Caerbannog

• CaerbannogAug 30, 2012, 3:02 PM

  3 points

  on: What’s the Value of In­for­ma­tion?

  Could this be a trick question?

  The top of the paper says “1d12” or “2d6“, right? The first number is either “1” or “2”. If this interpretation is correct, then knowing the first number has a value of 500 pounds.

  As has already been stated, you have a 50% chance of guessing correctly to win 1000, so you already have an expected value of 500. To raise that to 100%, you should be willing to pay 500.

• CaerbannogMay 10, 2012, 6:14 PM

  3 points

  in reply to: bryjnar’s comment on: Alan Carter on the Com­plex­ity of Value

  My understanding of ‘Utility Monster’ is someone who gets increasing utility per resource unit when greater resources are spent (greater than linear return). For example it would get utility of 1x when getting one cupcake, and utility of >2x when getting 2 cupcakes.

  If such a monster existed, you would increase the average utility by giving ALL of everyone’s resources to it.

  A child may get more enjoyment from the same amount of resource than an adult in some situations, but you don’t raise the average utility by giving the entire cupcake to just one of your 2 children.

• CaerbannogJan 6, 2012, 9:24 PM

  1 point

  on: Less wrong has a fi­toc­racy group (in­vites)

  I am already a Fitocracy member so I can’t use the invite code, right? I’d still join the LW group on Fitocracy—but I couldn’t find it in a search. Can you say what the name of the group is?

• CaerbannogAug 25, 2011, 3:54 PM

  2 points

  on: Pri­soner’s Dilemma as a Game The­ory Laboratory

  This should be interesting. I’ve sent you my strategy by private message.

• CaerbannogJun 3, 2011, 1:07 AM

  8 points

  on: Brief ques­tion about Con­way’s Game of LIfe and AI

  If the board is 3^^^3, per side and set up randomly, then it almost certainly would be instantiated with googolplexes of Turing-complete simulations of our entire universe by complete chance alone (similar to Boltzmann Brains), and there would be vastly more universes very much like ours.

  Most of these universes would be wiped out quickly by local disturbances before they got very far, but still vast numbers would have enough clear or static space around them to permit reasonable durations. What’s a reasonable size and duration: 10^150? 10^(10^150)? The size of 3^^^3 absolutely dwarfs these.

  I think some of these comments are failing to account for how much space (3^^^3)^2 actually is. For any universe the size of ours, it is practically infinite.

  There would also be completely alien structures, more “natively” suited to GOL physics. These could be organisms with cells 10^100 by 10^100 units wide if necessary. They would notice individual attacking gliders as much as we notice a single high-energy photon or alpha particle.

• CaerbannogMay 17, 2011, 1:19 AM

  1 point

  in reply to: thejash’s comment on: Life Ex­ten­sion through Diet Modification

  The feeling of hunger never disappeared, but it got easier to accept.

  Some days that were really busy at work flew by without a problem at all. It was easier for me when I was engaged in a task that demanded most of my concentration.

• CaerbannogMay 17, 2011, 1:13 AM

  0 points

  in reply to: glunkthunker’s comment on: Life Ex­ten­sion through Diet Modification

  No, I meant that exercising on feast days was no problem.

  I did not try to exercise on fasting days more than a couple of times. It wasn’t terrible, but I don’t know if it’s healthy.

• CaerbannogMay 16, 2011, 9:53 PM

  3 points

  in reply to: jimrandomh’s comment on: Life Ex­ten­sion through Diet Modification

  Some articles said that the CR subjects exhibited more restlessness, or “foraging” type behavior. This hypothesis wasn’t tested as far as I know, though.

  Based on my experience, I didn’t feel less active or lethargic, just hungry. I think my body conserved its calories by reducing resting metabolic rate: Decreases in pulse, blood pressure, body temperature, body mass. My desire to exercise did not diminish, and neither did my capacity for aerobic exercises like running and swimming.

• CaerbannogMay 16, 2011, 9:46 PM

  6 points

  in reply to: Alicorn’s comment on: Life Ex­ten­sion through Diet Modification

  Maybe I didn’t use the best choice of words. Food did taste pretty amazing on the feast days, though.

Life Ex­ten­sion through Diet Modification

Refer­ence Classes in the Dooms­day Argument

• CaerbannogMay 14, 2011, 1:10 AM

  0 points

  in reply to: Tyrrell_McAllister’s comment on: Refer­ence Classes in the Dooms­day Argument

  It is possible I have missed an important point you are making, but here is how I interpret what you wrote:

  Observer #1 in this scenario is a special class because he knows that he was created before Doomsday. Because of this, he knows that his retrospective probability for heads is 50% because he was created regardless of the coin’s outcome.

  In our world, the timing of Doomsday is not so well-defined that we can say whether we’re in the same position as Observer #1 or not. Maybe we have lived past the most likely Doomsday scenario, and maybe we haven’t.

  Edit: grammar

• CaerbannogMay 13, 2011, 11:13 PM

  1 point

  in reply to: Manfred’s comment on: Refer­ence Classes in the Dooms­day Argument

  I think I see what you’re saying about fuzzy classes yielding fuzzy results, and that doesn’t mean that the results are invalid.

  In your opinion, how would the extra information (that we’re self-replicating, and whatever else) affect the argument?

• CaerbannogMay 9, 2011, 4:06 PM

  0 points

  in reply to: DanielLC’s comment on: What causes peo­ple to be­lieve in con­spir­acy the­o­ries?

  Your worldview and your choice of people whose opinion to respect don’t have to be selected rationally. I would argue, in fact, that a large proportion of people don’t choose these rationally.

  An alarmingly large fraction of Americans believe that the earth was created 6000 years ago, a position that most people here would find irrational. This is a worldview that is most often acquired from one’s parents or from respected religious figures. Would such a worldview be considered to be rationally selected?

  Other people hold the position that humans evolved from earlier primates over millions of years through evolution by natural selection. Many of these people don’t understand evolution well enough to hold it as a rational belief, and they may also have acquired this belief through their parents or other respected figures rather than by a reasoned analysis. I’ve been asked by someone who accepts evolution: “Wouldn’t it be great if humans would evolve wings! That would increase fitness, why doesn’t that happen?” [paraphrased]

  I think it’s not controversial to say that peoples’ worldviews and authority figures are not selected rationally.

• CaerbannogMay 7, 2011, 3:15 AM

  4 points

  on: What causes peo­ple to be­lieve in con­spir­acy the­o­ries?

  It seems that people are more likely to believe conspiracy theories that already are in line with their worldview. This would be an example of confirmation bias, to an extent.

  People are also more likely to believe a particular conspiracy theory if they hear it from someone whose opinion they already respect, or if many others in their social group believe such a theory.

  I don’t believe rational decision-making plays much part in the acceptance of conspiracy theories. You note that only 6% of Americans believe that the moon landing was hoaxed, and consider that an example of a fringe theory. Note, however, that about a quarter of Russians and English people think the moon landing was hoaxed.

  It seems that what’s considered fringe varies by population, and not necessarily by rationality or evidence. It makes me wonder if there are any theories believed by most Americans that are considered ridiculous elsewhere.

• CaerbannogApr 30, 2011, 3:45 AM

  0 points

  on: As­sump­tion of pos­i­tive rationality

  As you describe them, an irrational Bob’s beliefs are random, and a rational Bob bases and updates his beliefs on evidence. If he is trying to use a systematic method to determine his degree of rationality, or even trying to devise one, doesn’t that automatically make him rational (even if it’s only just his own definition of ‘rational’)?

  Regarding Boltzmann brains:

  If I’m not a Boltzmann brain, then my current understanding of the subject of Boltzmann brains correctly tells me that the overwhelmingly vast majority of Boltzmann brains would not have memories and thoughts with the degree of coherence that I do have.

  On the other hand, if I am a Boltzmann brain, then I’m either one of the vanishingly rare coherent ones and can trust my thoughts, or I’m so disconnected with reality that I cannot trust my conclusions about the degree of coherence of my thoughts and experiences (like irrational Bob, I suppose).

  But if I am an incoherent Boltzmann brain, I am one that can still think of the concept of a Boltzmann brain (and ponder the degree of coherence of my thoughts). I would say that argues against the likelihood of me being an incoherent Boltzmann brain. This leaves the options that I’m either not a Boltzmann brain, or that I’m a relatively coherent one.