Yeah, at the end of the post I point out both the potential falsity of the SVP and the problem of updated deference. Approaches that make the agent indefinitely uncertain about the reward (or at least uncertain for longer) might help with the latter, e.g. ifHis also uncertain about the reward, or if preferences are modeled as changing over time or with different contexts, etc.
I’m pretty wary of introducing potentially-false assumptions like the SVP already, and it seems particularly bad if their benefits are only temporary.
I agree, and I’m not sure I endorse the SVP, but I think it’s the right type of solution—i.e. an assumption about the training environment that (hopefully) encourages cooperative behaviour.
I’ve found it difficult to think of a more robust/satisfying solution to manipulation (in this context). It seems like agents just will have incentives to manipulate each other in a multi-polar world, and it’s hard to prevent that.
Yeah, at the end of the post I point out both the potential falsity of the SVP and the problem of updated deference. Approaches that make the agent indefinitely uncertain about the reward (or at least uncertain for longer) might help with the latter, e.g. if H is also uncertain about the reward, or if preferences are modeled as changing over time or with different contexts, etc.
I agree, and I’m not sure I endorse the SVP, but I think it’s the right type of solution—i.e. an assumption about the training environment that (hopefully) encourages cooperative behaviour.
I’ve found it difficult to think of a more robust/satisfying solution to manipulation (in this context). It seems like agents just will have incentives to manipulate each other in a multi-polar world, and it’s hard to prevent that.