, if a user specifies an inappropriate goal, the AI can refuse.
2. Guiding the AI to “do the right thing” through the developers’ goals and constraining the AI to “not do the wrong thing” through the rules may seem a bit redundant. If the AI has learned to do the right thing, it should not do the wrong thing. However, the significance of the rules is that they can serve as a standard for AI monitoring, making it clear to the monitors under what circumstances the AI’s actions should be stopped.
3. If the monitor is an equally intelligent AI, it should have able to identify those behaviors that attempt to bypass the loopholes in the rules.
Thank you for your feedback! I’ll read the resources you’ve shared. I also look forward to your specific suggestions for my paper.
Thank you for your suggestions! I have read the CAIS stuff you provided and I generally agree with these views. I think the solution in my paper is also applicable to CAIS.
Thank you for your suggestions! I will read the materials you recommended and try to cite more related works.
For o1, I think o1 is the right direction. The developers of o1 should be able to see the hidden chain of thoughts of o1, which is explainable for them.
I think that alignment or interpretability is not a “yes” or “no” property, but a gradually changing property. o1 has done a good job in terms of interpretability, but there is still room for improvement. Similarly, the first AGI to come out in the future may be partially aligned and partially interpretable, and then the approaches in this paper can be used to improve its alignment and interpretability.
1. One of my favorite ideas is Specializing AI Powers. I think it is both safer and more economical. Here, I divide AI into seven types, each engaged in different work. Among them, the most dangerous one may be the High-Intellectual-Power AI, but we only let it engage in scientific research work in a restricted environment. In fact, in most economic fields, using overly intelligent AI does not bring more returns. In the past, industrial assembly lines greatly improved the output efficiency of workers. I think the same is true for AI. AIs with different specialties collaborating in an assembly line manner will have higher efficiency than using all-powerful AIs. Therefore, it is possible that without special efforts, the market will automatically develop in this direction.
2. I think the key for convincing people may lie in the demonstration of AI’s capabilities, that is, showing that AI does indeed have great destructive power. However, the current AI capabilities are still relatively weak and cannot provide sufficient persuasion. Maybe it will have to wait until AGI is achieved?