Hiya Yovel!
Q1: How have you been impacted by the recent hostilities?
Q2: What do you think are the potential end goals of this newly re-escalated conflict for the Israeli government? (As an naive observer, seems like [occupying Gaza / leave a power vacuum / let the Hamas reorg after] are all rather bad outcomes)
Thanks for your concern! Thankfully I’ve been impacted very little personally. I live in the center of Israel which “only” gets bombed once a day or so. My room is a bomb shelter (as is required by Isreali law to be available in every apartment), so I don’t even have to get out of bed if there’s an alarm during the night! However two of my cousins are in combat, have enlisted as resrves and will go into the Gaza strip if it’s invaded, so I’m worried for their safety.
In two word: Yes, exactly. Israel’s strategy since the Hamas took the strip over in 2007 has been to try and contain it, and keeping it weak by periodic, limited confrontations (the so called Mowing the Lawn doctorine), and trying to economically develop the strip in order to give Hamas incentives to avoid confrontation. While Hamas grew stronger, the general feeling was that the strategy works and the last 15 years were not that bad. I think the genral concensus in Israel right now is that Hamas proved this strategy does not work, and we have to re- occupy the strip and topple Hamas’s regime, then maybe try to establish a non- terrorist regime (maybe by some UN force or the Palestinial Authority). All that might not be possible. We’ll have to live and see.
Israel’s strategy since the Hamas took the strip over in 2007 has been to try and contain it, and keeping it weak by periodic, limited confrontations (the so called Mowing the Lawn doctorine), and trying to economically develop the strip in order to give Hamas incentives to avoid confrontation. While Hamas grew stronger, the general feeling was that the strategy works and the last 15 years were not that bad.
I am surprised to read the bolded part! What actions have the Israeli government taken to develop Gaza, and did Gaza actually develop economically in that time? (That is not a rhetorical question—I know next to nothing about this.)
Looking quickly at some stats, real GDP per capita seems to have gone up a bit since 2007, but has declined since 2016, and its current figure ($5.6K in 2021) is lower than e.g., Angola, Bangladesh, and Venezuela.
Qualitatively, the blockade seems to have been net negative for Gaza’s economic development. NYT writes:
The Palestinian territory of Gaza has been under a suffocating Israeli blockade, backed by Egypt, since Hamas seized control of the coastal strip in 2007. The blockade restricts the import of goods, including electronic and computer equipment, that could be used to make weapons and prevents most people from leaving the territory.
More than two million Palestinians live in Gaza. The tiny, crowded coastal enclave has a nearly 50 percent unemployment rate, and Gaza’s living conditions, health system and infrastructure have all deteriorated under the blockade.
But that is a news report, so we should take it with a grain of salt.
Sorry it took me some time. I agree with your asessment. I did say Israel tried to do that, but it’s a hard problem. I didn’t want to elaborate on this point in the original comment since it felt off topic, so here goes:
TL;DR: Blockade is the baseline from which we try to improve, since Hamas are genocidal terrorists and use any aid to military needs. Under that constraint Israel has supplied water, food, electricity, and tried to build more generators and let palestinians work within its borders.
Some links will be in hebrew, sorry in advance. I’ll only use major newpapers, wikipedia or large think tanks.
First of all the background assumption is that Israel is trying to improve the situation in the stip within the constraint “a genocidal terror organization is in reign, and they’ll abuse any aid”. The original raional behind the Separation in 2005 was to let the Palestinian Authority control a relatively large piece of land with a port. All that went to hell after Hamas won the democratic elections in 2006, then killed all other political parties in 2007. Since then work visas from Gaza to Israel were stopped, and the blockade started.
Provide basic human needs such as electricity, even though the Palestinians don’t actually pay for it.
It is not much. However, keep in mind that everything that entered the strip was used for military needs first, and civilian second: cement for bunkers and offensive tunnels, iron for rockets (couldn’t find a good link, but they’re produced locally and the iron comes from somewhere), and sandbags for bunkers. And that’s the stuff we actually let through, not the military equipment they are constantly smuggling inside, some in civilian guise.
In conclusion: It’s hard. There are no good solutions. We are trying. It’s not optimal, or even the best we could concievably do, but nothing ever is. We are trying to manage our own potential genociders, backed by popular support. It’s an impossible situation, and everyone suffers, but we’re triying to make it better than baseline.
“Economically develop” is only meaningful against some baseline. Israel has had policies that clearly massively harm Gaza’s development, and other policies that somewhat help it. There are also other factors Israel doesn’t control, which probably are a net positive; economies in general tend to develop over time.
So if the baseline is some past year, or if it’s the counterfactual situation with a blockade and no mitigating policies, there’s been development. But if it’s the counterfactual with no blockade and no mitigating policies, I’d guess not so much.
In other words: Israel’s “strategy” has included at least some things that in themselves help Gaza’s development, but Israel has still hurt its development overall / on net.
Maybe it is more helpful to speak in terms of subgoals:
Israel try to achieve security. For that, it try to keep Hammas both quiet and weak. The externality of most ways that we keep them quiet is better life for Palestinians, and the opposite is true for making Hammas weak, with larger effect size.
(I believe most Israelis also care somewhat about Palestinians having better conditions as a terminal value—though probably not enough to effect policy, except for avoiding unnecessary harm. I don’t know from the inside about Palestinians attitude toward Israelis, but public information suggest that many of them wish us harm as a terminal value, even when in expense of other goals)
There are also many Israelies that don’t consider Plaestinians to be humans worth protecting, but rather as evil beings / outgroup / whatever you’d call that.
Also (with much less confidence), I do think many Palastinians want to kill Israelies because of things that I’d consider brainwashing.
Hard question—what to do about a huge population that’s been brainwashed like that (if my estimation here is correct), or how might a peaceful resolution look?
On 1, I agree that there are some Israelis that view them collectively as evil, and would harm them instrumentally without much thought. Hard to put numbers, but I
guess that those are ~15% of the Jewish population. I don’t think that there is more that 1% that support direct violence against non-terrorists for its own sake (as opposed to “we really want to kill your arch-terrorist neighbor, and you happen to be there too, and we really can’t wait until you aren’t home”) even in a state of war. I don’t say my opinion about it, just that it is very different from the apparent Palestinian attitude.
On 2 I agree. It seem to be a general argument for judging people relative to their society, but this question is hard in the general case. As an anecdote, taking over the and contra-brain-washing the next generation was very successful in post-war west Germany. It is hard though, and probably work only under very specific conditions.
“I don’t think that there is more that 1% that support direct violence against non-terrorists for its own sake”: This seems definitely wrong to me, if you also count Israelies who consider everyone in Gaza as potential terrorists or something like that.
I’m not sure whether our disagreement comes from different perceptions of specific populations/parties in Israel, or from you writing about current positions while I meant to write about the positions before the attack. Today, I sadly agree that it is far more than 1%. I hope and expect that the change is mostly temporary, and hope that it will not bring us to do things that we will be too ashamed of in the meanwhile.
Why would you have less confidence that many Palestinians want to kill Israelis when the stated goal of their government is to wipe out all Jews? At least publicly, the Israeli government does not have a policy of wiping out all Arabs.
Elections are complex and there are many reasons to prefer one politician over another.
Besides, according to Google, Gaza’s median age is 18. Most of the people who are currently living in Gaza were not able to vote back in 2006.
My main point here is that good information about the views is hard to access. The fact that you point to information that’s been out of date for more than a decade is a sign that good information is hard to access.
I agree. However I know that it’s widely accepted Hamas is enjoying popular support. I don’t have good public sources to support that statement, it follows from many little anecdotes over the years. A good example is that unlike widely unliked authoritarian regimes such as Belarus, they enjoyed very little protests over the years, and have managed to repeatedly rally people to their needs.
While it’s a defensible position from a “briefely googled this” point of view, I really don’t think people who have been following closely hold this position.
Hamas does provide social services. A short GPT4 summary is:
>Hamas, an Islamist Palestinian political and military organization, has a significant social welfare component. Since its establishment in 1987, Hamas has set up numerous social service institutions, clinics, schools, and other humanitarian agencies in the Palestinian territories, particularly the Gaza Strip. Here are some of the social services that Hamas provides or has provided:
>Education: Hamas has founded and operated schools, kindergartens, and colleges. The educational institutions not only provide basic education but also often include religious teachings and, in some cases, political indoctrination.
>Healthcare: Hamas operates a network of clinics and hospitals in Gaza. These institutions provide medical services ranging from basic healthcare to surgical procedures. During periods of conflict, these institutions have also treated individuals injured in the fighting.
>Charities: Hamas has established various charitable organizations that distribute aid to the needy, including food, clothing, and financial assistance.
>Orphanages and Youth Centers: Institutions have been set up to care for orphans and provide youth with various activities, training, and support.
>Mosques and Religious Classes: Hamas’s roots are in the Muslim Brotherhood, and it places significant emphasis on religious outreach and education. It has built and maintained mosques and offers religious classes.
>Rehabilitation and Special Needs Services: Some facilities have been set up to cater to individuals with disabilities and to help rehabilitate those affected by the ongoing conflict.
>Housing and Infrastructure: After conflicts or due to deteriorating living conditions, Hamas has sometimes been involved in housing projects or infrastructure repair, either directly or by supporting such projects.
>These social services have helped Hamas garner significant popular support among Palestinians, particularly in the Gaza Strip. By filling a void often left by a weak or absent central government, the organization has been able to cultivate loyalty and bolster its political and social standing. However, it’s worth noting that this support comes amidst controversy, as many countries and organizations label Hamas as a terrorist organization due to its military activities and attacks against Israel. Critics also argue that Hamas uses its social services as a means of gaining popular support and furthering its political objectives.
Given how poor Gaza is those services matter and even people who don’t support killing Israelis might support Hamas by because the main thing they care about are the social services.
A good example is that unlike widely unliked authoritarian regimes such as Belarus, they enjoyed very little protests over the years, and have managed to repeatedly rally people to their needs.
Lack of protest can be a sign of people liking a regime, it can also be a sign that people are afraid to protest because that has personal consequences for them. Acts like running a Youth Center help with letting the Youth Center organize support rallies.
The fact that Gaza has this repressive environment is one of the reasons it’s harder to know what people actually think.
On #2, my personal view is that Israel has as much of an end-game strategy in Gaza as the US did after 9/11 invading Afghanistan—essentially none, but so much public pressure to overreact that they will go in and try to take over anyways.
Hiya Yovel! Q1: How have you been impacted by the recent hostilities? Q2: What do you think are the potential end goals of this newly re-escalated conflict for the Israeli government? (As an naive observer, seems like [occupying Gaza / leave a power vacuum / let the Hamas reorg after] are all rather bad outcomes)
Thanks for your concern! Thankfully I’ve been impacted very little personally. I live in the center of Israel which “only” gets bombed once a day or so. My room is a bomb shelter (as is required by Isreali law to be available in every apartment), so I don’t even have to get out of bed if there’s an alarm during the night!
However two of my cousins are in combat, have enlisted as resrves and will go into the Gaza strip if it’s invaded, so I’m worried for their safety.
In two word: Yes, exactly.
Israel’s strategy since the Hamas took the strip over in 2007 has been to try and contain it, and keeping it weak by periodic, limited confrontations (the so called Mowing the Lawn doctorine), and trying to economically develop the strip in order to give Hamas incentives to avoid confrontation. While Hamas grew stronger, the general feeling was that the strategy works and the last 15 years were not that bad.
I think the genral concensus in Israel right now is that Hamas proved this strategy does not work, and we have to re- occupy the strip and topple Hamas’s regime, then maybe try to establish a non- terrorist regime (maybe by some UN force or the Palestinial Authority). All that might not be possible. We’ll have to live and see.
I am surprised to read the bolded part! What actions have the Israeli government taken to develop Gaza, and did Gaza actually develop economically in that time? (That is not a rhetorical question—I know next to nothing about this.)
Looking quickly at some stats, real GDP per capita seems to have gone up a bit since 2007, but has declined since 2016, and its current figure ($5.6K in 2021) is lower than e.g., Angola, Bangladesh, and Venezuela.
Qualitatively, the blockade seems to have been net negative for Gaza’s economic development. NYT writes:
But that is a news report, so we should take it with a grain of salt.
Sorry it took me some time.
I agree with your asessment. I did say Israel tried to do that, but it’s a hard problem. I didn’t want to elaborate on this point in the original comment since it felt off topic, so here goes:
TL;DR: Blockade is the baseline from which we try to improve, since Hamas are genocidal terrorists and use any aid to military needs. Under that constraint Israel has supplied water, food, electricity, and tried to build more generators and let palestinians work within its borders.
Some links will be in hebrew, sorry in advance. I’ll only use major newpapers, wikipedia or large think tanks.
First of all the background assumption is that Israel is trying to improve the situation in the stip within the constraint “a genocidal terror organization is in reign, and they’ll abuse any aid”. The original raional behind the Separation in 2005 was to let the Palestinian Authority control a relatively large piece of land with a port. All that went to hell after Hamas won the democratic elections in 2006, then killed all other political parties in 2007. Since then work visas from Gaza to Israel were stopped, and the blockade started.
Concrete steps are, for instance:
Letting money donations from Qatar into the strip, which was used to pay Hamas officials and pay for social needs
Providing work permits for 15,000 palestinians in the last years, with hopes of giving more in time. There are 150,000 palestinians workers in Israel from the west bank, 10% of its workforce. Gaza could (and have, before Hamas) have similar proportions.
Provide basic human needs such as electricity, even though the Palestinians don’t actually pay for it.
It is not much. However, keep in mind that everything that entered the strip was used for military needs first, and civilian second: cement for bunkers and offensive tunnels, iron for rockets (couldn’t find a good link, but they’re produced locally and the iron comes from somewhere), and sandbags for bunkers. And that’s the stuff we actually let through, not the military equipment they are constantly smuggling inside, some in civilian guise.
In conclusion: It’s hard. There are no good solutions. We are trying. It’s not optimal, or even the best we could concievably do, but nothing ever is. We are trying to manage our own potential genociders, backed by popular support. It’s an impossible situation, and everyone suffers, but we’re triying to make it better than baseline.
“Economically develop” is only meaningful against some baseline. Israel has had policies that clearly massively harm Gaza’s development, and other policies that somewhat help it. There are also other factors Israel doesn’t control, which probably are a net positive; economies in general tend to develop over time.
So if the baseline is some past year, or if it’s the counterfactual situation with a blockade and no mitigating policies, there’s been development. But if it’s the counterfactual with no blockade and no mitigating policies, I’d guess not so much.
In other words: Israel’s “strategy” has included at least some things that in themselves help Gaza’s development, but Israel has still hurt its development overall / on net.
(I’m not an expert or an insider here.)
Maybe it is more helpful to speak in terms of subgoals: Israel try to achieve security. For that, it try to keep Hammas both quiet and weak. The externality of most ways that we keep them quiet is better life for Palestinians, and the opposite is true for making Hammas weak, with larger effect size.
(I believe most Israelis also care somewhat about Palestinians having better conditions as a terminal value—though probably not enough to effect policy, except for avoiding unnecessary harm. I don’t know from the inside about Palestinians attitude toward Israelis, but public information suggest that many of them wish us harm as a terminal value, even when in expense of other goals)
There are also many Israelies that don’t consider Plaestinians to be humans worth protecting, but rather as evil beings / outgroup / whatever you’d call that.
Also (with much less confidence), I do think many Palastinians want to kill Israelies because of things that I’d consider brainwashing.
Hard question—what to do about a huge population that’s been brainwashed like that (if my estimation here is correct), or how might a peaceful resolution look?
On 1, I agree that there are some Israelis that view them collectively as evil, and would harm them instrumentally without much thought. Hard to put numbers, but I guess that those are ~15% of the Jewish population. I don’t think that there is more that 1% that support direct violence against non-terrorists for its own sake (as opposed to “we really want to kill your arch-terrorist neighbor, and you happen to be there too, and we really can’t wait until you aren’t home”) even in a state of war. I don’t say my opinion about it, just that it is very different from the apparent Palestinian attitude.
On 2 I agree. It seem to be a general argument for judging people relative to their society, but this question is hard in the general case. As an anecdote, taking over the and contra-brain-washing the next generation was very successful in post-war west Germany. It is hard though, and probably work only under very specific conditions.
“I don’t think that there is more that 1% that support direct violence against non-terrorists for its own sake”: This seems definitely wrong to me, if you also count Israelies who consider everyone in Gaza as potential terrorists or something like that.
If you offer Israelies:
Button 1: Kill all of Hamas
Button 2: Kill all of Gaza
Then definitely more than 1% will choose Button 2
I’m not sure whether our disagreement comes from different perceptions of specific populations/parties in Israel, or from you writing about current positions while I meant to write about the positions before the attack. Today, I sadly agree that it is far more than 1%. I hope and expect that the change is mostly temporary, and hope that it will not bring us to do things that we will be too ashamed of in the meanwhile.
Why would you have less confidence that many Palestinians want to kill Israelis when the stated goal of their government is to wipe out all Jews? At least publicly, the Israeli government does not have a policy of wiping out all Arabs.
Government policy does not determine the views of the population.
Getting accurate views of what the Palestinian population thinks likely isn’t easy.
The government was democratically elected in 2006, so it’s not a bad indication.
Elections are complex and there are many reasons to prefer one politician over another.
Besides, according to Google, Gaza’s median age is 18. Most of the people who are currently living in Gaza were not able to vote back in 2006.
My main point here is that good information about the views is hard to access. The fact that you point to information that’s been out of date for more than a decade is a sign that good information is hard to access.
I agree. However I know that it’s widely accepted Hamas is enjoying popular support. I don’t have good public sources to support that statement, it follows from many little anecdotes over the years. A good example is that unlike widely unliked authoritarian regimes such as Belarus, they enjoyed very little protests over the years, and have managed to repeatedly rally people to their needs.
While it’s a defensible position from a “briefely googled this” point of view, I really don’t think people who have been following closely hold this position.
Hamas does provide social services. A short GPT4 summary is:
>Hamas, an Islamist Palestinian political and military organization, has a significant social welfare component. Since its establishment in 1987, Hamas has set up numerous social service institutions, clinics, schools, and other humanitarian agencies in the Palestinian territories, particularly the Gaza Strip. Here are some of the social services that Hamas provides or has provided:
>Education: Hamas has founded and operated schools, kindergartens, and colleges. The educational institutions not only provide basic education but also often include religious teachings and, in some cases, political indoctrination.
>Healthcare: Hamas operates a network of clinics and hospitals in Gaza. These institutions provide medical services ranging from basic healthcare to surgical procedures. During periods of conflict, these institutions have also treated individuals injured in the fighting.
>Charities: Hamas has established various charitable organizations that distribute aid to the needy, including food, clothing, and financial assistance.
>Orphanages and Youth Centers: Institutions have been set up to care for orphans and provide youth with various activities, training, and support.
>Mosques and Religious Classes: Hamas’s roots are in the Muslim Brotherhood, and it places significant emphasis on religious outreach and education. It has built and maintained mosques and offers religious classes.
>Rehabilitation and Special Needs Services: Some facilities have been set up to cater to individuals with disabilities and to help rehabilitate those affected by the ongoing conflict.
>Housing and Infrastructure: After conflicts or due to deteriorating living conditions, Hamas has sometimes been involved in housing projects or infrastructure repair, either directly or by supporting such projects.
>These social services have helped Hamas garner significant popular support among Palestinians, particularly in the Gaza Strip. By filling a void often left by a weak or absent central government, the organization has been able to cultivate loyalty and bolster its political and social standing. However, it’s worth noting that this support comes amidst controversy, as many countries and organizations label Hamas as a terrorist organization due to its military activities and attacks against Israel. Critics also argue that Hamas uses its social services as a means of gaining popular support and furthering its political objectives.
Given how poor Gaza is those services matter and even people who don’t support killing Israelis might support Hamas by because the main thing they care about are the social services.
Lack of protest can be a sign of people liking a regime, it can also be a sign that people are afraid to protest because that has personal consequences for them. Acts like running a Youth Center help with letting the Youth Center organize support rallies.
The fact that Gaza has this repressive environment is one of the reasons it’s harder to know what people actually think.
Yes. Then again, eventfull 17 years passed and minds could change (I don’t think it happened to be honest)
I really doubt that. The Hamas generally enjoys popular support, AFAIK (no good public source).
I really doubt that. The Hamas generally enjoys popular support, AFAIK (no good public source).
On #2, my personal view is that Israel has as much of an end-game strategy in Gaza as the US did after 9/11 invading Afghanistan—essentially none, but so much public pressure to overreact that they will go in and try to take over anyways.