That post in particular is a vague overview of meta-rationality, not a systematic account of it. It doesn’t describe meta-rationality as something that qualifies as a theory. It just says there is such a thing without telling exactly what it is.
Do you mean the sequence “Map and Territory”? I don’t find it to include a comprehensive and well-defined taxonomy of ways of being rational and irrational. I was investigating whether I should present a certain theory here. Does this −4 mean you don’t want it?
Insofar as LW is interested of irrationality, it seems interested of some kind of pseudo-irrationality: reasoning mistakes whose existence is affirmed by resorting to rational argumentation. I call that pseudo-irrationality, because its existence is affirmed rationally instead of irrationally.
I am talking about the kind of irrationality whose existence can be observed, but cannot be argued for, because it is obvious. Examples of such forms of irrationality include synchronicities. An example of a synchronicity would be you talking about a bee, and a bee appearing in the room. There is no rational reason (ostensibly) why these two events would happen simultaneously, and it could rightly be deemed a coincidence. But how does it exist as a coincidence? If we notice it, it exists as something we pay attention to, but is there any way we could be more specific about this?
If we could categorize such irrationally existing things comprehensively, we would have a clearer grasp on what is the rationality that we are advocating. We would know what that rationality is not.
This post is another one of the ones I was talking about. I wasn’t really paying attention to where in the sequences anything was (it’s been so long since I read them that they’re all blurred together in my mind).
There are certainly strong arguments against the meaningfulness of coincidence (and I think the heuristics and biases program does address some of when and why people think coincidences are meaningful).
But this doesn’t answer the legitimate philosophical dilemma: If every belief must be justified, and those justifications in turn must be justified, then how is the infinite recursion terminated?
I do not assume that every belief must be justified, except possibly within rationality.
Do the arguments against the meaningfulness of coincidence state that coincidences do not exist?
That post in particular is a vague overview of meta-rationality, not a systematic account of it. It doesn’t describe meta-rationality as something that qualifies as a theory. It just says there is such a thing without telling exactly what it is.
Sorry, I meant that that series of posts addresses the justification issue, if somewhat informally.
Do you mean the sequence “Map and Territory”? I don’t find it to include a comprehensive and well-defined taxonomy of ways of being rational and irrational. I was investigating whether I should present a certain theory here. Does this −4 mean you don’t want it?
Insofar as LW is interested of irrationality, it seems interested of some kind of pseudo-irrationality: reasoning mistakes whose existence is affirmed by resorting to rational argumentation. I call that pseudo-irrationality, because its existence is affirmed rationally instead of irrationally.
I am talking about the kind of irrationality whose existence can be observed, but cannot be argued for, because it is obvious. Examples of such forms of irrationality include synchronicities. An example of a synchronicity would be you talking about a bee, and a bee appearing in the room. There is no rational reason (ostensibly) why these two events would happen simultaneously, and it could rightly be deemed a coincidence. But how does it exist as a coincidence? If we notice it, it exists as something we pay attention to, but is there any way we could be more specific about this?
If we could categorize such irrationally existing things comprehensively, we would have a clearer grasp on what is the rationality that we are advocating. We would know what that rationality is not.
I didn’t vote on this article, as it happens.
This post is another one of the ones I was talking about. I wasn’t really paying attention to where in the sequences anything was (it’s been so long since I read them that they’re all blurred together in my mind).
There are certainly strong arguments against the meaningfulness of coincidence (and I think the heuristics and biases program does address some of when and why people think coincidences are meaningful).
The page says:
I do not assume that every belief must be justified, except possibly within rationality.
Do the arguments against the meaningfulness of coincidence state that coincidences do not exist?