A113

Karma: 19

A113 1 Aug 2013 20:08 UTC
2 points
in reply to: James_Miller’s comment on: More “Stupid” Questions
I’m in the same boat. I don’t have anything against music, but never derived pleasure from it like other people seemed to. I’ve enjoyed particular songs, e.g. stuff from Dr. Horrible’s Sing-Along Blog, because I can enjoy cleverness and humor and a lot of songs have content that is clever or funny. But the music itself is background at best.

What I feel when listening to Bach isn’t what someone else feels about a song they dislike; more like what you feel about an overheard conversation with nothing to do with you. Or a speech on an issue you don’t care about. I have tried to change this, because of utilitarianism, but it turns out it’s hard.

A113 1 Jul 2013 18:12 UTC
1 point
in reply to: mstevens’s comment on: Harry Potter and the Methods of Rationality discussion thread, part 19, chapter 88-89
I think the obvious solution is basically this, with a Time-Turning involved. The troll could be real, or not (probably is). The hardest part about changing the past is faking the evidence including memories, but with a False-Memory Charm that becomes trivial. Memory charm Harry and possibly Dumbledore as well, depending on whether he objects “but I remember feeling a student die.” They won’t do it this way because it’s too finger snap-ish and not dramatic enough, but if it’s not at least addressed then I will allege a holding of the Idiot Ball.

Harry will need the help of Dumbledore or Quirrel to unlock the time-turner and cast the memory charms. Quirrel wouldn’t help but I’d be interested to see his excuse; Dumbledore should be possible to convince but might not be. McGonagall or someone might be capable of it but wouldn’t obliviate Albus without him asking for it. Unless this is what was foreshadowed with the question about her first loyalty?

A113 3 Jun 2013 4:25 UTC
3 points
on: When Truth Isn’t Enough
I usually use the phrase “only literally.”

A113 29 Apr 2013 19:06 UTC
1 point
on: Three more ways identity can be a curse
This post, the first section especially, is likely to contribute to me intentionally changing my behavior for consequentialist reasons. Upvoted.

A113 18 Apr 2013 17:45 UTC
2 points
on: Open Thread, April 15-30, 2013
I heard a speaker claim that the frequency of names in the Gospels matches the list of most popular names in the time and place they are set, not the time and place they are accepted to have been written in. I hadn’t heard this argument before and couldn’t think of a refutation. Assuming his facts are accurate, is this a problem?

A113 20 Feb 2013 0:21 UTC
0 points
on: Get genotyped for free ( If your IQ is high enough)
Apparently selection is still ongoing: I got an email today saying they’re sending me the kit. What kind of information should I expect when the results come back? I’ve never been genotyped before, so I don’t know if this will be telling me stuff I already know, listing risk factors for diseases, declaring me genetically nonhuman, or what. I’m a step behind the rest of you on what genotyping actually does.

A113 11 Dec 2012 4:21 UTC
1 point
on: Do I really not believe in God? Do you?
I found this very interesting because I often have the exact inverse experience. I am a theist, but when I have a close call like that my first reaction usually is “I got lucky.” It’s when my conscious mind kicks in that I start thinking “”Lucky” doesn’t have to mean just “lucky,” and God has worked in more mysterious ways before.” (Which, yes, is precisely what you’d predict a theist would say if you asked one.) And then I start feeling gratitude.

I know people here would say that this must mean I don’t actually believe in God and only believe I do, but if you judge real beliefs by first reactions then shminux has a point.

A113 1 Dec 2012 2:22 UTC
2 points
in reply to: Snowyowl’s comment on: Causal Universes
I said not receiving a CD from the future is the most likely because that’s what usually happens. But I do have a pretty huge sampling bias of mainly talking to people who don’t have time machines.

i would expect “no CD” to be the most common even if you do have one, just because I feel like a closed time loop should take some effort to start. But this is probably a generalization from fiction, since if they happen in the real universe they do “just happen” with no previous cause. So I guess I can’t support it well enough to justify my intuition. I will say that if I’m wrong about this, any time traveller should be prepared for these to happen all the time on totally trivial things.

A113 29 Nov 2012 8:55 UTC
6 points
in reply to: Snowyowl’s comment on: Causal Universes
The Novikov Self-Consistency Principle can help answer that. It is one of my favorite things. I don’t think it was named in the post, but the concept was there.

The idea is that contradictions have probability zero. So the first scenario, the one with the paradox, doesn’t happen. It’s like the Outcome Pump if you hit the Emergency Regret Button. Instead of saying “do the following,” it should say “attempt the following.” If it is one self-consistent timeline, then you will fail. I don’t know why you’ll fail, probably just whatever reason is least unlikely, but the probability of success is zero. The probability distribution is virtually all at “you send the same number you received.” (With other probability mass for “you misread” and “transcription error” and stuff).

If your experiment succeeds, then you are not dealing with a single, self-consistent universe. The Novikov principle has been falsified. The distribution of X depends on how many “previous” iterations there were, which depends on the likelihood that you do this sequence given that you receive such a CD. I think it would be a geometric distribution?

The second one is also interesting. Any number is self-consistent. So (back to Novikov) none of them are vetoed. If a CD arrives, the distribution is whatever distribution you would get if you were asked “Write a number.” More likely, you don’t receive a CD from the future. That’s what happened today. And yesterday. And the day before. If you resolve to send the CD to yourself the previous day, then you will fail if self-consistency applies

Have you read HPMoR yet? I also highly recommend this short story.

A113 7 Nov 2012 21:34 UTC
1 point
in reply to: TheOtherDave’s comment on: Think Twice: A Response to Kevin Kelly on ‘Thinkism’
Not just because I can. Maybe for other reasons, like the fact that I still care about the punier humans and want to make it better for them. That depends on preferences that an AI might or might not have.

It’s not really about what I would do; it’s the fact that we don’t know what an arbitrary superintelligence will or won’t decide to do.

(I’m thinking of “superintelligence” as “smart enough to do more or less whatever it wants by sheer thinkism,” which I’ve already said I agree is possible. Is this nonstandard?)

A113 7 Nov 2012 21:13 UTC
−2 points
on: Think Twice: A Response to Kevin Kelly on ‘Thinkism’
I agree with both you and Kelly most of the time, you more than him. I did think this part required a nitpick:

To me, at first impression, the notion that a ten million times speedup would have a negligible effect on scientific innovation or progress seems absurd. It appears obvious that it would have a world-transforming impact. To me, it appears obvious that it would be capable of having a world-transforming impact. Just because it can doesn’t mean it will, though I certainly wouldn’t want to assume it won’t.

If I became superintelligent tomorrow, I probably wouldn’t significantly change the world. Not on a Singularity scale, not right away, and not just because I could. Would you? My point there is that you can’t assume that because the first superintelligence can construct nanobots and take over the world, it therefore will.

A113 27 Oct 2012 22:13 UTC
0 points
in reply to: Stuart_Armstrong’s comment on: Smoking lesion as a counterexample to CDT
I meant in the second example. I agree that in the first one if she doesn’t use the desire as evidence of the gene she’ll get a result saying she should smoke. But in the second one even if she does ignore that then the probability of cancer given that she smokes is higher than the probability of cancer given that she doesn’t.

If she doesn’t have the gene, then she can smoke or not without any change in risk. She doesn’t know if she has the gene or not, but if she then smoking makes her more likely to get cancer. So, if she sums across both possibilities, she’s more likely to get cancer if she smokes. Not by as large a margin as if she knew she had the gene, or even by as large a margin as she would estimate if she included the urge to smoke as evidence that she does, but it’s still more likely.

P(C|S&~G) = P(C|~S&~G) = P(C|~S&G) < P(C|S&G). So P(C|S) > P(C|~S), even without looking at the probability of the gene given that she prefers to smoke.

A113 27 Oct 2012 1:20 UTC
2 points
on: Smoking lesion as a counterexample to CDT
It seems to me that even under CDT, Susan smoking would make her more likely to get cancer. She gets some enjoyment out of smoking, but there is also a probability P that she gets cancer from it. Even if she isn’t allowed to use her preference as evidence that she has the gene, she still might have it. The dislike of cancer dominates the equation. I suppose you could fix that by adjusting the utilities she assigns to smoking and cancer, and the probability that she gets cancer given that she smokes, but I suspect that’s not the point.

What’d I miss?