It’s unclear what point the Bank of Japan example is meant to illustrate. You acknowledge that Nobel laureates and other prestigious economists agreed that the macroeconomic policy of the Bank of Japan would have very bad consequences. So I’d expect Hal Finney, and other epistemically modest folk, to be skeptical of the Bank of Japan on the basis of what these experts believe.
Note, however, that Eliezer didn’t take the inside view here: he was deferring to bloggers (“by reading econblogs, I believe myself to have identified which econbloggers know better”). So, again, it seems that this example doesn’t illustrate a clear thesis. If we agree modest folk could criticize the Bank of Japan out of deference to Nobel laureates, why should we take Eliezer’s deference to econbloggers as illustrative of epistemic immodesty?
One difference in my model of a modest-epistemologist vs a person who isn’t, is that when they both read Eliezer’s passing remark in the Macroeconomics papers (saying that Japan’s econ polict is deranged) the modesty person says “I believe you are wrong because the Bank of Japan are experts” and the other person says “I do not have a strong belief here”. I feel the modest epistemologist is quicker to make judgements about what you can’t know, whereas the other person thinks you may indeed know better than the Bank of Japan, because this isn’t that far out of sync with how the world generally is.
I think the reasonable reaction upon reading the statement that the Bank of Japan’s macroeconomic policy is deranged, made by someone who lacks formal credentials in the area and who appears to have a less-than-stellar track-record of defying expert consensus, is indeed to be skeptical. By contrast, that position becomes much more reasonable if one learns that Nobel laureates, prestigious economists and smart econbloggers agree with it.
So the claim “I believe you are wrong because the Bank of Japan are experts” seems to be a caricature of modest epistemology, based on an equivocation between
“In the absence of other information, I would rather trust the Bank of Japan than Eliezer Yudkowsky here” and
“It’s reasonable to side with Nobel laureates, prestigious economists and smart econbloggers if they disagree with the Bank of Japan.”
The clearest description that Eliezer gave of this part of his process looks to be:
when I read some econbloggers who I’d seen being right about empirical predictions before saying that Japan was being grotesquely silly, and the economic logic seemed to me to check out, as best I could follow it, I wasn’t particularly reluctant to believe them.
So it wasn’t just that he trusted Scott Sumner’s judgment, it was the combination of I think Sumner has good judgment about things like this (outside view) and the parts of his argument that I can evaluate all look solid (inside view). I wouldn’t call that “deferring.”
If we agree modest folk could criticize the Bank of Japan out of deference to Nobel laureates
Point of clarification: Eliezer was not, in fact, deferring to Nobel laureates who were critical of Japan’s monetary policy, or even aware that such laureates existed at the time. He was specifically deferring to econ bloggers who he happened to follow. Nor should we consider it an act of modesty (“not taking the inside view”) to side with one set of experts over another; to do so is to call the opposing side wrong, after all.
Eliezer was not, in fact, deferring to Nobel laureates who were critical of Japan’s monetary policy, or even aware that such laureates existed at the time. He was specifically deferring to econ bloggers who he happened to follow.
I completely agree—this is what I was claiming in my previous comment. My point was that Finney’s (hypothetical) decision to defer to Nobel laureates and Eliezer’s decision to defer to econ bloggers are similar in the relevant respects, so it’s unclear why one decision would be an instance of epistemic modesty while the other an instance of epistemic immodesty.
It’s unclear what point the Bank of Japan example is meant to illustrate. You acknowledge that Nobel laureates and other prestigious economists agreed that the macroeconomic policy of the Bank of Japan would have very bad consequences. So I’d expect Hal Finney, and other epistemically modest folk, to be skeptical of the Bank of Japan on the basis of what these experts believe.
But should he have distrusted his own view before learning that fact?
I agree that’s the relevant question.
Note, however, that Eliezer didn’t take the inside view here: he was deferring to bloggers (“by reading econblogs, I believe myself to have identified which econbloggers know better”). So, again, it seems that this example doesn’t illustrate a clear thesis. If we agree modest folk could criticize the Bank of Japan out of deference to Nobel laureates, why should we take Eliezer’s deference to econbloggers as illustrative of epistemic immodesty?
One difference in my model of a modest-epistemologist vs a person who isn’t, is that when they both read Eliezer’s passing remark in the Macroeconomics papers (saying that Japan’s econ polict is deranged) the modesty person says “I believe you are wrong because the Bank of Japan are experts” and the other person says “I do not have a strong belief here”. I feel the modest epistemologist is quicker to make judgements about what you can’t know, whereas the other person thinks you may indeed know better than the Bank of Japan, because this isn’t that far out of sync with how the world generally is.
I think the reasonable reaction upon reading the statement that the Bank of Japan’s macroeconomic policy is deranged, made by someone who lacks formal credentials in the area and who appears to have a less-than-stellar track-record of defying expert consensus, is indeed to be skeptical. By contrast, that position becomes much more reasonable if one learns that Nobel laureates, prestigious economists and smart econbloggers agree with it.
So the claim “I believe you are wrong because the Bank of Japan are experts” seems to be a caricature of modest epistemology, based on an equivocation between
“In the absence of other information, I would rather trust the Bank of Japan than Eliezer Yudkowsky here” and
“It’s reasonable to side with Nobel laureates, prestigious economists and smart econbloggers if they disagree with the Bank of Japan.”
The clearest description that Eliezer gave of this part of his process looks to be:
So it wasn’t just that he trusted Scott Sumner’s judgment, it was the combination of I think Sumner has good judgment about things like this (outside view) and the parts of his argument that I can evaluate all look solid (inside view). I wouldn’t call that “deferring.”
Point of clarification: Eliezer was not, in fact, deferring to Nobel laureates who were critical of Japan’s monetary policy, or even aware that such laureates existed at the time. He was specifically deferring to econ bloggers who he happened to follow. Nor should we consider it an act of modesty (“not taking the inside view”) to side with one set of experts over another; to do so is to call the opposing side wrong, after all.
I completely agree—this is what I was claiming in my previous comment. My point was that Finney’s (hypothetical) decision to defer to Nobel laureates and Eliezer’s decision to defer to econ bloggers are similar in the relevant respects, so it’s unclear why one decision would be an instance of epistemic modesty while the other an instance of epistemic immodesty.