So I normally defend the “trust the experts” position, and I went to grad school for philosophy, but… I think philosophy may be an area where “trust the experts” mostly doesn’t work, simply because with a few exceptions the experts don’t agree on anything. (Fuller explanation, with caveats, here.)
Also, from the same background, it is striking to me that a lot of the criticisms Less Wrong people make of philosophers are the same as the criticisms philosophers make of one another. I can’t really think of a case where Less Wrong stakes out positions that are almost universally rejected by mainstream philosophers. And not just because philosophers disagree so much, though that’s also true, of course; it seems rather that Less Wrong people greatly exaggerate how different they are and how much they disagree with the philosophical mainstream, to the extent that any such thing exists (again, a respect in which their behavior resembles how philosophers treat one another).
Since there is no consensus among philosophers, respecting philosophy is about respecting the process. The negative .claims LW makes about philosophy are indeed similar to the negative claims philosophy makes about itself. LW also makes the positive claim that it has a better, faster method than philosophy but in fact just has a truncated version of the same method.
But Alexander misunderstands me when he says I accuse Yudkowsky “of being against publicizing his work for review or criticism.” He’s willing to publish it–but only to enlighten us lesser rationalists. He doesn’t view it as a necessary part of checking whether his views are actually right. That means rejecting the social process of science. That’s a problem.
Or, as I like to put it, if you half bake your bread, then you get your bread quicker...but its half baked,
So I normally defend the “trust the experts” position, and I went to grad school for philosophy, but… I think philosophy may be an area where “trust the experts” mostly doesn’t work, simply because with a few exceptions the experts don’t agree on anything. (Fuller explanation, with caveats, here.)
Also, from the same background, it is striking to me that a lot of the criticisms Less Wrong people make of philosophers are the same as the criticisms philosophers make of one another. I can’t really think of a case where Less Wrong stakes out positions that are almost universally rejected by mainstream philosophers. And not just because philosophers disagree so much, though that’s also true, of course; it seems rather that Less Wrong people greatly exaggerate how different they are and how much they disagree with the philosophical mainstream, to the extent that any such thing exists (again, a respect in which their behavior resembles how philosophers treat one another).
Since there is no consensus among philosophers, respecting philosophy is about respecting the process. The negative .claims LW makes about philosophy are indeed similar to the negative claims philosophy makes about itself. LW also makes the positive claim that it has a better, faster method than philosophy but in fact just has a truncated version of the same method.
As Hallquist notes elsewhere
But Alexander misunderstands me when he says I accuse Yudkowsky “of being against publicizing his work for review or criticism.” He’s willing to publish it–but only to enlighten us lesser rationalists. He doesn’t view it as a necessary part of checking whether his views are actually right. That means rejecting the social process of science. That’s a problem.
Or, as I like to put it, if you half bake your bread, then you get your bread quicker...but its half baked,
If what philosophers specialise in clarifying questions, they can trusted to get the question right.
A typical failure mode of amateur philosophy is to substitute easier questions for harder ones.