“Galaxies continue to exist after the expanding universe carries them over the horizon of observation from us” trivially unpacks to “If we had methods to make observations outside our light cone, we would pick up the signatures that galaxies after the expanding universe has carried them over the horizon of observation from us defined by c.”
You say “Any meaningful belief has a truth-condition”. This is exactly Peirce’s 1878 insight about the meaning of truth claims, expressed in slightly different language—after all, your “truth-condition” unpacks to a bundle of observables, does it not?
The standard term of art you are missing when you say “verificationist” is “predictivist”.
I can grasp no way in which you are not a predictivist other than terminological quibbles, Eliezer. You can refute me by uttering a claim that you consider meaningful, e.g. having a “truth-condition”, where the truth condition does not implicitly cash out as hypothetical-future observables—or, in your personal terminology, “anticipated experiences”
Amusingly, your “anticipated experiences” terminology is actually closer to the language of Peirce 1878 than the way I would normally express it, which is influenced by later philosophers in the predictivist line, notably Reichenbach.
Great Mambo Chicken and Engines of Creation were in my reference list for a while, until I decided to cull the list for more direct relevance to systems of training for rationality. It was threatening to get unmanageably long otherwise.
I didn’t know there was a biography of Korzybski. Thanks!