I haven’t finished reading this; I read the first few paragraphs and scanned the rest of the article to see if it would be worth reading. But I want to point out that starting with Harsanyi’s Utilitarianism Theorem (a.k.a. Harsanyi’s Impartial Observer Theorem) implies that you assume “independence of irrelevant alternatives” because the theorem assumes that its agents obey [1] the Von Neumann–Morgenstern utility theorem. The fourth axiom of this theorem (as listed in Wikipedia) is the “independence of irrelevant alternatives.”. Since from the previous article,
The Nash Bargaining Solution is the only one that fulfills the usual three desiderata, and the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives.
I am not surprised that this results in the Nash Bargaining solution as the solution to Bargaining Games. The last article also points out that the independence of irrelevant alternatives is not an obvious axiom, so I do not find that the Nash Bargaining solution to be more plausible because it is a generalization of the CoCo Equilibria.[2]
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From the abstract here: [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228049690_Harsanyi′ s_′Utilitarian_Theorem’_and_Utilitarianism] and the introduction to Generalized UtilitarianismandHarsanyi’s Impartial Observer Theorem
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This is a bit inconsistent on my part because I usually make formal decisions according to Rule Utilitarianism, and most forms of utilitarianism assume Von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility. However, in my defense, I’m not firmly attached to Rule Utilitarianism; it is just the current best I’ve found.
Feature request: some way to keep score. (Maybe a scoring mode that makes the black box an outline on hover and then clicking right=unscored, left-right=correct, and left-left-right=incorrect—or maybe a mouse-out could be unscored and left = incorrect and right = correct).