I would argue that there are plenty of fields of science in which elegance is considered important.
Most prominently, mathematics. Mathematicians do run experiments, courtesy of computers, and it is the very field physics must so closely rely on. If mathematicians do not practice the scientific method, what the heck do they do?
Since you’re a computer guy (and I imagine many people you talk to are also computer-savvy), I’m surprised you don’t use file/process analogues for identity.
If I move a file’s physical location on my hard drive, it’s obviously still the same file, because it has handle and data continuity. This is analogous to existing in different locations, being expressed with different atoms.
If I change the content of the file, it’s obviously still the same file, because it has handle and location continuity. This is analogous to changing over not-technically-time-but-causal-effect-chains-that-we-may-as-well-call-time-for-convenience.
If I delete the file (actually just removing its’ file handle in most modern systems) and use a utility to recover it, it’s obviously still the same file, because it has location and data continuity. This is analogous to cryonics.
Identity is thus describable with three components: handle, data, and location continuity, only two of which are required at any given point. As for having just one:
If you have only handle continuity, you have two distinct objects with the same name.
If you have only data continuity, then you have duplicate work.
If you have only location continuity, you’ve reformatted.
All three break file identity.
As for cryonics, I would sign up if I could be convinced that I would not become obsolete or even detrimental to a society that resurrects me. And looking at some of the problems in my country already being caused by merely having a normally aging population at current social development rate, I don’t even think it’s a given that I could contribute meaningfully to society during the twilight of my at-present-natural life.
Morality-as-preference, I would argue, is oriented around the use of morality as a tool of manipulation of other moral actors.
Question one: “It is right that I should get the pie” is more convincing, because people respond to moral arguments. Why they do so is irrelevant to the purpose (to use morality to get what you want).
Question two: People don’t change their terminal values (which I would argue are largely unconscious, emotional parameters), though they might change how they attempt to achieve them, or one terminal value might override a different one based on mood-affecting-circumstance (“I am hungry, therefore my food-seeking terminal value has priority”). This, btw, answers why it is less morally wrong for a starving man to steal to eat versus a non-starving man.
Question three: “I want this, though I know it’s wrong” under this view maps to “I want this, and have no rhetoric with which I can convince anyone to let me have it.” This might even include the individual themselves, because people can criticize their own decisions as if they were separate actors, even to the point where they must convince a constructed ‘moral actor’ that has their own distinct motives, using moral arguments, before permitting themselves to engage in an action.
I find it amusing that in this article, you are advocating the use of deliberate self-deception in order to ward yourself against later deliberate self-deception.
That said, I feel the urge to contribute despite the large time-gap, and I suspect that even if later posts revisit this concept, the relevance to my contribution will be lower.
“I believe X” is a statement of self-identity—the map of the territory of your mind. But as maps and territories go, self-identity is pretty special, as it is a map written using the territory, and changes in the map can affect the territory as a result—though not necessarily in the exactly intended fashion. So even if deliberate self-deception isn’t possible, then some approximation of it probably is.
Moreover, I’d like to question the definition of ‘belief’ in the context. If we place an emphasis, in the concept, of a belief as something that affects one’s actions, then there is such a thing as a false belief that someone holds: that is to say, an assumption someone intentionally makes, regardless of its’ truth or falsehood, that they use to guide their behavior for external reasons.
That is to say, acting, or role-playing.
I’m rather a believer in cognitive minimalism—that our brains are very uncomplex. So I would assert that the same system that we use to model others’ behavior—or to play others’ roles—we use for our own self-identity. So when you say, “I believe X”, you’re effectively saying, “I act as if X is true”. And if we use the same system to act like ourselves, to model our own behavior, as we do to model or act like anyone else, then that’s most of what the practical impact of a belief is.
What I’m trying to say is that the only difference between acting a certain way and believing a certain thing is that you only do the acting under certain practical conditions—the belief, insofar as a belief is different from an act, is acting in a certain way all the time, for any reason.
Replace “I believe X because...” with “I act as if X is true because...” and I don’t think it’s confusing anymore. Self-identity modification as a tool is pretty important to human cognition, not just for trying to convince yourself that what you don’t think is true, is.
Edit: Actually, I want to amend that last part now that I think on it. I would assert that there is no difference whatsoever; that all reasonable beliefs are contingent. In fact, a big part of acting rationally is about making your beliefs contingent on the truth or falsehood of the object of the belief. Beliefs that aren’t based on accuracy are still contingent, just on things like, “This is beneficial to me in some way.” And really, a rational belief is similar, it just goes, “I believe X because it is accurate,” with the implied addition, “and accuracy is good to have in a belief,” so that boils down to a practical reason as well.
That’s nice, but how does the Mathematical Method differ from the scientific one?
What differing insights do the ‘Math Goggles’ offer, as it were.