TCB

• TCBMay 21, 2011, 4:04 AM

  3 points

  in reply to: Cyan’s comment on: The Joys of Con­ju­gate Priors

  Thank you very much for the compliments, and for the honest criticism!

  I am still thinking about your comment, and I intend to write a detailed response to it after I have thought about your criticisms more completely. In the meantime, though, I wanted to say that the feedback is very much appreciated!

The Joys of Con­ju­gate Priors

• TCBMay 19, 2011, 11:11 PM

  4 points

  on: Rap­ture/​Pet Insurance

  Perhaps I have a different system of morality than other people who have commented on this topic, but I personally judge actions as “moral” or “immoral” based on the intentions of the do-er rather than the consequences. (Assuming morality is relative and not an absolute component of the universe, this seems like a valid moral system.)

  If the atheists who run this website are doing so to make money by exploiting the perceived stupidity of their customers, this seems immoral to me. On the other hand, if they are running the service because they honestly want to increase the peace of mind of rapture-believing-in pet owners, then that seems like it would be a moral action. However, knowing people, I really suspect that it’s the former.

  If the rapture really does happen and this really saves pets (assuming that it is a good thing to save pets), then I would still consider this service immoral. I would rather live in a world where people were compassionate enough that they did not to want to trick each other for money (even if they thought each other’s beliefs were moronic). Barring that, I’d like to live in a world where people consider tricking each other for money immoral and wouldn’t do it because of some internal moral crisis or external punishment. I hold this opinion even if some of the tricks for money backfire and end up benefiting the trickees more than the trickers.

• TCBMay 5, 2011, 1:37 PM

  0 points

  in reply to: prase’s comment on: Hol­low Adjectives

  I suppose I am assuming that the universe operates under some set of formal rules (though they might not be deterministic) independently of our ability to describe the universe using formal rules. I would also say that our inability to comprehend a given contradiction is related to the fact that we are inside the system. If God were outside the system he would not necessarily have this problem.

  I disagree with your second point, though. Sure, 1 and 2 are labels for concepts that exist within a formal system we’ve developed, and sure, we can create an isomorphism to different labels. But I would consider this to be the same formal system. The example I gave (working in the integers mod 2) involves switching to a formal structure that is decidedly not isomorphic to the integers under addition.

  Also, sorry if I was unclear—I did not mean to imply that mathematical formalisms as we’ve developed them are related to the fundamental laws of the universe. I only meant to say that if the universe is a formal system of some sort, and God operates outside that formal system, then it is conceivable that God could switch to a different formal system where things that we consider impossible are not, just like we can switch to a different formal system where 0 and 2. Maybe God could do something analogous and put me in the universe (mod 10 feet) so that if I walk ten feet straight across the room I’ll end up where I started; this seems like a contradiction in our universe but is definitely imaginable.

  [Quick edit for clarity: maybe it doesn’t seem like a contradiction that I could walk ten feet away and end up back where I started, but it does seem like a contradiction that I could walk ten feet and both be ten feet away, and also be exactly where I started. This is what I imagine happening in the universe (mod 10 feet).]

• TCBMay 5, 2011, 6:10 AM

  4 points

  on: Hol­low Adjectives

  I find this post very interesting, but I disagree with your examples about God. This comment is rather lengthy, and rather off-topic, so I apologize, but I wanted to bring it up because your post features these questions so prominently as examples.

  Specifically, I don’t think that the answer to the questions about God can be written off so easily as “no”. It seems to me that the questions “Could God draw a square circle?” “Could God create a stone so large that even He could not lift it?” are asking about the bounds on omnipotence.

  Suppose an omnipotent being exists in a universe, and that universe operates under some fundamental laws that among other things define what can exist vs. what is a contradiction. It seems fairly obvious, based on the standard definition of omnipotence, that the omnipotent being should be able to do all things that do not violate these fundamental laws and cause a contradiction. I’ll call this Level 0 Power.

  “Could God draw a square circle?” is asking about what I’ll call God’s Level 1 Power. It is asking “Does an omnipotent being have the power to change the fundamental laws of the universe?”, or, if you like, “Can God reprogram the universe?” If God is in charge of the rules, then presumably he could rewrite them such that things which are currently a contradiction are no longer a contradiction. In terms of the circle/​square question, this seems kind of silly, since circles and squares are not contained in the universe but are products of formal systems invented by humans. Alternatively we could ask “Can God make 1+1 add up to something other than 2?” and the answer is “Of course; even mathematicians can do this, by redefining the axioms or working in the integers (mod 2) or something.” In terms of this example, then, Level 1 Power is asking “If the universe is a formal system of sorts, can God change the axioms?”

  Suppose God has Level 1 Power and can change the axioms of the system (or systems) he creates. This isn’t so hard to imagine; it’s like a human programmer rewriting a piece of the code in the middle of running a simulation. But the question about whether God, if he existed, actually had such a power, seems like it would be a reasonable subject of discussion for theologians.

  “Could God create a stone so large that even He could not lift it?” is yet a more difficult question. Is it asking about God’s Level 1 Power? I think it depends on where omnipotence comes from. If God is omnipotent within the system because that’s the way he coded it, then it is asking about God’s Level 1 Power: all he has to do is go into the code for the universe and change the part that says he should be able to lift all stones. But if God’s omnipotence is something that exists independent of the system, then this question is asking whether God can change the rules which define himself.

  Anyway, your answer of “no” to these questions indicates not that the questions are worthless but that you assume an omnipotent being could only have Level 0 Power.

  What links here?

  • David_Gerard's comment on Hol­low Adjectives by Psychohistorian (May 5, 2011, 9:22 AM; 0 points)

• TCBApr 13, 2011, 3:24 AM

  1 point

  in reply to: Manfred’s comment on: Oc­cam’s Ra­zor, Com­plex­ity of Ver­bal De­scrip­tions, and Core Concepts

  I am aware that my definition of Occam’s razor is not the “official” definition. However, it is the definition which I see used most often in discussions and arguments, which is why I chose it. The fact that this definition of Occam’s razor is common supports my claim that humans consider it a good heuristic.

  Forgive me for my ignorance, as I have not studied Kolmogorov complexity in detail. As you suggest, it seems that human understanding of a “simple description” is not in line with Kolmogorov complexity.

  I think the intention of my post may have been unclear. I am not trying to argue that natural language is a good way of measuring the complexity of statements. (I’m also not trying to argue that it’s bad.) My intention was merely to explore how humans understand the complexity of ideas, and to investigate how such judgements of complexity influence the way typical humans build models of the world.

  The fact that human understanding of complexity is so far from Kolmogorov complexity indicates to me that if an AI were to model its environment using Kolmogorov complexity as a criterion for selecting models, the model it developed would be different from the models developed by typical humans. My concern is that this disparity in understanding of the world would make it difficult for most humans to communicate with the AI.

Oc­cam’s Ra­zor, Com­plex­ity of Ver­bal De­scrip­tions, and Core Concepts

• TCBApr 8, 2011, 2:55 PM

  7 points

  in reply to: PhilGoetz’s comment on: Hu­man er­rors, hu­man values

  Perhaps I am missing something here, but I don’t see why utilitarianism is necessarily superior to rule-based ethics. An obvious advantage of a rule-based moral system is the speed of computation. Situations like the trolley problem require extremely fast decision-making. Considering how many problems local optima cause in machine learning and optimization, I imagine that it would be difficult for an AI to assess every possible alternative and pick the one which maximized overall utility in time to make such a decision. Certainly, we as humans frequently miss obvious alternatives when making decisions, especially when we are upset, as most humans would be if they saw a trolley about to crash into five people. Thus, having a rule-based moral system would allow us to easily make split-second decisions when such decisions were required.

  Of course, we would not want to rely on a simple rule-based moral system all the time, and there are obvious benefits to utilitarianism when time is available for careful deliberation. It seems that it would be advantageous to switch back and forth between these two systems based on the time available for computation.

  If the rules in a rule-based ethical system were derived from utilitarian concerns, and were chosen to maximize the expected utility over all situations to which the rule might be applied, would it not make sense to use such a rule-based system for very important, split-second decisions?