*1969, degrees in business administration and more recently in psychology, 20 years work in hospital management, currently teaching/tutoring statistics
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Second, this is the start of a new cold war.
The current cold war didn’t start with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Maybe with the invasion of Georgia or of the Crimean peninsula or with the constant threats against the Baltic states.
But now the West has clearly realized it, and my point is that this has some potential to reduce the threat.
He threatened us when he invaded Ukraine, and threatened us again when there was the proposal of establishing a no-fly zone in Ukraine (“the consequences would be catastrophic for the entire world”).
During the Cold War nobody would have come up with a proposal like a no-fly zone during a regional war of one of both sides. The US didn’t even dream of proposing a no-fly zone over Afghanistan when the Russians invaded. The Soviet Union didn’t think of a no-fly zone over North Vietnam, either, I believe. Because both sides understood perfectly well the implications of such an act. It wasn’t necessary to make an explicit threat.
And I don’t think the Ukraine really thought it could get a no-fly zone. I see this more as a negotiation tool in the sense of requesting something huge that the other side is probably not willing to give in order to then get something smaller, which is a very effective tactic.
I don’t have memory of any other leader of a big nuclear power threatening the world with nuclear war if we meddle with their business, i.e. willing the risk world anihilation to accomplish his objectives.
Nixon comes to mind, Operation Giant Lance. It is hard to tell to what extent Putin is irrational and to what extent Putin projects irrationality as a tool, as in Nixon’s Madman Theory of foreign diplomacy.
And furthermore, there is a distinction to be made between different levels of change in the risk for nuclear war:
a) How likely was a nuclear war before Russia’s invasion? How likely is it now? That is what I have tried to adress.
b) As how likely was a nuclear war perceived before the invasion and as how likely is it perceived now?It is quite possible that the risk for a nuclear war has been stable or even decreased, and that, at the same time, the widespread perception of a hightened risk is correct in the sense that on average the current risk assessment is more realistic than the risk assessment was before the war.
What is, based on your understanding, the Russian perspective on what “Nazi” stands for?
I think that is an important distinction you are making. Russia’s (and Putin’s) motivations for aggression seem to be primarily defensive, made from a position of weakness, of vulnerability (which can make them extremely dangerous). That wasn’t the case with the SU.
Yes, two NATO members were involved on different sides in a civil war in a third (independent & non-NATO) country. I think that lies outside the scope of NATO’s Article 5.
If Russia were part of NATO, then something like that could have happened, too, e.g.:
Romanian and Russian troops fighting each other in a civil war in the Republic of Moldova.
I believe their last war ended 1922. But there were times when a next war between them seemed quiet likely and NATO spend a lot of energy discouraging both sides from open hostilities, if I remember correctly.
Yes, according to the NATO treaty there is only support for a victim of an attack. Here is the relevant Article 5 of the NATO treaty:
“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.” (NATO)
[emphasis by me]
I am not so sure whether it makes sense to put Russia and the SU in the same category when it comes to being missionary. The ideology of the SU was basically universal—an ideal end state would have been the conversion of every country in the world to communism. For Russia I don’t see that. Getting the former parts of the Russian empire back, yes, maybe being the leading slavonic country (especially an important motivation until 1917). But would Russia care how, e.g., Spain was governed? I don’t think so (SU or USA would care).
I was thinking about short term consequences. What do you think could be longer term consequences against which one should prepare now?
As long as it does not get really cold, according to the article.
It may be that I have overestimated the risk of a very cold late winter (implicitly I used 40% to get from 25% gas embargo risk to 10% risk for shortages).
Yes, there is that risk. In 2021 about 10% electricity with natural gas, and in addition hard coal (where the main source is Russia, too) 9%. This year probably more, because two additional nuclear power plants have been closed at the end of 2021.
But these numbers underestimate the problem: Natural gas is used to even out fluctuations in the production of electricity with wind or solar (33% of electricity in 2021, 23% wind, 10% solar). Therefore a lack of gas could seriously destabilise electricity production.
Because of that risk I would predict that the use of gas for electricity will have priority compared to private heating, decreasing the risk of electric grid breakdown but increasing the risk of supply shortages for private households (and industrial production, which uses even more natural gas than is used for heating).
Here, a senior fellow of the Brookings Institution shares his thoughts about possible parallels with Afghanistan, but more with the Russian occupation of Afghanistan: Could Ukraine be Putin’s Afghanistan?
He doen’t really answer this, but gives a couple of questions on which an answer could hinge:
Which state or states will be the frontline sponsor? [Pakistan in the case of Afghanistan]
Are they ready to take the heat from Russia?
How much support will the United States and NATO provide?
Will the insurgency spark a broader conflict, and can it be contained?
Are Ukrainians prepared to pay the price?
Thermal nuclear weapons are still Big Five exclusive. (I think India claim to have it, but the test yield is not conclusive)
North Korea’s test on 3 September 2017 could have been thermonuclear, too (BBC). Of course, even if true, that does not mean that they have successfully weaponized it yet. But North Korea being able to do that would lead me to updating the probability of other countries being able to develop thermonuclear weapons.
I think one has to look at what one can “afford” on different time scales. The answer can be quite different in the short run than with more time.
Of course, technically you are right. Germany could afford harsh sanctions against Russia even in the short term, in the sense that it will not be the end of Germany. However, living in Germany, I like to have electricity. And in winter I do like to have heating, too (the building I am living in is heated with natural gas—gas has a market share for heating of 48% in Germany, and district heating 14%, from which 42% are produced by gas, too). It is not only about “higher gas prices”—without Russian gas (and Russian coal) it is questionable if there will be enough energy available for electricity production and heating.
So, the main problem from my perspective isn’t the short term reluctance to risk Germany’s energy supply. The problem is that Germany has allowed itself to be dependent on such a highly unreliable energy source as Russia. And that one hasn’t invested in at least the option to use alternative sources, e.g., building a LNG terminal to be able to import gas from other sources (US, Qatar) - I believe mostly due to ideological reasons (gas is “bad” because it is a fossile fuel). And less than two months ago three additional nuclear power plants were shut down on schedule while the conflict between Russia and Ukraine was heating up.
When it comes to defense spending I believe there are different reasons for Germany’s unwillingness to do more: One factor is a highly naive reliance on an idealistic theory of foreign relations (that morality and international law trump national interests). Another factor is that it has worked in the past—during the cold war there was constant complaining by the US that the European countries should do more to defend themselves. Then there is the feeling that the threat to Germany is much less than during the cold war, Putin’s Russia is not seen as having aspirations to conquer Germany or all of Europe—quite different from the universalistic ideology of communism or from Hitler’s territorial aims (and I believe that assessment is actually somewhat correct—for Russia a neutral Germany would be more beneficial than a Germany under Russian rule—as with Sweden’s neutrality for Germany during WWII ). And, as a result of two lost world wars, Germany has become deeply pacifistic. All those reasons have led to a motivated blindness towards Putin’s aims and actions. I am quite curious whether this will change now (but I somehow doubt it).
That has been a key problem of NATO’s defense posture for many decades: How believable is it that the US will risk complete self destruction to protect the freedom of European countries? And iirc that was one reason during the cold war to switch from “massive retaliation” to “flexible response” as a deterrence doctrine.
As it was then, even now, I think, it is not about assuring the adversary that the US will be involved—there can’t be certainty about that. It is more about changing the probabilities for a US involvement. That is the main reason behind the troop movements to NATO’s eastern border, e.g. US F-35 fighter jets and an infantry batallion. An operation killing American soldiers in combat is massively more risky (and therefore, hopefully, much less likely) than an operation without this risk.
Telling the US “Get out of the Baltic states (even though you have guaranteed their safety), or else” is quite different from “Don’t get into Ukraine, or else”. Furthermore, there are troops in the Baltic states of other NATO countries with nuclear weapons, France and the UK.
Not unexpectedly, Europe is divided on the sanctions against Russia. Germany, Italy, Cyprus, and maybe the Netherlands seem to have blocked Russia’s exclusion from the international finance system SWIFT (Guardian).
One reason behind Germany’s position is the fear that without SWIFT it can’t pay for the Russian gas it depends on (FAZ—in German) for heating and for electricity.
Apparently, in one important sense this isn’t true: they physically possessed the weapons, but not the capacity to do anything with them.
That’s an important point.
However, I believe that a highly industrialized nation with modern nuclear weapons (but without the launch codes) would have had the capacity to do something with them. Using the weapons grade material (not only the fissible material, also the electronics etc) and using the weapons as prototypes for designing warheads should have had the potential to greatly accelerate a nuclear weapons program.
So, in a way this case is quite similar to Gaddafi’s—not giving up a functional nuclear arsenal (only South Africa has done that up to now, and I don’t think there will be a second case any time soon) but giving up the potential for a nuclear weapons program.
Nevertheless, I am quite confident that Putin could come up with historical arguments for invading the Baltic states, too. E.g., that the Baltic states were part of Russia for more than a century and had gotten their independence primarily from the German occupation forces at the end of WW I.
...that the setting up of the Union Republics of the USSR in 1922 (which included the three Baltic states) involved transferring the territory and “the population of what was historically Russia” to the new states.
The setting up of the SU in 1922 did not include the Baltic states—these were independent states from 1918 until 1940 (and I don’t think that in Monday’s speech Putin contradicted that).
Parties to the Treaty on the Creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1922 were only:
- Russian SFSR
- Ukrainian SSR
- Byelorussian SSR
- Transcaucasian SFSR
...with the Baltic states being analogous to Czechoslovakia (which was allies with France, but which was more or less abandoned to Hitler)
I think a key difference is the presence of NATO troops in the Baltic states (NATO Enhanced Forward Presence, Baltic Air Policing). Militarily, those are only a tripwire, but killing US pilots in an attack on the Baltic states seems to me a very dangerous move.
If France and England had had garrisons in Czechoslovakia, then 1938 could have played out quite differently.
That is a very important point. We don’t know how stable or instable the (first) Cold War would have been with social media. How would have been the West’s reaction to Budapest 1956 or Prague 1968 with Twitter and Facebook?